Shareholders' wealth effects of corporate takeovers in the UK by Zhao, Huainan
Durham E-Theses
Shareholders’ wealth effects of corporate takeovers in
the UK
Zhao, Huainan
How to cite:
Zhao, Huainan (2002) Shareholders’ wealth effects of corporate takeovers in the UK. Doctoral thesis,
Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1063/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
University 
of Durham 
Department of Economics &- Finance 
Shareholders' Wealth Effects of Corporate Takeovers in the UK 
By Huainan Zhao 
Principle Supervisor: PrA A. Antoniou/ProL K. Paudyal 
Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Finance 
APR 40f. " 
September 2002 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
frnm. it --,. hould 
be acknowledged. 
To Xiaorong 
Shareholders' Wealth Effects of Corporate Takeovers in the UK 
By Huainan Zhao 
Abstract 
This thesis investigates many issues regarding the financial performance of corporate 
takeovers. Firstly, we test the validity of the control firms approach (advanced by 
Barber and Lyon 1997) in the countries such as UK where the listed firms have 
various accounting year endings through examining target and bidding firms' long- 
run stock returns both before and after takeovers. We find that the differences of the 
accounting year endings of UK firms do not significantly affect the validity of Barber 
and Lyon's control firms approach. Secondly, we investigate the long-run post 
acquisition underperformance puzzle, test the impact of overlapping returns to the 
conventional t-statistics, and also examine the effect of takeover premiums, methods 
of payment to the shareholders' long-run stock returns. We do not find any 
statistically significant three-year post acquisition abnormal stock returns for the UK 
bidding firms in the 1990s, which is consistent with the EMH. We do find that 
overlapping returns inflate the test statistics through inflating the long-run post 
acquisition average stock returns. Furthermore, we find an optimal premium region 
for the bidding firms and reject the overpricing explanation to the post acquisition 
underperformance puzzle. Moreover, we report that stock offer underperforms the 
other three methods of payment in two years after the takeover. Finally, we test the 
monitoring role of institutional funds through a new framework of corporate takeover 
by examining and comparing bidding firms' (with large level of institutional funds 
ownership or with low or without this ownership) three-year pre- and post takeover 
stock returns. We do not find any evidence in supporting the monitoring role of 
institutional funds both in three years pre- and post acquisition period, and even some 
evidence against it has been detected. Put together, we cast our doubt on the 
monitoring role of institutional funds to the firms in which they hold large stakes. 
The material contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree in 
this or any other University. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without his prior consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions is one of the most researched areas in finance. It first became a 
topic of public policy debate during the greater merger waves in the U. K. and the U. S. 
at the end of the I 9th century. Most research on the financial perfon-nance of mergers 
and acquisition has focused on stock returns surrounding the takeover announcement 
dates. Virtually all researchers have reported large significant positive average abnormal 
returns to target firms, a result that is not surprising given the significant premiums 
typically offered by the bidding firms. Conversely, these researchers have found small 
abnormal returns to bidding firms over the announcement period. In fact, while some 
papers have reported significant small positive performance, quite a few others have 
found either zero performance or even negative performance to the bidding firms at the 
time around the takeover announcement. 
Parallel to the research on announcement period returns, a smaller body of work has 
investigated long-run post acquisition stock returns of bidding firms. Researcher often 
pay little attention to the results on long-run stock returns, perhaps because the strong 
belief in market efficiency indicated what the results should be. However, a large 
number of previous papers reported significant negative long-run post acquisition 
abnormal stock returns to the successful bidding firms, and why merged companies on 
average suffer significant wealth loss is still an anomaly to us. As Jensen and Ruback 
(1983, p. 20) writes: "These post-outcome negative abnormal returns are unsettling 
because they are inconsistent with market efficiency and suggest that changes in stock 
prices overestimate the future efficiency gains from mergers. " 
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In Chapter 2, we provide a comprehensive review of these previous studies on mergers 
and acquisitions, especially the shareholders' wealth effects of corporate takeovers. We 
firstly review some key issues in the M&A literature, such as motives for takeoversq 
the impact of methods of payment to the shareholders' returns, and the size effect to the 
long-run stock returns of corporate takeovers. Secondly, We turn to review a few key 
papers of the past three decades that contribute a lot to the development of the M&A 
literature. This provides us a clear picture regarding the evolution of studies in the 
corporate takeovers. Thirdly, we critically analyze the stock retums of both target and 
bidding firms in the entire acquisition process (i. e., from several years prior to the 
takeover announcement to a few years after the completion of the takeover). Finally, we 
present a detailed review of the methodologies applied in these previous studies. In a 
word, Chapter 2 provides readers a broad view of the studies in M&A, and helps them 
to the further understanding of the following empirical chapters. 
As mentioned above and concluded from Chapter 2, why bidding firms suffer a 
statistically significant negative abnormal returns in several years after the completion 
of takeover is still a puzzle to us. One primary explanation for this anomaly is that the 
phenomena are caused by methodological errors in calculating and interpreting the 
long-run stock returns. These errors may arise through choice of inappropriate control 
models and also the use of inappropriate test statistics. Indeed, the application of test 
statistics that reflect the non-normal properties of distributions of long-run returns do 
reduce the significance of results based on parametric tests. 
Attempts to provide what are deemed to be more appropriate models have been made in 
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recent papers by Franks, Harris and Titman (1991), Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker 
(1992), and Rau and Vennaelen (1998) by using US data; and Gregory (1997) by using 
UK data. In addition to potential errors arising from the inappropriate choice of control 
models, a number of researchers have most recently pointed out that the process used in 
the calculation of long-run stock returns is itself biased. 
Recent papers by Kothari and Warner (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997) address 
biases in long-horizon event studies. Both document that for randomly chosen finns, the 
traditional Mest of abnormal performance is misspecified and indicates abnormal 
perfon-nance too frequently. Kothari and Warner (1997) examine a variety of abnormal 
return models, i. e., Market-Adjusted Model, Market Model, CAPM, and the Fama- 
French three-factor Model. They find that all four models are severely misspecified 
regardless the use of CARs or BHARs, (all four models significantly over-reject the null 
hypothesis), and the degree of misspecification is not highly sensitive to the models 
applied. Based on these findings, Kothari and Warner argue that parametric long- 
horizon tests will often indicate abnormal performance when none is present, thus the 
interpretation of long-horizon tests requires extreme caution. 
Barber and Lyon (1997) in an independent simulation study argue that many of the 
common methods used to calculate long-run abnormal stock returns are flawed and lead 
to biased test statistics. They evaluate three approaches for detecting the long-run 
abnormal stock returns, i. e., Reference Portfolio Approach, Control Firms Approach, 
and Farna-French three-factor Model. Barber and Lyon argue that using Reference 
Portfolio Approach (size portfolios, book-to-market portfolios, size/book-to-market 
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portfolios, and equally-weighted market index) and the Fama-French three-factor Model 
to calculate long-run abnormal returns yield mis-specified test statistics (empirical 
rejection rates exceed theoretical rejection rates). Barber and Lyon point out that 
misspecification arises from three possible biases: the new listing bias, the rebalancing 
bias, and the skewness bias. The new listing bias arises because sample firms usually 
have a long pre-event return record, whereas the benchmark portfolio includes firms 
that have only recently begun trading and are known to have abnormally low returns 
(Ritter (1991)). The rebalancing bias arises because the compounded return on the 
benchmark portfolio implicitly assumes periodic rebalancing of the portfolio weights, 
whereas the sample firm returns are compounded without rebalancing. The skewness 
bias refers to the fact that with a skewed-right distribution of abnonnal returns, the 
student t-distribution is asymmetric with a mean smaller than the zero null. They 
advocate that a more appropriate approach would be a comparison of buy-and-hold 
returns with an appropriate firm matched on size and book-to-market ratios. 
Barber and Lyon (1997) find that the Control Firm Approach yields well-specified test 
statistics in virtually all-sampling situations they considered. They argue that this 
control firms approach yields well-specified test statistics because it alleviates the new 
listing bias (since both the sample firm and control firm must be listed in the identified 
event month), the rebalancing bias (since both the sample firm and control firm returns 
are calculated without rebalancing), and skewness biases (since the sample firm and 
control firyn are equally likely to experience large positive returns). 
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In a following up paper, Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) find that using size/book-to- 
market control firrns approach yields well-specified test statistic for the conventional t- 
statistic in all random samples. They also find that in random samples the control firm 
approach yields well-specified test statistics either for using CARs or BHARs to 
calculate the abnormal returns. We discuss in details about these methodological issues 
in Chapter 3. 
We construct Chapter 3 as our methodological chapter; it presents all the methodologies 
that we are going to apply in this thesis. In this chapter, we firstly discuss and analyze 
the misspecification problems associated with previous methodologies in detecting the 
long-run abnonnal stock returns. We then introduce the control firms approach 
advanced by Barber and Lyon (1997). Since the control firms approach minimizes the 
chances that the test statistics are misspecified, we set this approach as our main method 
to calculate the CARs and the BHARs in the following empirical chapters. In addition 
to the control firms approach, we also present the Fama-French three-factor model as an 
alternative to calculate the CARs. Finally, Chapter 3 describes both the conventional 
parametric t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test; both of them will 
be used as the test statistics throughout the following empirical chapters. 
According to the discussions above, the control firms approach have so far seemed as a 
very promising way in the studies of detecting long-run abnormal stock returns. 
However, the control firms approach advanced by Barber and Lyon (1997) may not be 
without questions while applying to the out-of-sample studies. In their approach, Barber 
and Lyon use June of year t to find the market value (size), and December of year t-I to 
calculate the book-to-market ratio. The use of December to calculate the book-to-market 
ratio is because that US firms have the same fiscal year ending in December. Thus, it is 
reasonable and convenient to calculate the book-to-market ratio at the same accounting 
year ending, i. e., December. However, the accounting year endings of UK firms are 
different months across the whole year, if we introduce the same approach into UK, we 
are not able to calculate the book-to-market ratios at the accounting year ending for 
most of the firms. Due to UK firms accounting year endings vary from January to 
December; the Barber and Lyon's control firms approach will not be exactly the same 
when we apply it in the UK. But, how should we apply it in the UK? 
In Chapter 4, we empirically test the validity of Barber and Lyon's control firms 
approach under various accounting year endings. We apply both CAR and BHAR to 
calculate the long-run abnormal stock returns for both target and bidding firms under 
two different ways. First, we follow Barber and Lyon (1997) by calculating the book-to- 
market ratio at December of year t- I and size at June of year t by ignoring the difference 
of the accounting year endings of UK finns, we call it as the control finns approach 
under the December-June model. Second, we calculate the book-to-market ratios at 
different months according to sample firms accounting year endings and find their size 
in six month after, we name it as the control firms approach under Various-Accounting- 
Year-Ending model. Finally, we test whether the long-run abnormal stock returns 
calculated under these two approaches are significantly different, and hence to test 
whether Barber and Lyon (1997)'s control firms approach can be directly applied in the 
countries, such as UK, where their firms do not have the same accounting year endings. 
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We have so far discussed one possible explanation to the post acquisition 
underperformance puzzle, i. e., the methodological errors; the other possible 
interpretation to the long-run significant negative post acquisition stock returns is that it 
represents a delayed market reaction to overpriced takeovers. That is bidding firms 
might have overvalued and paid too much premiums to the targets that leads to a 
delayed correction in their post acquisition period. There are two common reasons about 
it. One is that bidding firms might overestimate the value of the targets and have paid a 
higher price than their true values. The other is that managers of bidding companies 
might be too optimistic to think that they could improve the performance of the 
acquired firms sufficiently to recoup the higher premiums they paid for them. Is this the 
case that leads to bidding firms post acquisition underperformance? 
Furthermore, apart from the explanations for the post acquisition underperformance 
anomaly, previous studies have consistently reported that bidding firms shareholder 
returns are methods of payment dependent. Almost all these papers have reported that 
cash financed bidding firms consistently outperform the equity financed bidding firms. 
However, these studies have only concentrated on two kinds of methods of payment, the 
cash offer and the stock offer; few papers have investigated the other two alternative 
ways: alternative offer and combined offer. Alternative offer means that bidding firms 
deliver a choice to the targets, target firm shareholders can either choose a full cash 
offer or a ftill equity offer, it all depends on the preference of target firms' shareholders. 
Combined offer means that the payment terms are neither pure stock nor pure cash; both 
stock and cash are jointly used. Thus, the alternative and combined offer should not be 
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ignored in the empirical studies; the impact of all four kinds of methods of payment 
should be examined. 
Moreover, based on the work of Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner 
(1997), Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) conclude that misspecification of test statistics 
can be traced to (1) the new listing bias, (2) the rebalancing bias, (3) the skewness bias, 
(4) cross-sectional dependence, and (5) a bad model of asset pricing. 
The control firms approach advanced by Barber and Lyon (1997) can not only avoid 
using a bad asset price model, but also eliminates the new listing, the rebalancing, and 
skewness biases. Thus the only problem left to the control firms approach is the cross- 
sectional dependence in sample observations. Cross-sectional dependence inflates test 
statistics because the number of sample firms overstates the number of independent 
observations. Two extreme sample situations of the problem of cross-sectional 
dependence are: 
Calendar clustering. It is reasonable to assume that the contemporaneous returns of 
firms are more likely to be cross-sectionally related than returns from different periods. 
If true, the problem of cross-sectional dependence will be most severe when all sample 
firms share the same event date. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) find that the control 
firms approach control well for calendar clustering of event dates. 
Overlapping return calculation. A common problem in event studies that analyse long- 
run abnormal returns is overlapping periods of return calculation for the same firm. 
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Because these returns share several months of overlapping returns. This is the most 
severe form of cross-sectional dependence in the event study of long-run abnonnal 
returns. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) find that the lack of independence generated by 
overlapping returns yields misspecified test statistics, and suggest the only solution to 
this problem is to remove the sample of observations of overlapping returns. 
As we know most of bidding firms have different takeover event dates, they of course 
do not share the same event date, this makes the calendar clustering little problem for 
the takeover studies. Thus, the most severe problem is the overlapping return 
calculations. Previous studies have failed to take the overlapping returns problem into 
account; however, we argue that this is a severe problem and demands full attention. 
In Chapter 5, we fully investigate the two explanations regarding the post acquisition 
underperfon-nance puzzle. We apply the control firms approach to eliminate the 
observed methodology problems, and we also use the Fama-French three-factor model 
as an alternative to test whether the previous reported anomaly is due to the 
methodological errors. We then turn to examine the impact of takeover premiums to the 
bidding firms long-run post acquisition stock returns, and intend to answer the question 
whether the underperformance is due to a delayed market reaction to overpriced 
takeovers. We also examine the impact of methods of payment to shareholders returns 
based on all four kinds of takeover financing methods, and it would be a complete 
investigation on this topic. Finally, we take the overlapping returns problem into full 
account throughout the whole investigation process, and intend to find out whether 
overlapping returns do lead to a misspecified test statistics. 
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Finally, we are going to examine the monitoring role of institutional funds through a 
brand new framework of long-run stock returns of corporate takeovers. Institutional 
funds have become increasingly prominent in the UK over the past two decades. In 
1999, institutions held Pounds 2,477bn of funds, nearly three times the 1990 total, and 
accounted for over 85% of total identified funds under management. In the UK, a 
substantial proportion of institutional funds are invested in equity. As a result, 
institutional investors account for a large proportion of shares in the UK than in most 
industrialized countries, nearly 60% in 1999 (IFSL 2001). UK institutional funds have 
traditionally favoured investment in equity since the 1960s, given the generally good 
long-term returns reflecting the higher growth of equity markets relative to other asset 
classes. 
Being the largest shareholder in the UK, institutional funds are expected to play a 
significant role in the corporate governance and that may well enhance corporate 
efficiency. However, the issue of involvement of institutional funds in the running of 
companies is controversial. There are two main hypotheses regarding this issue. One is 
the "active monitoring hypothesis". Institutional funds hold substantial stakes in 
individual companies. The size of these stakes renders them particularly sensitive to the 
performance of firms in their portfolios, and provides them powerful incentives to 
monitor firm management, ensuring that managers choose investment strategies to 
maximize long-run value rather than to meet short-term earnings goals. This vigilant 
institutional monitoring enhances managerial efficiency and the quality of corporate 
decision making. Such institutional monitoring may involve holding discussion with 
management on corporate plans and performance, supporting (opposing) the 
16 
management's wealth enhancing (reducing) policies and decisions, and active 
participating in board elections and other voting issues. 
However, on the other hand, it is well argued that institutional funds are incapable to 
monitor corporations due to their passivity, myopic goals, legal constraints and conflict 
of interests. Some argue that institutional funds are passive investors who are more 
likely to sell their holdings in poorly performing finns than to expand their resources in 
monitoring and improving their performance. It is further argued that institutional funds 
are short-termists, because fund managers are under considerable pressures from their 
clients to perform. For instance, nearly all of the pension schemes set target for their 
fund managers, it is commonly to beat one specific benchmark by one or two percent. 
Moreover, many funds are also concerned that they might incur some legal liability if 
they take on active roles. There is also free-rider problem associated with institutional 
ftinds activism or monitoring. This problem arises because small and passive 
shareholders realize the benefits of monitoring done by large institutions but they incur 
none of the costs. Thus monitoring will be possible only when the monitoring is 
sufficient to cover all the associated monitoring costs. In addition to that, institutional 
funds themselves may be subject to agency problems, because the vast majority of 
funds are externally managed by fund managers (in 2000, self-managed pension funds 
accounted for around only 2% of total identified UK funds under management, IFSL 
2001), there are possible conflicts of interests between the private and institutional 
clients and the fund managers. Thus they either always vote with management or sell 
their shares to avoid voting. This is referred to as the "passive voting hypothesis" - 
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In summary, previous studies have provided us contradictory evidence on the 
monitoring issue. These mixed results make us difficult to judge the monitoring role of 
institutional funds. If we can find a new approach to examine these two controversial 
hypotheses, it will create and add fresh evidence on the existing findings. Thus, we 
believe that the testing of these hypotheses under a different framework is called for. 
In Chapter 6, we will test the active monitoring and passive voting hypotheses through 
the corporate takeover markets by examining the bidding firms' (with large level of 
institutional ownership or with low or without this ownership, say 3%) long-run stock 
returns. It is long argued that institutional funds are finance professionals with expertise 
in the area of investment management, if they are indeed monitoring corporations, then 
takeovers undertaken by bidding firms with high level of institutional funds ownership 
may be expected to be more wealth enhancing (higher stock returns) than those with 
low or without institutional funds ownership. 
Finally, this thesis concludes with Chapter 7, where the empirical findings of the 
previous chapters are summarized and also with some suggestions for the topics that 
demands further investigation. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1. Merger and Acquisition Theories 
2.1.1. Definition 
Globe merger and acquisition activities have experienced their largest and busiest 
period in the 1990s. The daily newspapers are filled with a series of case studies of 
mergers and acquisitions. The value of mergers and acquisitions worldwide picked up 
again from 1991 and followed a clear and strong increase thereafter. The globe value of 
mergers and acquisitions notched up $3.5 trillion record in 2000, up from $3.3 trillion in 
1999 (Acquisition Monthly 2001). Apart from the unresolved puzzles in the past 
decades, mergers and acquisitions today raise many new issues that needed to be 
explored. However, first of all, we will review some fundamentals of merger and 
acquisition theories. 
Acquisitions are investment decisions by acquiring firms. The expected benefits of 
acquisitions are the incremental cash flows generated by the combination of the 
previously independent firms or by the achievement of control over the operations of 
acquired firms. The overall cost of this investment decision is equal to the search and 
negotiating costs plus the actual amount paid or the equivalent amount of the securities 
issued to the shareholders of the target finn. 
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2.1.2. Mode ofAcquisitions 
Mergers are one form of corporate acquisitions. Merger is an agreement to combine two 
or more corporations under procedures established by the state of incorporation of each 
of the participating finns. These state regulations typically require a favorable vote by at 
least two-thirds of the target shareholders in general meeting and all shareholders are 
bound if the required vote is obtained. Furthermore, the merger proposal must be 
approved by the board of directors of the target finn who then puts the proposal to 
stockholders vote. In effect, the board has the power to veto all merger proposals and 
can refuse to put any proposal to stockholder vote. The subsequent of the veto power of 
incumbent management is that merger proposals become discretionary decisions 
delegated to management by stockholders. Stockholders must vote to approve or reject 
any merger proposals that the incumbent management recommend but do not get an 
opportunity to approve merger proposals that management reject. 
An alternative forni of corporate acquisition is a tender offer. A tender offer is a cash or 
stock bid by one company (the bidder) for a block of another (the target) company's 
outstanding common stock. The stockholders accept the offer by tendering their shares, 
and those not tendering retain their ownership claims to the target firm. A successful 
tender offer is frequently followed by a merger proposal. However, tender offers do not 
involve the veto power of incumbent management. The decision to accept or reject the 
offer is made by each individual shareholder and the success or failure of the offer 
depends upon the proportion (normally two-thirds or more) of shareholders tendering 
their shares. 
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2.2. Motives for Takeovers 
2.2.1. Value Maximization 
One general motive for takeovers is value maximization motivations in which the 
acquisition should meet the same criteria as any other investment decision. Thus there 
should be a positive expected economic gain from the acquisition and depending on the 
competitiveness of the acquisitions market, some proportion of the economic gain will 
accrue to the target firm's shareholders. Regardless of this state of competition, the 
acquiring firm should at least earn a normal rate of return. 
2.2.1.1. Financial Motivation 
There are a number of acquisition motivations that are consistent with the goal of value 
maximization. The first is financial motivation. One argument presented is that an 
acquisition permits a redeployment of excess cash held either by the acquiring firm or 
the target firm. Another argument is that the diversification benefits provided by an 
acquisition can reduce the probability of default thereby reducing expected bankruptcy 
costs and increasing the debt capacity of the new entity. The idea of the co-insurance 
effect is first advanced by Lewellen (1971). He argues that the combinations of two or 
more firms whose eaming streams were less perfectly correlated would reduce the risk 
of default of the merged firms and therefore increase the debt capacity of the combined 
firms. Furthermore, the use of underutilized tax shields and other types of tax 
advantages are also included in the financial motivation. All of these influences would 
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increase the market value of the equity after the acquisition relative to the sum of the 
market values prior to the takeover. 
2.2.1.2. Synergy 
Another set of economic motivations is captured by the term synergy in which the 
acquisition results in an increase in the expected cash flow over their sum as 
independent firms. These gains can occur from economies of scale for horizontal 
mergers, vertical integration, adoption of more efficient production or organizational 
technology, excess capacity in some factors of production such as managerial or 
financial control, or economies of scope which generate cost advantages when output is 
increased by the post-acquisition entity not in one product but in a vector of products. In 
sum, the gains in synergistic takeovers are generated by efficiencies that result from 
combining the physical operations of the bidder and target firm. 
Asquith (1983) finds that target firms have unique resources that provide synergy when 
combined across firms. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) suggest that a permanent 
positive revaluation of the unsuccessful target shares requires the target resources be 
combined with those of an acquiring fin-n. That is, the gains to the stockholders of 
unsuccessful targets stem from the anticipation of a future successful acquisition and 
not simply from the revaluation of new information regarding the true value of the 
target resources. Thus, they conclude that the synergy hypothesis is more consistent 
with the evidence than the information hypothesis. 
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Dennis and McConnell (1986) find that mergers, on average, are value-creating 
activities for combined bidding and target firms. This result is consistent with the 
synergy hypothesis of mergers. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) investigate a nearly 
exhausted sample of successful tender offers between 1963 and 1984. They find that the 
average synergistic gain of the sample is 117 million dollars, and that represents a 7.4% 
increase in the combined wealth of the shareholders of the target and acquiring firms. 
This is once again consistent with the synergy hypothesis. Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993) study the motives for corporate takeovers, their evidence indicates that synergy 
is the primary motive in value maximization acquisitions. 
2.2.1.3. Information 
Another motivation is an attempt by the acquiring firm management to take advantage 
of asymmetric information. This information hypothesis postulates that the acquiring 
firm has information concerning the target firm that is not available to other participants 
in the market and is not reflected in the current share price of the target firm. There are 
two forms of this information hypothesis. First, the information may be that the target 
shares are undervalued based on publicly available information. The second argues 
there are more efficient operating strategies that could be used by the target's 
management and if the existing management knew these strategies they could become 
more efficient and the stock price would increase. 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) find shareholders of unsuccessful target firms earn large 
positive abnormal returns in the event month and normal returns thereafter. This 
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evidence is consistent with the information hypothesis and inconsistent with the synergy 
hypothesis. Since the information hypothesis predicts positive returns for unsuccessful 
targets as the information of future potential gains from elimination of the source of the 
inefficiency is revealed by the tender offer, and the synergy hypothesis predicts negative 
performance for the unsuccessful offer. 
2.2.1.4. Competitions in Corporation Control 
Another takeover motivation is based on the attempt by acquiring finns to obtain 
control of targets. In its most general form the acquiring firm desires control to replace 
an incompetent management or to force existing management to follow a profit 
maximizing strategy. Under either situation it is expected that the shareholders of target 
firms would be earning below normal returns in some period preceding the acquisition. 
Mandelker (1974) investigates the market for acquisitions and the impact of mergers to 
stockholders of participating finns. The evidence for the acquired finns is consistent 
with the hypothesis that mergers act as a mechanism by which the market system 
replaces incompetent management. Jensen and Ruback (1983) conduct a comprehensive 
survey on the market for corporate control. They conclude that corporate takeovers 
create positive gains. Target firm shareholders benefit, and bidding firm shareholders do 
not loss. They point out that the market for corporate control is best viewed as an arena 
in which managerial teams compete for the right to manage corporate resources. 
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Martin and McConnell (199 1) examine the hypothesis that corporate takeovers act as an 
important role to discipline the top managers of poorly performing target firms. Their 
I findings indicate that corporate takeovers played an important role in controlling the 
non-value maximizing behavior of top corporate managers. This finding is consistent 
with the competition for corporate control hypothesis. Kennedy and Limmack (1996) 
investigate the CEO turnover in the acquisition activities. They compare the CEO 
turnover rate from five years prior to the bid announcement date to two years after the 
completion date. The result reveals a significant rate in CEO turnovers in the two years 
after the takeover and target companies that change their CEO in the two years after the 
bid experience lower returns before the takeover than other targets. This evidence once 
again provides the support for the hypothesis that takeovers result in the replacement of 
inefficient management. 
2.2.2. Non-value Maximization 
Acquisitions are attempts to maximize growth in sales or assets or to control a large 
empire. Acquisitions of this type have no economic gains to be divided among the 
corporations and given the costs of negotiating and the potential problems of 
coordination of the expanding corporate empire, it is likely that there would be an 
overall economic loss. Thus, any positive gains obtained by the target shareholders 
would be offset by a loss to the bidding firm's shareholders. 
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2.2.2.1. Agency Motive - Size Maximization 
This theory holds that beyond achieving a certain satisfactory level of profits, 
incumbent managers will attempt to maximize their own self-interests, and these do not 
necessarily correspond to maximizing shareholder wealth. Management self-interests 
are likely to include the factors such as reducing the risk of losing their jobs, increasing 
their salary levels, and increasing their power and job satisfaction. These self-interests 
can be aided by growth in size, and takeovers are the quick way of growing. 
In previous studies, Newbould (1970) and Singh (1975) find that the percentage chance 
of small firms being taken over is greater than that of large firms. Firth (1980) carries 
out a regression analysis to examine whether the percentage increase in management 
remuneration is associated with the percentage growth in assets of the acquiring firm. 
His finding indicates that the larger the increase in the finn's assets, the greater the 
increase in directors' remuneration. Furthermore, while takeovers have resulted in loss 
to shareholders, they have result in monetary benefits to directors. 
Malatesta (1983) shows that acquiring firm shareholders suffer significant wealth loss 
both immediately before and well before a merger. Based on this result, he point out 
that merger is a negative net present value project for acquiring firms, and this result 
appear to support the non-value maximizing hypothesis. Berkovitch and 
Narayanan 
(1993) investigate the motives for corporate takeovers, they find that agency 
is the 
primary motive for non-value maximization takeovers. 
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2.2.3. Summary 
Many of these hypotheses reviewed in this section appear to be reasonable explanations 
of merger and tender offer activities. However, a number of these hypotheses have 
similar implications for the impact of acquisitions on security prices of affected firms. 
Thus, it may be quite difficult to distinguish among these competitive hypotheses. 
Perhaps the best for us is to identify whether the value or non-value maximizing 
behavior is the dominant explanation. 
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2.3. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis with respect to Information on 
Acquisitions 
2.3.1. Definition 
An efficient market is defined as one in which a share price fully incorporates all 
available information on that security and that share prices provide accurate signals for 
optimal resource allocation. Further, any new items of information are speedily 
incorporated in the share price and in an unbiased manner. In a word, the efficient 
capital market hypothesis says that stock prices adjust instantaneously to new 
information and provide unbiased signals for efficient resource allocation. Hence, the 
efficient market theory states that the price of a security at any time is correct and 
represents the combined best judgment of the economic value of the share. 
If the capital market is efficient with respect to the acquisition, then any information 
about the acquisition should be incorporated instantaneously into the corresponding 
stock prices, the stock prices will then correctly reflect any economic gains or losses of 
the acquisition. Thus the efficient capital market hypothesis states that the stock market 
reacts efficiently to information about the acquisition activity. Assuming an efficient 
market, we can measure the movement of share prices around the time of the takeover 
event, and this provides us the economic impact of that event and gives a direct measure 
of the increase or decrease in shareholders wealth. 
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2.3.2. Studies Review 
Mandelker (1974) find that anticipatory price movements preceding the effective date of 
a merger exhaust all valuable information in mergers. Thus, the stock prices of the 
participating firms at the time of the merger already reflect all economic gains expected 
from the acquisition. Franks, Broyles and Hecht (1977) find that capital market prices 
fully reflect relevant information of acquisitions. Langetieg (1978) reports that the 
evidence regarding the post-merger abnormal returns is consistent with the efficient 
capital market hypothesis. Firth (1979) applies an efficient market framework to 
examine te profitability of takeovers. His finding shows that the stock market is 
efficient with respect to reacting to takeover information. 
As we know, in an efficient capital market, increases in the probability of merger should 
cause prices of target firms to adjust in one direction and decreases in the probability of 
merger should cause prices of target firms to adjust in the opposite direction. Asquith 
(1983) finds that target firm returns exhibit precisely this pattern and the evidence of the 
excess returns for bidding firms is also consistent with the hypothesis that the market 
efficiently evaluates uncertainty. 
29 
2.4. The Competitive Acquisition Market Hypothesis 
2.4.1. Definition 
In a perfectly competitive market, competition will equate the expected rates of return 
on assets of similar risk. If the acquisition market offers higher expected returns than 
equivalent activities of similar risk, more resources will be directed to this activity until 
expected rates of return are reduced to a competitive level. In a competitive acquisition 
market, competition among potential acquiring firms will raise the price of the target 
finns; consequently, the acquiring firms should earn a non-nal rate of return. 
2.4.2. Studies Review 
Mandelker (1974) tests the competition in the acquisition market. His findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the acquiring firms operate in a perfectly competitive 
acquisition market, in that the prices they pay for the acquired firms' stocks enable their 
stockholders to earn normal returns on the acquisitions, i. e., they earn a rate of return 
equal to other investment-production activities of similar risk. Franks, Broyles and 
Hecht (1977) find evidence that is consistent with the perfectly competitive acquisition 
market hypothesis that the value of all expected net benefits from a merger are paid to 
the acquired firm shareholders. Asquith (1983) argues that the lack of significant 
positive abnormal performance on average for bidding firms was consistent with perfect 
competition in the acquisition market. 
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In Ruback (1983) study of assessing competition in the market for corporate 
acquisitions, he defines that competition in the acquisition market is characterized in 
terms of gains that accrue to potential bidding firms: in a competitive acquisition market 
the stock price of the target firm rises until the acquisition is a negative net present value 
investment for all unsuccessful bidders. Ruback also point out that Mandelker and 
Asquith's tests are not a direct test of competition in the acquisition market since the 
potential gains to unsuccessful bidders are not examined. Mandelker (1974) and 
Asquith (1983) studies do not testify that the successful offer price exhaust the potential 
gains for unsuccessful bidders. The results of Ruback (1983) are consistent with the 
competitive acquisition market hypothesis; the successful offer price, on average, 
exhausts the potential gains for unsuccessful bidders. 
Travlos (1987) argue that the lack of statistically significant positive abnormal returns 
to the bidding firms is consistent with the hypothesis that a competitive markets for 
corporate control forces the bidding firms to pay the target firin stockholders a fair price 
for any shares they obtain from the acquisition. 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) provide an empirical analysis of competitions among 
bidding firms for control of the target firms. Their evidence indicates that competitions 
increase the returns to target firms and decease the returns to acquiring firms. They find 
that competitions reduce the bidding firm shareholders returns to a level that is not 
significantly different from zero. This finding once again gives support to the 
competitive acquisition market hypothesis. 
31 
2.5. Method of Payment 
2.5.1. Definition 
In early studies of mergers and acquisitions, especially prior to 1983, there is little effort 
to be made to explore the role played by the method of payment in the acquisition. 
However, we think it is possible that takeovers consummated by different types of 
payments stem from quite different motives and hence that firms acquired by different 
forms of payment have quite different financial characteristics. Thus, shareholders 
returns of participating firms may differ from different methods of payment. 
Previous studies show that there has been steady increasing in the cash payment as 
opposed to security exchanges as a means of financing takeovers since 1970s. A 
number of reasons have been suggested for the increased use of cash as a means of 
financing takeovers. In the 1960s, many mergers were consummated with convertible 
bonds. The interest payments on such convertible bonds were tax deductible. However, 
interest payments on convertible debt issued for acquisitions have not been allowed as 
tax-deductible expenses since 1969, thus reducing their desirability as a means of 
financing takeovers. 
Other possible explanations for the increased use of cash rest on market imperfections 
or agency considerations. It was often alleged that in the 1960s acquired firm 
shareholders did not understand the true value of convertible securities used as payment 
in mergers, since there was no requirement that earning figures be reported to reflect the 
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diluting effect upon conversion. Whether such market inefficiency existed then or not, 
accounting regulations now requires that earnings per share must be reported on a fully 
diluted basis adjusting for potential conversion. 
Another factor that may contribute to the increased use of cash is the increase in the 
number of hostile takeovers. Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) argue that in stock offers 
a bidding firm must obtain approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) before target shareholders begin to tender their shares. This process could take 
several months. In contrast, a bidding firm paying cash could start to acquire target 
shares within several weeks. Thus, cash offers facilitate speedy acquisition transactions. 
Faster transactions could be crucial for the success of a hostile offer. Longer processing 
time for a stock offer gives target management more opportunity to implement a 
defense. Additional bidders favored by target management also could be induced to join 
the competition. For example, target management can selectively reveal inside 
information about the target firm's value to preferred bidders. This information may 
result in an upward revision of cash flow estimates or reduction in uncertainty faced by 
such bidders. As a result favored bidders could offer higher premiums. Consequently, 
hostile stock offers may have a lower probability of success than those for cash. 
Finally, the increased use of cash may be further understood by looking at current 
differences between the taxes and accounting consequences of cash and security 
payments. Acquisitions can be treated as a pooling for accounting purposes and as a tax- 
deferred transaction if there is a continuity of ownership on the part of the shareholders 
of the acquired firm. An acquisition of one company by another may 
be ruled either 
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taxable or tax-free. The method of payment used in acquisitions is directly related to 
whether a takeover is ruled as taxable or tax-free. Generally speaking, a tax-free 
acquisition can result only if the owners of the acquired firm maintain a continuity of 
ownership after the takeover. As a result, acquisitions consummated by a cash payment 
would necessarily be taxable; an exchange of securities on the other hand would result 
in a tax-free takeover. There are two methods for accounting for an acquisition: 
purchase and pooling. Cash takeovers will be taxable acquisitions accounted for as 
purchases. Security exchanges, on the other hand, will be tax-free acquisitions that can 
be treated for accounting purposes as pooling of interest. 
In viewing different methods of payments employed to finance corporate acquisitions, it 
is reasonable to argue that these differences may lead to a different valuation effect to 
the participating firms' common stock prices. First, in a world of asymmetric 
information, the method of payment may signal valuable information to the market. If 
the bidding firms' managers possess information about the intrinsic value of their firms, 
independent of the acquisition, which is not fully reflected in the pre-acquisition stock 
price, they will finance the takeover in the most profitable way for the existing 
stockholders. In the context of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model, the managers will 
prefer cash offers if they believe that their firms are undervalued, while a common stock 
exchange offer will be preferred in the opposite case. Accordingly, the market 
participants interpret a cash offer as good news and a common stock exchange offer as 
bad news about the bidding firm's true value. Furthermore, cash offers allow the 
bidding firm's current shareholders to retain all of the future (positive) returns. 
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Conversely, stock offers shift part of the (possible negative) future returns to the new 
shareholders. 
Hansen (1987) and Fishman (1989) argue that a stock offer benefits the bidder when the 
target has private information about its assets. Since the target only accepts cash offers 
that exceed its private valuation, cash offers subject that bidder to adverse selection and 
result in overpayments to the target. Stock offers reduce overpayments, because target 
shareholders share in any subsequent decrease of the merged firm's stock if the bidder 
overpays. Therefore, other things being equal, the returns to the merging firms in cash 
offers will be higher than in common stock offers. Furthermore, since most tender offers 
are financed via cash, whereas most merger proposals call for the exchange of common 
stocks, the information effect argument implies that returns in tender offers will be 
higher than in mergers. 
Second, cash offers and stock exchange offers have different tax implications. The 
taxability of gains to target shareholders is determined largely by the method of 
payment. In general, a tax-deferred acquisition requires target shareholders to continue 
ownership in the combined firm after acquisition. A stock transaction that involves 
exchange of voting shares is tax-deferred. Since a cash acquisition requires target 
shareholders to exchange ownership for cash, the transaction is necessarily taxable. 
According to the tax argument, cash offers have higher returns than stock offers to 
compensate target shareholders for the immediate payment of taxes. 
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2.5.2. Studies Review 
Carleton et al (1983) might be the first study to examine the role of the medium of 
exchange in mergers. They argue that cash takeovers might be sufficiently different 
from security exchange takeovers. In this study, they provide evidence of the mid 1970s 
and point out that cash takeovers and stock exchange takeovers are motivated by 
different considerations. Lower dividend payout ratios and lower market-to-book ratios 
increase the probability of being acquired in a cash takeover relative to being acquired 
through a stock exchange. 
Travlos (1987) examines the effect of the method of payment to the bidding firms' 
common stock returns at the announcement of takeover bids. The result on the pure 
stock exchange bidding firms indicates that their shareholders experience significant 
loss at the announcement of the takeover proposal. On the other hand, the result on the 
cash financing bidding firms indicates that their stockholders earn normal rate of return 
at the announcement period. Moreover, the difference in the abnormal returns between 
these two groups is statistically significant and independent of the type of takeover 
studied (i. e., mergers versus tender offers). In addition, the evidence based on 
unsuccessful bids indicated that stock exchange offers are associated with negative 
abnormal returns regardless of the outcome of the bid. These findings are consistent 
with the signaling hypothesis, which implies that financing a takeover through exchange 
of common stock conveys the negative information that the bidding firm is overvalued. 
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Huang and Walking (1987) find that target firm abnormal returns related with cash 
offers are significantly higher than those associated with stock offers. They argue that 
this effect are consistent with a tax explanation, shareholders demand higher premiums 
to offset the immediate tax payment on their gains. 
Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) examine the relationship between corporate control 
(i. e., the extent of managerial ownership of corporations) and the means of financing 
corporate acquisitions. They find that the higher the managerial ownership fraction of 
the acquiring company the larger the probability of the acquisition being financed by 
cash rather than by a stock offer. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that 
managers who value control and hold a significant ownership fraction of their finn's 
stock will be reluctant to reduce their holdings and take the risk of loss of control by 
issuing stock to finance investments. In this study, they also examine the information 
effect of the method of takeover financing in conjunction with managerial ownership. 
They find that stock financing is not associated with significant negative abnormal 
returns for firms with relatively high managerial ownership, although the evidence, in 
general, shows that announcement of stock financing is associated with negative 
nil abnormal returns. In addition, the evidence indicates that negative abnormal returns 
associated with stock financing are concentrated mainly in firms with low managerial 
ownership. 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) observe significant relations between stock returns and 
method of payment. Their result reports, on average, acquiring firms stock returns are 
greater than matching stock returns in cases where a tender offer is made and where 
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cash is used for payment. Acquiring firms stock returns are smaller than matching stock 
returns in cases where a merger is made and where stock is used for payment. The 
difference is statistically significant, ranging from -25.0% for stock mergers to 61.7% 
for cash tender offers. Gregory (1997) reports that cash offers are associated with post- 
merger performance that is not significantly different from zero, while stock offers are 
associated with significant negative post-merger performance. 
Thus, so far, almost all the previous studies have tried to examine the impact of method 
of payment to the common stock returns of bidding firms that acquire the publicly 
traded targets, however, few studies have examined this impact when the target firm is 
privately held. Chang (1998) finds that the method of payment also plays an important 
role in acquiring privately held firms. Bidding firms shareholders experience a positive 
anlumormal return in stock offers, which contrasts with the negative abnormal return 
typically found for bidders acquiring a publicly traded target. On the other hand, 
bidding firms shareholders do not earn any significant abnon-nal returns in cash offers. 
Draper and Paudyal (1999) examine the impact of the method of payment on common 
stock returns of both target and bidding firms. Firstly, their finding is consistent with 
previous studies that common stock returns of both target and bidding firms are method 
of payment dependent. Secondly, they find that the trading activities on the 
announcement of bid proposals are also dependent on the method of payment. 
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2.6. Size Effect 
2.6.1. Definition 
Size effect in the share price studies of takeover event is regarded as the effect 
generated by the relative size of bidding to target firms. The size effect can distort long- 
run performance measures and hence affect the event study results, unless it is explicitly 
taken into account in the research. 
2.62. Studies Review 
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) point out that previous merger studies of bidding 
finn returns have ignored the size effect (i. e., the relative size of bidding to target 
firms). They argue that if bidding firms' share prices are affected by the merger, the 
observed abnormal return should be related to the relative size of the bidding and target 
firms. In this study, they apply regression analysis by taking into account of the size. 
The finding indicates that the relationship between the bidding firm's cumulative 
abnormal return and the relative size of the target firm's equity to the bidders is positive 
and statistically significant. On average, a bid for a target finn half the bidding fin-n's 
size produces a cumulative abnormal return 1.8% greater than a bid for a target one 
tenth of the bidder's size. 
In analysis of abnormal rates of return, Malatesta (1983) finds that acquiring finn 
shareholders earn negative abnormal returns in the post-merger period, and the 
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magnitude of post merger abnormal returns is related to the acquiring firm's size. 
Smaller firms suffer significant loss. In percentage terms, post merger abnon-nal returns 
to large firms are trivial. Dimson and Marsh (1986) provide fresh insights into the 
impact of the size effect on event studies. Based on their findings, they conclude that an 
adjustment for firm size is quite important in studies of long-run stock perfonnance; the 
long-term performance measures that ignored the size effect might be of no value to 
researchers. This adjustment is likely to be particularly important in studies of takeovers 
since acquiring finus are usually large finus. 
Franks and Harris (1989) find that when targets are relatively large in comparison with 
bidders, there is no evidence that bidders lose. In contrast, target firms abnormal returns 
do appear higher when the target is small in relation to the bidder. Loughran and Vijh 
(1997) examine the influence of the relative size of target to bidding firms within stock 
mergers. They find that abnormal returns became smaller and eventually negative as the 
relative size of target to acquiring firm increase. In the top quartile of target to acquiring 
size ratio, they earn negative excess return. 
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2.7. Main Steps in the Studies of Takeover Returns 
v 2.7.1. Early Studies (pre- 19 74) 
Early empirical studies of mergers and acquisitions (pre-1974) applied comparative 
studies of firm performance to test for synergy in mergers and acquisitions. Kelly 
(1967) might be the first study to investigate merger profitability using measures 
including security price changes. His sample consists of 42 firms matched iii 21 pairs of 
one merging and one non-merging firm. He compares pre-merger and post-merger 
performance based on five measures of profitability (percentage changes in stock price, 
P/E ratios, earnings per share, sales per share, and profit margin) and concludes that 
mergers have little impact on acquiring firm shareholders. 
Hogarty (1970) constructs indices of investment performance based on changes in stock 
prices. His sample consists of 43 acquiring firms whose indexes are compared with 
similarly constructed indexes of their respective industries. He concludes that mergers 
have a negative effect on the profitability of the acquiring firms; investment 
perfonnance of acquiring firms is 5% less (significant at a 10% level) than their 
industries' performance, and a neutral effect on the sum of acquired plus acquiring 
firms. 
Lev and Mandelker (1972) face a similar problem of selecting a standard against which 
to compare merging firms' performance. Measuring profitability 
by the annual stock 
market return on each of 69 acquiring firms, they calculate the average return 
for the 
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five pre-merger and five post-merger years for each finn; they then deduct the 
respective pre- and post-merger average returns of 69 matching firins to control for 
factors presumed to identically affect each pair of firms. They find that the market value 
of acquiring firms rise an average of 5.6% (significant at the 10% level) more than that 
of the matching control firms. 
To this point the evidence on security price changes resulting from mergers is 
conflicting, and these studies suffer from various shortcomings. Most employ small 
sample sizes and used rather primitive models, i. e., they neither adjusted for risk nor do 
they take into account of changes in risk. To solve these problems, the study of 
Mandelker (1974) appears. 
2.7.2. Studies in 1970s (post-1974) 
Mandelker (1974) and Ellert (1976) 
Mandelker (1974) is generally considered the first modem treatment of the financial 
consequences of mergers, with merger completion dates being precisely deten-nined and 
abnormal returns being calculated relative to a benchmark. Mandelker applies the Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) methodology to examine the profitability of mergers. He argues 
that betas of individual stock might be influenced by specific company-connected 
events. An acquisition might influence risk through a change in the mix of products 
produced by the acquiring firm. It might also indicate changes in its investment and 
growth policy. Mandelker estimates the betas for individual firms involved in mergers 
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by using the ex post form of the CAPM and measures the time period from months prior 
to the merger to months following the merger. 
Mandelker (1974) tests two hypotheses. One is the perfectly competitive acquisition 
market hypothesis. The other is the efficient capital market hypothesis with respect to 
information on acquisitions. His findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
acquiring firms operate in a perfectly competitive market. The competition in the 
market for acquisitions resulted in competitive prices for the acquired firms. The 
acquiring firms thus earn normal rate of returns on the acquisitions. (The CAR of 
acquiring firms is 2.8% at month -1, and there is no increase in CAR during the period - 
7 to - 1). They earn a rate of return equal to other investment or production activities of 
similar risk. The average residuals for the acquiring firms are generally positive but not 
statistically significant. However, He finds that stockholders of the acquired finns 
receive positive cumulative abnormal returns, (the CAR of the acquired firms rise by 
13.1% during the seven-month period prior to the merger), indicating that they earn 
abnormal returns from the mergers. This evidence suggests that the acquired finns may 
have had some unique resources whose potential values are realized at the time of 
merger. Alternatively, the acquired firms may have been operating at below their 
optimal levels of efficiency, and the mergers have increased the effectiveness of their 
operations. 
With respect to the hypothesis of efficient capital markets, Mandelker's findings are 
consistent with the view that the stock market operates efficiently with respect to 
information on mergers (i. e., anticipatory price movements preceding the effective date 
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of a merger reflect all valuable information in mergers). Thus, the stock prices of the 
participating firms at the time of the merger have already reflected all economic gains 
expected from the takeover. There no post-merger adjustment is observed in the stock 
prices of the merged firm. While significant changes in betas are observed, the rates of 
return adjusted efficiently to the changes in risk. 
The findings of Mandelker (1974) are consistent with the two-parameter portfolio 
models and highlight the importance of appropriate measures of risk in estimating 
expected returns. It has been shown that failure to adjust for risk or take into account 
changes in risk lead to erroneous results in some previous research on mergers. 
Ellert (1976) also employs the Fama & MacBeth (1973) methodology and uses a much 
larger sample for an overlapping period. Although his study is not primarily concerned 
with the market reaction to mergers in general, he provides evidences directly 
comparable to that of Mandelker's. Like earlier findings of Mandelker (1974), Ellert 
also finds that the impact on the common stock prices of merging firms takes place 
seven to twelve months prior to the actual merger. For acquiring firms, he finds that 
stockholders of acquiring firms earn significant positive abnormal returns over the 
seven to twelve months before the effective date of merger. This finding is inconsistent 
with Mandelker's. In study of the returns to acquired firms, he finds that the CAR rise 
by 14.6% from the beginning of month -7 to the end of the merger month and the t- 
statistic is very large. This result is consistent with that of Mandelker's. 
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Both Mandelker and Ellert find that very substantial increases in the CAR of acquiring 
firms take place during the period from four to eight years prior to the merger activity. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that the differentially higher efficiency of 
acquiring firms prior to mergers leads to their subsequent expansion both internally and 
externally. With respect to acquired finns, both Mandelker and Ellert find that their 
CARs are significantly negative in the years and months running up to the period when 
information about their upcoming acquisition by other firms become available. The long 
history of negative abnormal returns for the sample of acquired firms is consistent with 
the hypothesis that these firms have been poorly managed. The dramatic gains 
experienced in the eight months leading to merger suggests that the owners of these 
assets receive prices that reflects the value of the asset bases under more efficient 
management. Such evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that mergers perform a 
useful economic function in reallocating resources from less efficient to more efficient 
users. 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) 
Mandelker (1974) reports that acquiring firms earn a normal rate of return from their 
acquisitions and that any gains from mergers accrue to shareholders of the acquired 
firms. His result confirms that the capital market is efficient with respect to information 
released in merger announcements. However, there are a number of limitations to be 
considered in assessing Mandelker's results. 
First, he selected the 'effective date of merger' as his announcement date, thus 85 
percent of his acquired firms are delisted in that month. He is unable to identify the 
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market reaction in the month of merger for acquired firms. Second, Mandelker(1974) 
reveals that shareholders of acquired firms eam abnon-nal positive retums over the 
seven months before the effective month. The pre-merger gains may reflect the market 
reaction to the earlier release of this information. In fact, accurate estimation of the 
market response to corporate acquisitions requires use of an earlier date (i. e., the date of 
public announcement of the acquisition). Third, Mandelker (1974) and previous studies 
consider only successful mergers and ignored many attempts that failed. The market 
reactions to unsuccessful attempts have rarely been estimated. 
Due to above limitations, Dodd and Ruback (1977) apply the market model to estimate 
the market reaction to tender offers, and include both successful and unsuccessful tender 
offers into their sample. They define month 0 as the month of first public announcement 
of the tender offer. The most striking aspect of their findings is the large positive 
abnormal return earned by stockholder of successful and unsuccessful target firms in the 
month of the first public announcement of the tender offer. The abnormal return in 
month 0 is 20.58% with t-statistics of 25.81 for successful targets and 18.96% with t- 
statistics of 12.41 for unsuccessful targets. In contrast to the target firms, the abnormal 
return for successful bidders is 2.83% with t-statistics of 2.16 and 0.58% with t-statistics 
of 1.19 for unsuccessful bidders. Shareholders of bidding firms, both successful and 
unsuccessful, earn positive abnormal returns before the announcement of the tender 
offer. (CARs from month -60 to month -1 go from zero to 11.69% for successful 
bidders and from zero to 5.93% for unsuccessful bidders). Conversely, the stockholders 
of target firms appear to eam nonnal retums over the same period. For all classes of 
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firms there is no obvious pattern in the cumulative abnormal returns after the offer (i. e., 
period from month +1 to month +60). 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) conclude that the gains to the unsuccessful target firms 
(abnormal positive returns in the event month and normal returns thereafter) are 
consistent with the information hypothesis and inconsistent with the synergy hypothesis. 
The information hypothesis predicts positive returns for unsuccessful targets as the 
information of future potential gains from elimination of the source of the inefficiency 
is revealed by the tender offer. 
Firth (1979) 
Studies of measuring common stock returns of takeovers in the 1970s have been 
primarily carried out in the U. S., such as Mandelker (1974), Ellert (1976), Dodd and 
Ruback (1977), Langetieg (1978). What does the U. K. evidence show? In order to 
conduct an independent investigation of the shareholders' wealth effects of takeovers in 
the U. K., Firth (1979) examines the profitability of takeovers in the U. K. His findings 
indicate that on average there are no gains associated with the takeovers and indeed 
there is a very small loss (possibly due to the expenses involved with the takeover 
process). The gain-loss is divided between the acquired finns and the acquiring firms 
and it is found that large gains is earned by the former and that these are offset with the 
loss by the latter. Regression analysis shows that the premium paid to target firms 
expressed as a percentage of the acquiring firm's market capitalization, is a major 
determinant of the loss suffered by the acquiring finn's shareholders. 
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Firth's study indicates that takeovers do not lead to any overall gains and the acquiring 
fin-n's shareholders lost wealth. These findings are consistent with the non-value 
maximization hypothesis (in the form of size maximization) other than the alternative 
value maximization hypothesis. However, we must notice that there are only three years 
data (1972-1974) in Firth's studies, his results may seriously suffer from the short 
sample period, and may not robust in the long time sample specification. 
2.7.3. Studies in 1980s 
Dodd (1980) 
Mandelker (1974) and Ellert (1976) choose the effective date (the date of completion of 
the merger) as the event date to examine the impact of mergers to the shareholder 
returns. Dodd and Ruback (1977) use different methodology by choosing the 
announcement date as the event date to test the impact of tender offers to shareholders 
wealth in both successful and unsuccessful tender offers. However, there are few studies 
that have chosen the announcement date as the event date to study the impact of 
mergers to stockholders wealth. Furthermore, previous studies only consider completed 
mergers; merger proposals that are rejected by either the incumbent management or the 
target shareholders have been ignored. Moreover, as we notice, previous studies 
examine only the monthly returns to mergers and tender offers; no studies have 
examined the daily stock returns to the event of acquisitions. 
To bridge the gap mentioned above, Dodd (1980) is the first study to examine the daily 
stock returns of mergers by choosing the announcement date as the event date. Daily 
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returns are studied for 151 merger proposals announced in the Wall Street Journal from 
1971 to 1977. Among them, 71 are eventually completed, and 80 are canceled by either 
target or bidder management. The evidence indicates that target firm shareholders earn 
large positive abnormal returns from the announcement of merger proposals, 
irrespective of the outcome of the proposal. In both completed and canceled merger 
proposals, target shareholders, on average, earn approximately 13% abnormal return at 
the time the offer is initially announced. For those completed merger proposals, target 
firm shareholders earn positive abnormal returns after the announcement date. Over the 
duration of the merger proposals (defined as 10 days before the first announcement 
through 10 days after approval by target shareholders), target shareholders eam 
abnormal returns of 33.96%, on average. 
For merger proposals that are subsequently canceled, target firms shareholders earn, on 
average, significant negative abnormal returns on the date of the announcement of the 
termination of negotiations. Over the duration of the proposal (defined as 10 days 
before the first announcement through 10 days after the termination) these shareholders 
earn abnormal returns of 3.68%. However, when the sample of canceled merger 
proposals is classified on the basis of whether or not the target firm's management 
ten-ninating the negotiations, the market reaction is different. Where, the merger 
proposal vetoed by incumbent management, target stockholders earn, on average, 
10.95% over the duration of proposal and this represents a permanent revaluation of the 
target shares. In the remaining canceled proposals, either bidder firm managements 
retract their offers or no reason for the tenninations are given. Shareholders of target 
firms in these cases earn only 0.18% over the duration of the proposal, i. e., after an 
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initial gain of 13.43% at the time of first announcement of the merger proposal, the 
stock price returns to its pre-proposal level. In contrast, for stockholders of bidding 
firms, in both completed and canceled merger proposals, there is evidence of negative 
abnormal returns of -7.22% and -5.50% respectively, over the duration of the proposals. 
Asquith and Kim (1982) 
Previous empirical studies on mergers and acquisitions focused only on the effects of 
acquisitions on the shareholder returns of participating firms, these studies examine the 
wealth effects of only one group of the firm's claimants, the stockholders. However, 
acquisitions might have impact on other claimants of the participating firms. 
Shareholders positive abnormal returns might come at the expense of other claimants 
(especially the bondholders). There are two arguments on this issue. One supports that 
stockholder may earn positive abnormal returns at the expenses of bondholders by 
increasing the firm's risk level through acquisition activities. Thus the positive 
abnormal returns to stockholders would be a wealth transfer from bondholders. The 
other argues that acquisitions reduce the risk of the merging firms by combining two 
separate cash flows that are less perfectly correlated. The reduction in the risk level 
increases the market value of the merging firms' outstanding debt. This is the co- 
insurance effect for corporate debt. Lewellen (1971) first point out that the 
consolidation of two or more less perfectly correlated firms would reduce the risk of 
default and increase the debt capacity of the combined firms. However, without any real 
synergy or pure financial effects, the market value of the post-acquisition firm is simply 
the sum of the pre-acquisition firms market value. This means that the increase in the 
market value of outstanding debt leads to a decline in the market value of the equity. 
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Thus, the question is, are there any real wealth transfer between stockholders and 
bondholders? 
Based on this point of view, Higgins and Schall (1975) and Galai and Masulis (1976) 
conduct further investigation and find that the co-insurance effect would lead to an 
increase in the market value of the merging firms' debt and a subsequent decline in the 
market value of their equity. Thus they conclude that the net financial result of non- 
synergistic mergers would be a wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders. Kim 
and McConnell (1977) apply both theoretical and empirical approaches to investigate 
the co-insurance effect of corporate takeovers. Their findings indicate that bondholders 
of merging firms do not earn any positive abnormal returns around the time of merger, 
and there is no statistically significant wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders. 
To further examine the issue of wealth transfer between stockholders and bondholders, 
Asquith and Kim (1982) choose 50 firms out of 2870 firms involved in the acquisitions 
and announced in the Wall Street Journal from 1960 to 1978 by using four criteria. 
Their findings indicate that bondholders on average do not earn positive or negative 
abnonnal returns. If wealth transfer does occur, it is offset by other effects. The 
evidence reveals that only acquired firm stockholders gain from the merger, and their 
gains do not come at the expense of other security holders. This finding is consistent 
with a market that efficiently resolves conflicts of interest between stockholders and 
bondholders. Finally, they conclude that mergers generate no noticeable impact on 
bondholders and no noticeable wealth transfers between bondholders and stockholders. 
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Asquith (1983) 
Many previous studies such as Mandelker (1974), Ellert (1976), Langetleg (1978) and 
Dodd (1980) have already examined the effect of mergers on stockholder returns. 
However, all of these studies only valued the participating firms' stock at points during 
a merger bid, none of them examined the merging finus shareholder returns for the 
entire merger process. There was no thorough investigation of stock price behavior for 
merging firms before a merger bid. Mandelker (1974), Ellert (1976) and Langetieg 
(1978) all examine the period before the merger date, but they all use the outcome date 
of the merger as the event date and inevitably hide the stock market reactions before the 
merger bid begin. In addition, none of them examine the stock returns during the merger 
bid, (i. e., the period between the event date and the outcome date). Furthermore, the 
question of whether the bidding firm's shareholders gain on average from a merger bid 
was unresolved. 
Asquith (1983) constructs a sample of successful and unsuccessful merger bids where 
the target finns were listed on the NYSE during 1962-1976. He investigates the stock 
returns in the entire merger process by using this sample. The evidence shows that 
abnormal returns occur throughout the period from the event date to the outcome date as 
new information is released and do not merely occur at the time of the announcement. 
Furthermore, the market reverses the initial positive abnon-nal returns for both target 
and bidding firms in unsuccessful merger bids. These results suggest that the 
announcement of a merger bid contains only limited information. 
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Asquith reports large significant negative CARs for both successftil and unsuccessful 
target firms during the pre-announcement period. On the announcement day and the day 
before, both successful and unsuccessful target firms experience similar signIficant 
positive abnormal returns. On the outcome date, successftil target firms earn 
significantly positive abnormal return, and unsuccessful target firms experience 
negative abnormal returns. During the interim period (period between the event date and 
the outcome date), the CAR rise for successful target firms and fell for unsuccessful 
target firms. Unsuccessful target firms suffer significant wealth loss in the post-merger 
period. On the other hand, the successful bidding firms experience a large significant 
positive CAR during the pre-announcement period and no significant CAR for 
unsuccessftil biding firms at this period. There are no significant abnormal returns for 
successful bidding firms either on the event date and the outcome date or on the interim 
period. In contrast, there is significant negative CAR for unsuccessful bidding finns 
during the interim period. Both successful and unsuccessful bidding firms experience 
significant negative CAR during the post-merger period. 
Schipper and Thompson (1983) & Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) 
Almost all the previous studies so far have only examined the impact of the single 
acquisition to the participating firm shareholders. However, in some ca5es, individual 
mergers and tender offers are often a part of extensive acquisitions programs taking 
place over a number of years. 
Schipper and Thompson (1983) examine the market reactions to the announcement of a 
major acquisitions program. They test the hypothesis that share prices of firms which 
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undertaking acquisition programs should fully reflect the expected value of those 
programs as soon as the entire program is announced or anticipated, (i. e., the stock 
prices at the time of the announcement fully capitalize the expected value of the 
program). They argue that the relevant measure of the benefit of acquisition activities is 
the original capitalized value of the programs that encompass the individual mergers. 
Based on the findings, Schipper and Thompson (1983) conclud that acquisition 
programs undertaken before the merger-related regulatory changes of 1967-1970 (such 
as the Williams Amendments) are capitalized as positive net present value projects at 
the time the programs are announced. The view that positive pre-acquisition 
performance found in previous studies is consistent with the merger program 
announcement. The small positive returns for the acquiring fin-ns at the acquisition 
event found in previous studies is consistent with the hypothesis that the initial 
capitalization of the acquisition program is relatively accurate, with only a minor 
adjustment required at the actual merger. They also find a significant adverse impact on 
share prices of acquiring finns after the regulatory changes. They explain the negative 
post acquisition performance found in some prior studies are because that many of the 
post acquisition months in these studies fell in the time after the date of the regulatory 
changes. 
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) directly test the Schipper and Thompson hypothesis 
discussed above. They examine the market reaction to the first four merger bids in the 
merger program. The period before 1969 is also compared to the period after 1969. 
They also point out that measurement difficulties in calculating abnormal returns may 
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arise if the relative size of two participating firms was disparate (i. e., the size effect). 
The evidence shows that statistically significant CARs are observed for the acquiring 
firms' from the first to the fourth merger bids. This finding does not support the 
argument that all the benefits from mergers are capitalized in the acquiring firms' stock 
prices at or before the announcement of a merger program. 
Regression analysis indicates that the relationship between the relative size of the target 
firm's equity and the acquiring firm's cumulative abnormal returns is positive and 
statistically significant. On average, a bid for a target firm half the acquiring finn's size 
experienced a cumulative abnormal return 1.8% greater than a bid for a target one tenth 
of the acquiring firm's size. Furthermore, the evidence indicates the excess returns to 
the acquiring finns prior to 1969 are higher than that after 1969, this is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the market for mergers have changed. Finally, they conclude that 
mergers are positive net present value activities for acquiring firms, and that merger 
programs are consistent with value-maximizing behavior by management. 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) & Fabozzi et al (1988) 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) and Bradley (1980) find that firms in the unsuccessful tender 
offers experience significant and permanent increases in the share prices. Furthermore, 
Bradley (1980) finds that in unsuccessful tender offers, this permanent revaluation of 
the target shares exceeds the per share premium of the rejected bid. These evidences are 
consistent with the infonnation hypothesis of tender offers and contradict the synergy 
hypothesis. While the revaluation of targets' shares of unsuccessful tender offers is 
consistent with the information hypothesis, it is not a sufficient evidence to reject the 
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synergy hypothesis. The positive returns to unsuccessful targets may be due to the 
anticipation of a future higher-valued bid. 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) investigates the rationale behind inter-firm tender offers 
by examining the stock returns realized by the target firm stockholders in unsuccessful 
tender offers and firms that have made unsuccessful offers. They point out that the 
infonnation hypothesis does not predict that the value of target shares that receive no 
subsequent bid would fall back to their pre-offer level. The findings indicate that share 
prices of the target firms that are not targets of subsequent, successful acquisition 
attempts within five years of an unsuccessful offer fell back to their pre-offer level 
within two years. Share prices of those targets that received a successful subsequent bid 
experience an additional significant positive revaluation. This evidence reveals that the 
revaluation is due primary to the anticipation of another acquisition bid (i. e., gains to the 
stockholders of unsuccessful targets stem from the anticipation of a future successful 
acquisition and not simply from the revelation of new information regarding the true 
value of the target resources). 
In addition to examining the unsuccessful target firms, they also investigate the stock 
returns of unsuccessful bidding firms. They argue that under information hypothesis the 
returns to unsuccessful bidding finn shareholders should not be affected by whether or 
not there is a change in control of the target resources. The empirical results indicate 
that, on average, the stockholders of unsuccessful bidding firms suffer a significant 
wealth loss in the wake of an unsuccessful offer. Further investigation reveals that this 
wealth loss is due primarily to the negative returns realized by firms that lost bids for 
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their targets to rival bidding firms. That is, if a firm makes an unsuccessful offer and the 
target is not acquired by another bidding finn, then there is no effect on the wealth of 
the unsuccessful bidding firms shareholders. However, if the offer fails because another 
rival firm successfully acquires the target, then the stockholders of the unsuccessful 
bidding firm suffer a significant wealth loss. This result is once again consistent with 
the synergy hypothesis. The successful bidding finn possesses specialized resources that 
allow for acquisition and that these resources are eventually used to put the unsuccessful 
bidding firm at a competitive disadvantage in the market. 
Fabozzi et al (1988) extend the work of Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983)'s by analyzing 
returns to target shares in the time between the date of offer and one year after the 
offer's failure and public withdrawal (i. e., the time from announcement to withdrawal 
and the first year after that event). Their findings give support to Bradley, Desai, and 
Kim (1983) studies. They find that all of offer premiums disappear by the time failure 
became public and abnormal returns are zero in the post failure year. 
Malatesta (1983) 
The studies discussed above are all investigated by using the abnormal rate of returns to 
examine the bidding and target firms shareholder returns. Malatesta (1983) examine the 
same question by using a different distinctive methodology. He calculates the wealth 
effects of mergers by the abnormal dollar returns in addition to abnormal rate of returns. 
Malatesta's findings based on abnormal rate of returns are generally consistent with 
those of previous studies. However, his findings on abnormal dollar returns are 
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somewhat different. The evidence indicates that merger itself have a positive impact on 
acquired firm shareholders wealth. Cumulative abnormal dollar retums to target firms 
from five month before to the announcement date average 19.67 million dollars and it is 
statistically significant. However, acquired firm shareholders suffer wealth losses during 
the period well before a merger. Estimated cumulative abnormal dollar returns average - 
9.42 million dollars 61 months prior to the announcement date. Hence, the estimated net 
impact of the merger to the target firm shareholders wealth is negative prior to the 
announcement of the bid. 
The results on the bidding firm side reveal that acquiring firm shareholders suffer 
wealth loss both immediately before and well before a merger. Cumulative abnormal 
dollar returns to acquiring firms from five months before to the announcement date 
average -27.65 million dollars. The cumulative abnormal dollar returns over the 61 
month prior to the announcement date is -I 11.17 million dollars. Both of these estimates 
are statistically significant. According to these results, Malatesta conclude that merger is 
negative net present value project for acquiring firms and this is inconsistent with 
previous studies by using the abnormal rate of returns. The evidence of previous studies 
shows that acquiring firms experienced a quite good performance prior to the merger 
announcement. 
Dennis and McConnell (1986) 
A number of empirical studies have documented the effect of merger on the wealth of 
the common shareholders of merging firms, and a much smaller number of studies 
examined the returns to the senior securities of merging finns. However, these studies 
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investigate returns only to non-convertible bonds, leaving the question of what effect 
the merger have on the market values of firms' other senior securities unanswered. 
Dennis and McConnell (1986) bridge the gap by examining the effect of merger on the 
wealth of the various classes of merging firms' securityliolders (i. e., common 
stockholders, preferred stockholders, both convertible and non-convertible, and 
bondholders, both convertible and non-convertible). 
Dennis and McConnell examine the returns to above security-holders of both target and 
bidding firms around the announcement date of bids. The evidences indicates that, on 
average, target firms' common stockholders, convertible and non-convertible preferred 
stockholders, and convertible bondholders receive statistically significant gains in 
mergers as did bidding firms' convertible preferred stockholders. The results also 
indicate that, on average, target firms' non-convertible bondholders and bidding firins' 
convertible bondholders, non-convertible preferred stockholders, and non-convertible 
bondholders neither gain nor lose by a statistically significant amount in mergers. 
Finally, for bidding firms' common stocks, the results are sensitive to the time period 
used to measure returns. However, on average, there is no evidence that bidding firms' 
stockholders lose, and there is some statistically significant evidence that they gain in 
mergers. When the abnormal returns are calculated by dollars, the evidence indicates 
that, on average, the total value of both the target and bidding finn increase by a 
statistically significant amount around the date of merger announcements. The evidence 
also suggests, that, on average, the combined dollar value of the target and bidding 
firms increase by a statistically significant amount. 
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A number of previous studies have reported that the common stockholders of bidding 
firms received negligible gains in mergers. So one question left to us is what is the exact 
reason for bidding firms to undertake mergers if there is no gains. Dennis and 
McConnell's studies provide us some insight of this question. As the evidence revealed 
that some classes of security-holders other than common stockholders reap the gain and 
the total value of the firm increase by a statistically significant amount in merger, this is 
the sufficient motive to undertake the merger. Pervious studies of mergers have 
investigated only common stock returns to examine the total wealth effect of merging 
firms. In principle, such studies should examine the returns to all classes of the merging 
firms' securities. Thus, the failure of previous studies to consider the effect of merger on 
the other various classes of merging firms' securities would lead to a biased estimate of 
the total value created by the merger. 
Travlos (1987) 
Previous studies on corporate takeovers Provided inconclusive results on the wealth 
effects of takeovers on the common stock of bidding firms. The existence of mixed 
empirical findings for the bidding firms makes it difficult to interpret existing evidence 
and to draw conclusions about the managers' acquisition motives. However, it is 
observed that mergers are usually common stock exchange offers whereas tender offers 
are usually cash offers. Since the different methods of financing have different signaling 
implications, the mixed stock returns of bidding firms in mergers and tender offers may 
be due to the method of payment in financing takeovers. Although the method of 
payment in acquisitions have been suggested to be important (Carleton et al 1983), no 
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previous studies provided a direct confin-nation of the bidding firms' differential return 
relationship across different methods of payment. 
Travlos (1987) examines the impact of the method of payment on the common stock 
prices of bidding firms at the announcement of unanticipated takeover proposals by 
investigating a sample of successful takeovers during the period 1972-198 1. His 
analysis is mainly concemed with the wealth effects associated with two distinct 
methods of payment: common stock exchanges and cash offers. The findings on the 
pure stock exchange offer bidding firms indicate that their shareholders suffer 
statistically significant loss at the announcement of the takeover proposals. In contrast, 
the results on the cash offer bidding firms show that shareholders earn normal rates of 
return at the announcement period. Furthermore, the differences in the abnon-nal returns 
between these two groups are statistically significant and independent of the type of 
takeover studied (i. e., mergers or tender offers). Based on these evidences, Travlos 
points out that the results are consistent with the signaling hypothesis, which implies 
that financing a takeover through pure stock exchange offer conveys the negative 
information that the bidding firm is overvalued. The results also suggest that the mixed 
results of earlier studies might be due to the failure to control for the method of finance. 
Franks and Harris (1989) 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) provide a comprehensive survey on the shareholders wealth 
effects of corporate takeovers in the U. S. They conclude that target firms clearly gain 
and bidding firms gain or at least do not lose. However, There are not as many studies 
in the U. K. as that in the U. S. 
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The evidences in the U. K. studies are mixed and lacked of such consensus shown in the 
U. S. studies. Furthermore, previous U. K. studies suffered from either small samples or 
samples confined to short periods. Thus a comprehensive U. K. study of the wealth 
effects of takeovers is very much demanded. 
Franks and Harris (1989) conduct a comprehensive U. K. study by using a sample of 
more than 1,800 U. K. acquisitions covering a 30-year period (from 1955 to 1985). Their 
study provides independent tests of many issues addressed in studies of U. S. 
acquisitions and also offers us the opportunity to see whether parallel findings emerge 
for the U. K. 
Their findings indicate that, on average, mergers are value creating for shareholders as 
measured by equity market prices around the date of merger announcement. 
Shareholders of target finns gain, and bidding firm shareholders gain or do not lose. 
Target shareholders gains and merger benefits appear to be higher in revised or 
contested bids. This evidence is similar to that found in many U. S. studies. By 
comparing the institutional differences between the two countries, they find that target 
wealth gains in both the U. K. and U. S. increased after 1968, this suggests that increases 
in U. S. target gains at the same period might not be attributed to the Williams Act. 
Finally, after the mode of acquisition (merger or tender offer) is controlled for, gains to 
U. K. targets are strikingly similar to those in the U. S.; this suggests the wealth effects of 
acquisitions are quite comparable in the two countries. 
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2.7.4. Studies in 1990s 
Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) 
Previous studies on the wealth effect of acquisition activities surveyed by Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) report an average abnormal returns of -5.5% during the twelve months 
after the completion of takeovers. They interpret such negative abnormal returns as an 
unsettled issue, since it is inconsistent with the market efficiency hypothesis and 
suggests that changes in share prices during takeovers overestimate the future gains 
from acquisitions. Negative post acquisition abnormal returns are also found by Franks, 
Harris, and Mayer (1988), they examine a comprehensive sample of U. S. and U. K. 
acquisitions during the period of 1955-1985. In interpreting these results, Ruback 
(1988) notes that 'Franks, Harris and Mayer use almost all mergers, and so the selection 
bias argument seems less plausible' and suggested again that the evidence is 
inconsistent with the market efficiency. 
However, the conclusion on the post-merger performance of acquiring firms is not all 
one-sided. Langetieg (1978) finds that post-merger abnormal performance is not 
significantly different from that of a control firm in the same industry. Neither 
Mandelker (1974) nor Malatesta (1983) find significant underperfonnance after the 
acquisition. In addition, Bradley and Jarrell (1988) find little evidence of significant 
underperformance in the three years following acquisitions. 
To examine this unsettled issue, Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of post-merger performance by investigating 399 U. S. 
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takeovers undertaken in the 1975-1984, they examine in particular whether the negatiý, e 
abnormal returns found in prior studies are due to an incorrect adjustment for risk. In 
their study, they analyze various subsets of the sample in order to evaluate the possible 
determinants of post-merger performance. They divided their sample by the method of 
payment, the relative size of the target and the bidder, the level of opposition by 
incumbent management and the presence of competing bidders. In addition to using the 
equal-weighted index and the value-weighted index as single index benchmarks, they 
also apply two multi-portfolio benchmarks: a ten-factor benchmark and an eight- 
portfolio benchmark. They highlight the results by using the eight-portfolio benchmark 
and include the other three benchmarks for comparison purposes. 
By using the equal-weighted index, their findings confirm earlier studies that find 
negative abnormal returns in post-merger period. However, this result is not robust to 
the choice of the benchmark. By using the value-weighted benchmark, they report 
positive post-merger performance. In contrast, the results generated with multi-factor 
benchmarks, in particular the eight-portfolio benchmark; show no statistically 
significant abnormal performance for the overall sample of bidders. The traditional 
single-factor benchmarks are quite sensitive to the method of payment, the relative size 
of the target to the bidder, and whether or not the bid is contested by incumbent 
management or other bidders; they generate significant differences in post-merger 
performance in examining these sub-samples. However, the eight-portfolio benchmark 
reveals smaller difference that is not statistically significant in these sub-samples. 
According to these findings, Frank, Harris and Titman point out that the prior findings 
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of negative post acquisition abnormal returns for biding firm shareholders are 'more 
likely due to benchmark errors than to mispricing at the time of the announcement'. 
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) 
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) also conduct a thorough analysis of the post- 
merger performance of bidding firms. They select a nearly exhaustive sample of 
mergers over 1955 to 1987 between NYSE acquirers and NYSE/AMEX targets. After 
adjusting for the firm size effect as well as beta risk. They find that shareholders of the 
bidding firms suffer a statistically significant wealth loss of about 10% over the five 
years following the merger completion. This finding is robust to a variety of 
specifications and does not seem to be caused by changes in beta following the merger. 
With these evidences, they conclude that the efficient market anomaly of post-merger 
underperformance highlighted in Jensen and Ruback's (1983) review is not resolved. In 
comparing with Franks, Harris and Titman's (1991) results, they point out that the 
contrary results were specific to their sample time period (1975-1984) and are due to the 
mixing of tender offers with mergers in their sample. To interpret what causes the large 
negative abnormal returns after the merger, they suggest that one possibility 
is that the 
market is slow to adjust to the merger event (i. e., the long-run performance reflects that 
part of the NPV of the merger to the acquiring firms which is not captured 
by the 
announcement period return). However, their results are inconsistent with this 
hypothesis. 
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Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) 
While almost all the previous studies in examining the wealth effects of acquisitions 
have used common stock price approaches, this methodology has obvious 
shortcomings. Stock price studies are unable to distinguish between the real economic 
gains and the market inefficiency explanations; stock price studies are also unable to 
identify the sources of any merger-related gains. Motivated by the inability of the stock 
price studies, Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) apply post-merger accounting data to 
test directly for changes in operating performance that resulted from mergers. 
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) investigate post-acquisition performance for the 50 
largest U. S. mergers between 1979 and 1984. In the study, they examine the post- 
merger cash flow performance of bidding and target firms, and explore the sources of 
merger-related changes in cash flow performance. Their findings indicate that merged 
firms have significant improvements in operating cash flow returns after the merger, the 
improvement result from increases in asset productivity relative to their industries. 
These improvements are particularly strong for transactions involving firms in 
overlapping business. The evidence shows that post-merger cash flow improvements do 
not come at the expenses of long-term performance, since sample firms maintain their 
capital expenditure and R&D rates relative to their industries after the merger. Finally, 
they find a strong positive relation between post-merger increases in operating cash 
flows and abnormal stock returns at merger announcement, indicating that expectations 
of economic improvements explain a significant portion of the equity reevaluations of 
the merging firms. 
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Loughran and Vi lih (1997) 
A few studies have already in particularly examined the assumption of market 
efficiency by measuring abnormal returns after the takeover effective date. However, 
their findings are mixed. Frank, Harris and Titman (1991) find no evidence of 
significant abnormal returns over a three-year period after the merger outcome date. In 
contrast, Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) find that tender offers are followed by 
insignificant abnormal returns, but mergers are followed by significant abnormal returns 
of - 10% over a five-year period after the merger effective date. 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) reexamine this controversial issue by investigating a sample 
of 947 firms delisted from the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ during 1970-1989, this 
study distinguishes with previous studies in two important aspects. First, the previous 
studies recognize that post-acquisition underperformance are inconsistent with market 
efficiency, and the abnormal returns imply that wealth gains from corporate acquisitions 
are overstated if measured simply over the pre-acquisition period. But they do not report 
the overall wealth gains by combining the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition returns. 
Second, Loughran and Vijh apply a different methodology to compute the excess 
returns; they measure abnormal returns by the difference between five-year holding 
period returns of sample stocks and matching stocks (chosen to control for size and 
book to market effects). 
Their findings reveal that during a five-year period following the acquisition, on 
average, finns that complete stock mergers earn significant negative abnon-nal returns of 
-25% whereas firms that complete cash tender offers earn significant positive abnormal 
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returns of 61.7%. Over the combined pre and post acquisition period, target 
shareholders who sold out soon after the acquisition effective date gain from all 
acquisitions, those who held on to the acquirer's stock received as payment find their 
gains diminish over time. Furthermore, target shareholders in the top quartile of target 
to bidding firm size ratio find their gains reverse and became negative. This findings 
suggest that wealth gains following the announcement of an acquisition do not only 
disappear in cases where the current bid failed and no subsequent bid materialized (as 
shown in Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) and Asquith (1983)), but also in cases where 
the bid succeeded and the target is large relative to the bidder. 
Chang (1998) 
The studies on the shareholders wealth effects of corporate takeovers to the acquiring 
firms so far examined only the takeovers of publicly traded targets, few studies have 
examined the acquiring firms' common stock returns on taking over privately held 
targets. Takeovers of privately held targets seem as a quite interesting issue when they 
are financed with common stock. Because in this case, the financing of takeovers is 
similar to private placements of equity since target firms are owned by one or a small 
number of shareholders. It is quite interesting to know that if the results of takeovers of 
privately held firms are consistent with what we have found in takeovers of publicly 
traded targets. 
Chang (1998) constructs a sample of 281 firms that successfully acquire privately held 
firms during the period of 1981-1992. This sample is divided into 131 cash offers, 100 
stock offers and 50 mixed offers. He examines the bidding firm stock returns at the 
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announcement of a takeover proposal to a privately held firm. The evidences shows, on 
average, bidding firms offering common stock experience a positive return, and those 
choosing cash offer do not find any significant abnormal returns. The finding of positive 
nlý abnormal return earned by stock financing strikingly contrasts with the negative 
ý11 abnormal return earned by common stock financing in acquiring a publicly held firin. In 
interpreting this result, Chang suggests that ownership is highly concentrated in 
privately held firms, acquiring these firms through stock offer tends to create large 
blockholders. These large shareholders effectively monitor the managerial perfon-nance 
and enhance the takeover prospects of the finn. 
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2.8. The Wealth Effects of Takeover Activities throughout the Entire Acquisition 
Process 
2.8.1. Shareholder Returns in Pre-Announcement Period 
2.8.1.1. Target Firm Shareholder Returns 
Mandelker (1974) finds that target firms' CAR is slightly negative during the period of 
month -30 to -7, and during the 12-month period -20 to -9, eight of the monthly 
average residuals are negative. However, There are increasing positive abnon-nal returns 
from month -7 to -1 and a big increase in the CAR during these periods. This evidence 
suggests that positive information regarding the merger starts to leak out to the market 
about 7 months before the merger. Ellert (1976) applies the same methodology and a 
much larger sample, to target firm shareholders, he finds that the CAR is strictly 
negative and accumulate to -11.7% over the months -100 to -8, and then the CAR rise 
by 14.6% from the beginning of month -7 to the end of the merger month and the t- 
statistic is very large. This result is consistent with that of Mandelker's. Langetieg 
(1978) finds target firms experience a significant negative average CAR over period of 
month -72 to - 19. 
Since the limitation of Mandelker and Ellert studies (They both choose the outcome 
date of merger as the announcement date), Dodd and Ruback (1977) apply different 
methodology by distinguishing the announcement date and the outcome date (use month 
0 as the first public announcement of the bid). They find that shareholders of target 
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firms earn normal returns over the period of month -60 to -1. Franks, Broyles and 
Hecht (1977) find that shareholders of target firms have enjoyed positive abnormal 
returns averaging 26% during the four months prior to the merger announcement. Firth 
(1979) reports that target firms experience slightly negative returns from month -24 to 
month -4, and the CAR at month -4 is -2.3% and that 56% of firms have negative 
CAR. This evidence is consistent with Mandelker (1974) that acquired firms have a 
poor stock market performance prior to the takeover. However, abnormal retums of 
target firms' shareholders increase sharply in months -3 to -1. 
Firth (1980) reveals that there is no evidence of significant abnormal returns to the 
target firm shareholders from 48 months to 2 months prior to the takeover 
announcement. However, in month -1, successful target firm shareholders earn an 
'I'k abnormal return of 6.5% with a t-statistic of 5.423 and unsuccessful target 
firm 
shareholders earn an abnormal return of 8.4% with a t-statistic of 6.171. Asquith (1983) 
defines the period from -480 days to -20 days prior to the announcement date as the 
pre-announcement period. He finds that the CAR for both successful and unsuccessful 
target firms have declined to -14.1% and -10.5% respectively from day -480 to -20. 
Martin and McConnell (1991) examine the pre-takeover performance of the targets. 
They find that the CAR is 4.3 1% with a t-statistic of 1.03 for the whole sample over the 
period from 48 months before through 3 months before the tender offer. 
Apart from using only the abnormal rate of return to evaluate the wealth effect of the 
takeover activity, Malatesta (1983) report that the cumulative abnormal dollar return to 
target firms from five month before to the announcement date average 19.67 million 
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dollars and it is statistically significant. However, acquired firm shareholders suffer 
wealth loss during the period well before a merger. The cumulative abnon-nal dollar 
return of target firms is -9.42 million dollars 61 months up to the announcement of the 
takeover. Hence, he concludes that the estimated net impact of the merger to the target 
firm shareholders wealth is negative prior to the announcement of the bid. 
2.8.1.2. Bidding Firm Shareholder Returns 
In study of pre-announcement stock returns to bidding firms, Mandelker (1974) finds 
that the CAR start to rise from 30 months prior to the merger, and the CAR increase 
during the 30 months prior to merger by 5.1%. This evidence suggests that the 
informational impact of a forthcoming merger is spread over about 30 months before 
the outcome date. However, there is no increase in CAR during the period -7 to -1. By 
applying the same methodology and a much large sample, Ellert (1976) finds that 
shareholders of bidding firms earn significantly positive abnormal returns over the 
seven to twelve months before the effective date of merger. This finding is inconsistent 
with Mandelker's. 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) find that bidding firm stockholders, both in successful and 
unsuccessful takeovers, earn positive abnormal returns before the announcement of the 
tender offer. The CAR goes from 0 to 11.69% for successful bidders and from 0 to 
5.93% for unsuccessful bidders during the period of month -60 to -1. Franks, Broyles 
and Hecht (1977) report that shareholders of acquiring firms have experienced small but 
positive abnormal returns during the four months prior to a merger. Firth (1979) shows 
72 
that shareholders of acquiring firms earn normal rate of returns during the period from 
month -24 to month- 1. 
Firth (1980) indicates that there are no significant abnormal returns to the bidding firm 
shareholders from 48 months prior to the month of the takeover announcement. Asquith 
(1983) finds that the CAR for both successful and unsuccessful bidding firms has risen 
to +14.3% and +2.2% respectively during that period. Schipper and Thompson (1983) 
find the CAR of bidding firms start to rise 30 months prior to the announcement of the 
takeover bid. The evidence indicates the increase in CAR from month -24 to the event 
month is over 20% with a t-statistic of 2.77, with particularly in the year that covers 
month -11 through the event month, the CAR is about 13.5% with a t-statistic of 2.26. 
Malatesta (1983) reports that acquiring finn stockholders suffer wealth loss both 
immediately before and well before a merger. Cumulative abnormal dollar returns to 
acquiring firms from five months prior to the announcement date average -27.65 million 
dollars. The cumulative abnormal dollar returns over the 61 month prior to the 
announcement date is - 111.17 million dollars. Both of these estimates are statistically 
significant. Based on these results, Malatesta concludes that merger is negative net 
present value project for acquiring finns. 
2.8.1.3. Summary 
The target firm shareholder returns, on average, experience negative abnormal returns 
from five to two years prior to the takeover announcement, the CARs are negative 
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during these periods. There is also some evidences show that target shareholders earn 
normal returns four or two years prior to the announcement of the bid. However, there is 
little evidence of the outperformance of the target shares during the period well before 
the takeover announcement. 
In contrast, vast majority of studies on the bidding firms side reveal that bidding firin 
shareholders earn a significant positive abnormal returns from five to two years prior to 
the takeover announcement. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
bidding firms have a good performance several years prior to the takeover bid. 
However, Firth (1979,1980) found nonnal returns to bidding finn shareholders four or 
two years before the announcement of the takeover proposal. In sum, bidding firm 
stockholders, on average, earn significant positive abnonnal returns several years prior 
to the announcement of the takeover bids. 
2.8.2. Shareholder Returns in the Announcement Period of the Bid 
2.8.2.1. Target Firm Shareholder Returns 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) find striking large positive abnormal returns earned by 
shareholders of both successful and unsuccessful target firms in the month of the first 
public announcement of the tender offer. The average residual in month 0 is 20.58% 
with t-statistic 25.81 for successful targets and 18.96% with t-statistic 12.41 for 
unsuccessful targets. Firth (1979) reports the abnormal returns of target finns at the 
announcement month of takeover is 22%. Firth (1980) investigates the takeover 
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announcement month abnormal returns to both successful and unsuccessful targets in 
the U. K., shareholders of successful targets earn an abnormal return of 28.1% with a t- 
statistic of 31.07, and shareholders of unsuccessful targets earn an abnonnal return of 
31.2% with a t-statistic of 31.866. 
Instead of applying monthly rate of returns, Dodd (1980) investigates the daily market 
reaction to the announcement of merger proposals. There is striking evidence of the 
large positive abnormal returns earn by shareholders of target firms on the day of public 
announcement of the takeover proposal and the day before. The abnormal return on day 
-1 (the accurate announcement date is in fact day -1 for some finns) is 8.74% with a t- 
statistic of 23.80, and on day 0 is 4.3% with a t-statistic of 11.71. Asquith (1983) 
findings are similar with Dodd's, the two-day (day -1 and day 0) abnormal return is 
6.2% for successful target firms and 7.0% for unsuccessful target firms. The t-statistics 
are +23.07 for target firms in successful merger bids and +12.83 for target firms in 
unsuccessful merger bids. 
Dennis and McConnell (1986) find that the market-adjusted returns on days -1 and 0 
are 4.50% and 4.06% for target firms' common stocks, respectively. The t-statistics are 
4.04 and 4.52 respectively. The two-day announcement period market-adjusted return is 
8.56% and with a t-statistic of 7.07. Huang and Walkling (1987) report that target finns 
abnormal returns on day -1 is 14.3% with a t-statistic of 85.738, and on day 0 
is 9.3% 
with a t-statistic of 55.694. For the two-day announcement period, target firm 
shareholders earn an average abnonnal return of 23.4%. 
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Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) present that target firm shareholders receive a 
statistically significant abnormal return of 14.5%, and the CAR is 24.57% on the day of 
tender offer announcement. Franks and Harris (1989) show that target shareholders earn 
statistically significant positive abnormal returns of about 23% at the month of 
announcement of the takeover proposal. 
Sudarsanam, Holl, and Salami (1996) investigate shareholders wealth gains in mergers 
by using a sample of 429 completed U. K. acquisitions during 1980-1990. They find that 
target firm shareholders experience statistically significant returns of 13.96% on the day 
of the merger announcement. Kennedy and Limmack (1996) using U. K. data of 1980- 
1989 find that target firm shareholders earn a large significant positive abnormal return 
of 28.75% in the month of takeover announcement. Draper and Paudyal (1999) report 
that UK target firm shareholders earn a significant abnormal return of 7.66% (equally 
weighted) and 7.18% (value weighted) on the day of announcement of the bids, 
respectively. 
2.8.2.2. Bidding Firm Shareholder Returns 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) shows that successful bidding firm shareholders earn 2.83% 
abnormal return with a t-statistic of 2.16 in the month of the first public announcement 
of the tender offer, and unsuccessful bidding firm shareholders earn only 
0.5% 
abnormal returns with a t-statistic of 1.19 in the same period. Firth (1979) 
finds that 
abnormal returns at month 0 for firms offering cash payment is -2.4%, and 
for finns 
offering equity payment is -3%. Firth (1980) reports successful 
bidding firm 
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shareholders suffer a significant negative wealth loss of -6.3%, and unsuccessful 
bidding finn shareholders also experience a significant negative wealth loss of -6%. 
Dodd (1980) reveals a small but negative return to bidding firms on the announcement 
day of merger proposals. The abnormal return at day -1 is -0.4% (the accurate 
announcement date is in fact day -1 for some firms) with a t-statistic of -2.46, and at 
day 0 is -0.62% with a t-statistics of -2.83. Asquith (1983) finds little reaction on the 
announcement day of a merger bid for both successful and unsuccessful bidding firms. 
The two-day (day -1 and day 0) abnormal returns are 0.2% for successful bidding firms 
and 0.5% for unsuccessful bidding finns, and the t-statistics are 0.78 for successful 
bidding finns and 1.92 for unsuccessful bidding firms respectively. 
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins, Jr. (1983) report that average announcement date 
abnormal return for all merger bids is 0.9% with a t-statistic of 4.68. Dennis and 
McConnell (1986) find bidding firms market-adjusted returns on day -1 and day 0 are 
0.22% with a t-statistic of 0.81 and -0.34% with a t-statistic of -1.48, respectively. The 
market-adjusted return for the two-day announcement period is -0.12% with a t-statistic 
of -0.33. 
Travlos (1987) finds that bidding firms choosing common stock financing had a 
negative effect on their common stock returns at the announcement period. Abnormal 
return on day -1 is -0.78% with a t-statistic of -3.95 and on 
day 0 is -0.69% with a t- 
statistic of -3.22. In addition, the abnormal return in the two-day announcement period 
is -1.47% with a t-statistic of -5.07. In contrast, 
bidding finns using cash offers 
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experience, on average, normal rate of returns. Abnormal returns are -0.05% with a t- 
statistic of +0.02 on day -1 and 0.29% with a t-statistic of 1.56 on day 0, respectively. 
In addition, the two-day announcement period abrionnal return is 0.24% with a t- 
statistic of 1.11. 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) find a small but insignificant abnormal return on the 
day when the tender offers are first announced. The average CAR to all the 236 bidding 
firms from event day -5 to +5 is 0.79% with a t-statistic of 1.69. Franks and Harris 
(1989) report that UK bidding firm shareholders earn statistically significant positive 
but small abnormal returns (about 1%) in the month of takeover announcement. 
Sudarsanam, Holl, and Salami (1996) find that UK bidding firm shareholders suffers a 
significant negative abnormal return of -1.26% at the day of the merger proposal 
announcement. 
Kennedy and Limmack (1996) find that UK bidding firm shareholders earns a small but 
significant positive abnormal return of 1.40% in the month of takeover announcement. 
Draper and Paudyal (1999) observe that UK bidding firm shareholders experiences a 
small but significant negative abnormal return of -0.82% (equally weighted) and - 
0.66% (value weighted) on the announcement day of merger proposals, respectively. 
2.8.2.3. Summary 
There are striking evidences of large significant abnormal returns to the target 
firm 
shareholders at the period of takeover announcement. Studies either based on the 
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monthly rate (month 0) of returns or daily rate (day -1 and/or day 0) of returns report a 
high significant abnormal return to the target shareholders, and all study is consistent 
with this result. 
The results on the bidding firms side are mixed. There are three groups based on the 
various results. One group finds that bidding firm stockholders earn a small but 
significant abnormal return on the takeover proposal announcement date. Another group 
argues bidding firm stockholders experience a normal rate of return during the bid 
announcement date. The final group reveals a small but significant negative abnormal 
return at the announcement of the bid. Since the significant positive or negative 
ý111 abnormal returns were quite small in all the studies, we might able to conclude that, on 
average, bidding firm stockholders earn a normal return at the announcement date of 
takeover bids. 
2.8.3. Shareholder Returns Between the Announcement Date and the Outcome 
Date 
2.8.3.1. Target Firm Shareholder Returns 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) estimate the shareholder returns after the announcement 
month of takeover proposals. They find no statistically significant abnormal returns 
for 
target firm shareholders (both for successful and unsuccessful targets) during 12 months 
after the takeover announcement. Firth (1980) fails to find any statistically significant 
abnormal returns for both successful and unsuccessful target firms in the period of 
12 
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month after the month of takeover announcement. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) 
report normal rate of returns to the target firm shareholders in the four months period 
after the day of takeover announcement. 
Asquith (1983) examines the interim period (i. e., the period from one day after the event 
day until two days before the outcome day) abnormal returns. The evidence shows that 
successful target firm shareholders eam a large positive CAR of 8.0% with a t-statistic 
of 4.00, and unsuccessful target firms in contrast experience a wealth loss of -8.1 % with 
a t-statistic of -3.43. 
2.8.3.2. Bidding Firm Shareholder Returns 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) do not find any statistically significant abnormal returns both 
for successful and unsuccessful bidding firm shareholders in the 12 months immediately 
after the month of takeover announcement. In contrast with Dodd and Ruback's finding, 
Firth (1980) finds that unsuccessful bidding firm shareholders experience a statistically 
significant abnormal return of 4.3% in the 12 months period after the takeover 
announcement. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) report a normal return to the bidding 
firm shareholders within this period. Kennedy and Limmack (1996) find that there is no 
significant abnormal return to the UK bidding firm shareholders in the twelve months 
beginning with the month of bid announcement. 
By examining the interim Period (i. e., the period from one day after the press day until 
two days before the outcome day) abnormal returns. Asquith (1983) finds that during 
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the interim period the average CAR for successful bidding firms is small, -0.46% and 
insignificant. However, the CAR for unsuccessful bidding firms is -6.19% with a t- 
statistic of -3.83. 
2.8.3.3. Summary 
There are not many studies on examining both the target and bidding firm shareholder 
returns during the period between the takeover announcement date and the outcome 
date. Asquith (1983) may be the only specific study to examine the merging firms stock 
returns in this interim period. However, his results either to the targets or to the bidders 
are inconsistent with the studies that investigated the merging firm returns in the 12 
months period after the takeover announcement. 
2.8.4. Shareholder Returns at the Outcome Date of Acquisitions 
The outcome date of acquisitions for the completed mergers is the date of 
announcement of the approval of the merger by the target stockholders and for the 
cancelled proposals it is the date of announcement of the termination of the merger 
negotiations by either or both boards of directors. 
2.8.4.1 Target Firm Shareholder Returns 
Dodd (1980) finds that the final approval of the mergers by stockholders have little 
impact on the value of the shares of target firms, the average abnon-nal return 
for target 
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finns is 0.08% at the approval day and 0.68% with a t-statistic of 2.58 at the day before. 
According to this result, he argues that most of the uncertainty as to the completion of 
the merger has been resolved before the final stockholder vote. In contrast, the abnormal 
returns to target firm shareholders in the announcement of termination of merger 
proposals is striking. On the day of the public termination announcement, target firm 
stockholders experience a negative abnormal return of -4.52% with a t-statistic of - 
10.39, and -4.16% with a t-statistic of -9.56 on the day before, respectively. 
Asquith (1983) investigates the shareholder returns on the date of merger approval. The 
evidence indicates that shareholders of successful target firms earn an abnon-nal return 
of 1.3% with a t-statistic of 5.99 on the outcome date and the day before. This result 
differs with Dodd (1980)'s. On the other hand, the abnonual return for the target firm 
shareholders in the unsuccessful mergers is dramatic. The two-day (outcome date and 
the day before) abnonual return is -6.4% with a t-statistic of -11.37. 
2.8.4.2. Bidding Firm Shareholder Returns 
Mandelker (1974) finds that bidding firm stockholders earn a nonnal rate of return at 
the month of the announcement of merger outcome. Dodd (1980) examines the market 
reaction to the announcement of the outcome of merger proposals. He finds that the 
final approval of mergers by stockholders have little impact on the values of shares of 
bidding firm stockholders, the average abnormal return at the approval date for bidders 
is 0.23%. On the other hand, he finds a slight positive abnormal returns to stockholders 
of bidding firms in cancelled mergers. On the day of the public termination 
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announcement, the average abnormal return to the bidding firm shareholders is 0.18%, 
and 1.06% with a t-statistic of 3.50 at the day before. 
Asquith (1983) reports that there are no significant stock price changes for both 
successful and unsuccessful bidding firms on the announcement date of the merger 
outcome. Lahey and Conn (1990) show that on the month of approval the CAR is - 
4.47% for using MM model and is -3.11 for using MAR model. However, these results 
are failed to be significant at a 5% level of significance. 
2.8.4.3. Summary 
Empirical findings on the common stock returns to both target and bidding finn 
shareholders are quite consistent with each other. Successful target firms experience a 
slightly significant positive abnormal return at the outcome date. However, unsuccessful 
target firms suffered a large and significant wealth loss. In contrast, both successful and 
unsuccessful bidding firms, on average, experienced a normal rate of return at the 
takeover outcome date. 
2.8.5. Shareholder Returns in the Post-Acquisition Period 
2.8.5.1. Unsuccessful Target Firm Shareholder Returns 
Asquith (1983) examines the post-merger stock returns to the unsuccessful target finns, 
his findings indicate that the decline of the CAR is small and insignificant for the first 
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80 days following the outcome date, but then decrease swiftly over the next 160 davs 
becoming significant for days +100 to +240. The total decline of the CAR from the 
outcome date (day 0) to the day +240 is 8.7%. 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) find that the entire abnormal returns gain from the 
announcement of takeover proposals to the target firms that are not subsequently taken 
over within five years of an unsuccessful offer dissipate within two years of the initial 
unsuccessful bid. 
2.8.5.2. Bidding Firm Shareholder Returns 
There are quite a few studies conducted on the bidding firms long-run post acquisition 
stock returns. We shall firstly have a brief look of the studies conducted in the UK. Firth 
(1979) shows the CAR (cumulative abnormal returns) of acquiring firms choosing cash 
offer decreases by 2.6%, and the CAR of acquiring firms offering equity decreases by 
7.8% at the end of 24 months after the takeover announcement. Bames (1984), Dodds 
and Quek (1985) report a CAR of -6.3% and -6.8% over the 60 months following the 
takeover announcement, respectively. Franks and Harris (1989) find that successful 
bidding firms suffer significant wealth loss in the two years period after the completion 
of takeovers, the CAR by using the market model is -12.6% by 24 months after the 
merger. Limmack (1991) uses three benchmarks to compute the post-acquisition 
abnormal returns. All the benchmarks produce significant negative CARs by 24 months 
following the completion of takeovers, and on average, the CAR is -9%. Kennedy and 
Limmack (1996) take into account of the size effect, they show that overall size 
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adjusted returns are negative with bidder abnormal returns being a significant -4.92% 
for the period 12 to 24 months post bid. Gregory (1997) examines the post-merger 
performance of UK bidding companies by using six benchmarks. He finds the two years 
CARs between -11.8% to -18% under these six different models, all of which are 
statistically significant. 
The evidence of long-term significantly negative abnormal returns of the merged firms 
following takeovers is echoed in the US. Langetieg (1978) reports significant CARs 
between -2.23% and -2.62% over 70 months using four different statistical methods. 
Asquith (1983) reports that the CAR decreases by 7.2% for the merged firms in the 240 
days following the merger completion date. Malatesta (1983) finds statistically 
significant CARs of -7.6% for the year after the first public announcement of the 
merger proposal. Jensen and Ruback (1983) survey seven previous studies of bidding 
firms' post-takeover performance and report an average CAR of -5.5% in 12 months 
after the takeover. Magenheim and Mueller (1988) find a significantly negative CAR of 
2.4% over three years after the merger announcement. Lahey and Conn (1990) apply 
two benchmarks and report a CAR of -10.2% and -38.57% respectively by three years 
after the merger approval. Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) provide a thorough 
analysis of the post-merger share performance of acquiring firms by using a nearly 
exhaustive sample of US mergers over 30 years. They find that shareholders of bidding 
firms suffer a statistically significant wealth loss of about -10% over five years after the 
merger. Anderson and Mandelker (1993) report significant five-year CARs of -9.6% 
and -9.3% under a size and a size & book-to-market adjustment model, respectively. 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) find a statistically significant BHAR (buy-and-hold abnormal 
85 
return) relative to a size and book-to-market control of -15.9%. Rau and Vennaelen 
(1998) use the size and book-to-market adjustment method and report a statistical 
significant three-year CAR of -4%. Most recently, Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) reviem, 22 
different papers of both UK and US examining the long-term post-acquisition stock 
returns, and conclude that merged firms' long-run performance is significantly negative 
following mergers. 
However, although the above evidence both in the UK and the US reports a significant 
negative long-run stock returns after the takeover, the findings are not all one sided. 
Mandelker (1974) finds that shareholders of bidding firms suffer a wealth loss in the 40 
months after the merger, the CAR decreases by 1.4%. However, it is economically 
small and no t-statistics are provided for this entire 40 months post-acquisition period, t- 
statistics for both a 10-month and a 20-month period are insignificant. Malatesta (1983) 
finds statistically significant abnormal returns for the year after the takeover 
announcement but insignificant results for the year after the management approval. 
Using the same data but different methodologies, Magenheim and Mueller (1988) and 
Bradley and Jarrell (1988) reach opposite conclusion. MM find significant CAR over 
three years, while BJ find insignificant results over the same time period. 
Lahey and Conn (1990) find a negative CAR of -10.20% in three years after the 
acquisition but it is statistically insignificant. Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) 
investigate the post-merger share price performance of acquiring finns by using two 
single-factor benchmarks (the equally-weighted index and the value-weighted index) 
and two multi-factor benchmarks (the eight-portfolio benchmark and ten-factor 
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benchmark). They find negative post-merger abnormal returns to the bidding firm 
shareholders by using an equal-weighted index. However, the value-weighted 
benchmark yields positive post-merger performance. In contrast, the result generated by 
using multi-factor benchmarks especially the eight-portfolio benchmark reveal no 
statistically significant abnormal performance for the overall sample of bidding finns 
during post-merger period. Loderer and Martin (1992) find a negative five-year 
abnormal returns but it is not statistically different from zero. 
In order to avoid the inability of stock price performance studies to determine whether 
takeovers create real economic gains and to identify the sources of such gains. Healy, 
Palepu, and Ruback (1992) examine the post-merger cash flow performance of 
successful bidding firms. Their findings indicate that merged firms have a significant 
improvement in operating cash flow returns after the merger, resulting from increases in 
asset productivity relative to their industries. Based on the similar method, Manson, 
Stark and Thomas (1994) in the UK find that operational cash flow gains after the 
takeovers. However, the evidence is not one-sided, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and 
Herman and Lowenstein (1988) report poor accounting performance after takeovers. 
2.8.5.3. Summary 
Successful target finns are unlisted after the outcome date of takeovers. Unsuccessful 
target firm shareholders suffer a large wealth loss after the outcome date, and evidence 
show that the entire abnormal returns gained from the announcement of takeover 
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proposals to the target firms that are not subsequently taken over within five years of an 
unsuccessful offer dissipate within two years of the initial unsuccessful bid. 
Although the negative long-run post acquisition abnormal returns to the bidding fin-ns 
gains a support from the majority, the issue is not unambiguous. Some studies do not 
find significant underperformance after the takeover, and even the studies carried out by 
examining the accounting performance after takeovers are divided. Fundamentally, the 
question is whether these acquisitions really led to significant negative abnonnal 
returns, or whether these findings are the result of some type of specification error. In 
summary, acquiring firms' long-run post acquisition stock returns is still an unsettled 
question that demands further investigation. 
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2.9. Review of Methodologies 
Franks, Harris and Titman (FHT) (1991) are viewed as a very important paper In the 
literature on long-r-un stock returns following takeovers. They alter this literature both 
by devoting their entire paper to post-acquisition shareholder returns and by using more 
sophisticated models (primarily the eight-portfolio model from Grinblatt and Titman 
(1988,1989), this benchmark consists of four portfolios based on firm size, three based 
on dividend yield and one based on past returns). Thus, we review the methodologies in 
the Pre-FHT and Post-FHT periods, respectively. 
2.9.1. Pre-FHT Period 
2.9.1.1. Market Model 
The Market Model (See Fama 1976, P63-132 for a discussion of this model) arises as an 
implication of the assumption of the two-parameter portfolio model that the joint 
distribution of returns on securities is multivariate normal. The market model is widely 
used in studies of the adjustment of securities prices to new information. Most of these 
studies are concerned with the reactions to company-specific information, such as a 
stock split or an announcement of takeovers. It specifies the following linear 
relationship between securityj returns and returns on a market portfolio. 
Rjt =ccj + PjR., +Ej, 
Where: 
Rjt = rate of return on securityj over period of t, 
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Rm, --.,: rate of return on a value weighted (or equally weighted) market portfolio in time 
period t. 
Since this model is based on the assumption that the joint distribution of returns on 
securities is multivariate normal, so that bivariate normality of kj, and k, is implied. 
(xjandPj = security- specific parameters that vary from one security to another, 
cci = E(kj)- PjE(k,, ý 
Pj = known as systematic risk, represents the risk of securityj relative to the total 
risk of the market portfolio, and is proportional to the contribution of 
securityj to the total risk of the market portfolio, i. e., 
Cov(kj, , 
k., )I Var(k., ý 
E'jt = the random disturbance term of securityj at period t, and E(ý'j, )=0. In the 
market model, the effects of company-specific information should show up in this 
disturbance. 
Least squares has been used to estimate (xj and Pj. They are calculated by regressing 
monthly returns for securityj on the monthly returns of the market index for a period (? 
month) prior to the bid. 
Once we obtain the estimates cij and ýj , we can compute the abnormal returns as 
follows: 
ýjl = Rj, -cij - 
ýjR., 
9 
(2) 
Where: 
6j, = the residual or the abnormal performance of stockj at month t. 
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The Average Residual (AR) for each month, -c , relative to the event month is, 
1N 
ARE =-L 6j, N j=l 
Where: 
N= the number of firms which have residuals for month -c . 
e, = the average residual across firms for month c 
These average residuals are summed over event time (from month -K to month T) to 
obtain the Cumulative Average Residual (CAR), 
T 
CART= >ýAR, (4) 
'r =-K 
2.9.1.2. Other Models 
Other models used in the Pre-FHT period to calculate the CARs are: 
(1) CAPM: F, jt = Rjt - 
[Rf, +pj (R. t - 
Rf, )] (5) 
(2) Mean Adjusted Return Model: ej, = Rj, - Rj (6) 
(3) Market Adjusted Retum Model: ej, = Rj, - R,,,, (7) 
2.9.2. Post-FHT Period 
2.9.2.1. Fama-French three-factor Model 
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The Sharpe-Lintner (SL) model [Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965)] implies that (a) 
expected returns on securities are a positive linear function of their market P, and (b) 
market P suffice to describe the cross-section of expected returns. 
There are several empirical contradictions of the SL model. Empirical researches find 
that P seems not able to explain the cross-sectional variation in average returns, and 
size (ME), leverage, book-to-market equity (BE/ME), and eamings-price ratios (E/P) all 
help to explain the cross-section of expected return. 
Fama and French (1992) argue "since E/P, ME, Leverage, and BE/ME are all scaled 
versions of price, it is reasonable to expect that some of them are redundant for 
describing average returns". They find that the combination of size (ME) and book-to- 
market equity (BE/ME) absorbs the roles of leverage and E/P in average stock returns. 
Fama and French (1993) identify three common risk factors in the stock returns, an 
overall market factor and factors related to firm size (ME) and book-to-market equity 
(BE/ME). They argue these three factors do a good job in explaining the cross-section 
of average stock retums. 
Based on the empirical findings of Fama and French (1992,1993), Fama and French 
(1993) write: "Many continue to use the one-factor Sharpe-Lintner model to evaluate 
portfolio performance and to estimate the cost of capital, despite the lack of evidence 
that it is relevant. At a minimum, the results here and in Fama and French 
(1992a) 
should help to break this common habit". 
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Fama and French (1996) argue that many of the CAPM average return anomalies are 
captured by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. However, this model 
cannot explain the continuation of short-term returns. The continuation of short-terrn 
returns is thus left unexplained by the model (Fama and French 1996). This model also 
has systematic problems explaining the average returns on categories of small stocks 
(Fama 1998). 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model is widely used in the Post-FHT period. [e. g. 
Gregory (1997), Mitchell and Stafford (2000)]. The Abnormal return based on this 
three-factor model is specified as follows: 
F, jt =Rjl -[Rft +PJR., -Rf, 
)+yj (SAMj+ 6j(HMLt)] (8) 
Where: 
R,, ý the monthly return on a value-weighted market portfolio. 
SMB=the value-weighted return on small firms minus the value-weighted returns on 
large firms (Small minus Big). 
HAIIL=the value-weighted return on high book-to-market firms minus the value- 
weighted return on low book-to-market (High minus Low). 
2.9.2.2. Size and book-to-market adjusted method (reference portfolio approach) 
Some studies do not use any specific model at all, (but they follow the spirit of 
Fama 
and French 1992,1993,1996), [e. g. Anderson and Mandelker (1993), 
Loughran and Vijh 
(1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998)]. Their method is to calculate Abnon-nal 
Returns for 
each firm relative to its size and book-to-market benchmark 
(i. e., the difference between 
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its monthly return and that of its reference portfolio). The method is described as 
follows: Firstly, they form, for instance, 10 size deciles at the end of every month on the 
basis of the market capitalization, then rank each firm into one of these 10 portfolios 
formed on the basis of these breakpoints. This decile breakpoint formation and ranking 
procedure is repeated every month between the investigation periods, for instance, 
years. Secondly, These deciles are further sorted into, for instance, 5 quintiles using 
book-to-market ratios. Portfolio returns are then formed every month by averaging the 
monthly returns for these 50 portfolios. These returns are then used as benchmarks to 
calculate abnormal performance. Finally, Abnormal Returns are calculated for each firrn 
relative to its size and book-to-market benchmark (as the difference between its monthly 
return and that of its reference portfolio) every month for 36 months after the merger 
completion date. CARs are calculated by averaging across all acquiring finns every 
month and then summing these averages over time. 
2.9.2.3. Other Models 
Other models used in the Post-FHT period to calculate the CARs are: 
(1) DM (Dimson and Marsh 1986) risk and size ad usted model: i 
& jt = Rj, - 
[Rs, + (p j-Ps 
XR., 
- Rft 
)] 
Where: 
R,, is the return on a size control portfolio in month t. 
P, is the beta of the control sample. 
(2) Simple size control portfolio Model (SS) 
e. R. ji jt 
(10) 
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2.10. Conclusion 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of previous studies on the financial 
performance of mergers and acquisitions, especially on the shareholders' wealth effects 
of corporate takeovers. We firstly review some key issues in the M&A literature, such 
as motives for takeovers, the impact of methods of payment to the shareholders returns, 
and the size effect to the long-run stock returns of corporate takeovers. Secondly, We 
turn to review a few key papers of the past three decades that contribute a lot to die 
development of the M&A literature. This provides us a clear time line regarding the 
evolution of studies in the corporate takeovers. Thirdly, we critically analyze the stock 
returns of both target and bidding firms in the entire acquisition process (i. e., from 
several years prior to the takeover to a few years after the completion of the takeover). 
Finally, we present a detailed review of the methodologies applied in these previous 
studies. In a word, this chapter provides readers a broad view of the studies in the 
mergers and acquisitions, and helps them to the further understanding of the following 
empirical chapters. 
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Chapter 3. Methodologies 
3.1. Introduction 
In event studies, both short and long term tests generally focus on a test statistic, i. e., the 
ratio of the sample mean CAR to its estimated standard deviation. Recent papers by 
Kothari and Warner (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997) address biases in long-horizon 
event studies. Both document that for randomly chosen firrns, the traditional t-test of 
abnormal performance is misspecified and indicates abnormal performance too 
frequently. 
Kothari and Warner (1997) argue that it is very difficult to obtain an unbiased estimate 
of each component of this ratio in the long horizons. The null will be over-rejected if the 
measured average abnormal performance is systematically nonzero or the standard 
deviation used to calculate the test statistics is too small, or both. It is also possible that, 
if the mean and standard deviation are correlated. 
Kothari and Warner (1997) examine a variety of abnormal return models, i. e., Market- 
Adjusted Model, Market Model, CAPM, and the Farna-French three-factor Model. They 
find that all four models are severely misspecified regardless the use of CARs or 
BHARs, (all four models significantly over-reject the null hypothesis), and the degree 
of misspecification is not highly sensitive to the models applied. Based on these 
findings, Kothari and Warner argue that parametric long-horizon tests will often 
indicate abnormal performance when none is present, thus the interpretation of long- 
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horizon tests requires extreme caution. However, they suggest that nonparametric 
procedures appear to have fewer potential problems, and conclusions based on these 
procedures seem less likely to be due to misspecification. 
Barber and Lyon (1997) in an independent simulation study argue that many of the 
common methods used to calculate long-run abnormal stock returns are flawed and lead 
to biased test statistics. They evaluate three approaches for detecting the long-run 
abnormal stock returns, i. e., Reference Portfolio Approach, Control Firrns Approach, 
and Fama-French three-factor Model. Barber and Lyon argue that using Reference 
Portfolio Approach (size portfolios, book-to-market portfolios, size/book-to-market 
portfolios, and equally-weighted market index) and the Fama-French three-factor model 
to calculate long-term abnormal returns yield misspecified test statistics (empirical 
rejection rates exceed theoretical rejection rates). 
Barber and Lyon (1997) point out that misspecification arises from three possible 
biases: the new listing bias, the rebalancing bias, and the skewness bias. The new listing 
bias arises because sample firms usually have a long pre-event return record, whereas 
the benchmark portfolio includes firms that have only recently begun trading and are 
known to have abnormally low returns (Ritter (1991)). The rebalancing bias anses 
because the compounded return on the benchmark portfolio implicitly assumes periodic 
rebalancing of the portfolio weights, whereas the sample firm returns are compounded 
without rebalancing. The skewness bias refers to the fact that with a skewed-right 
distribution of abnormal returns, the student t-distribution is asymmetric with a mean 
smaller than the zero null. They advocate that a more appropriate approach would 
be a 
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comparison of buy-and-hold returns with an appropriate firm matched on size and book- 
to-market ratios. 
Barber and Lyon (1997) find that the Control Firm Approach yields well-specified test 
statistics in virtually all-sampling situations they considered. They argue that this 
control firms approach yields well-sPecified test statistics because it alleviates the new 
listing bias (since both the sample firm and control firm must be listed in the identified 
event month), the rebalancing bias (since both the sample firm and control firm returns 
are calculated without rebalancing), and skewness biases (since the sample finn and 
control firm are equally likely to experience large positive returns). In a following up 
paper, Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) find that using size/book-to-market control firms 
approach yields well-specified test statistic for the conventional t-statistic in all random 
samples. 
In summary, control firms approach seems as a very promising way in the studies of 
testing long-run abnormal stock returns. Because it is not only avoid using the 
inappropriate asset pricing models, but also eliminates the new listing, the rebalancing, 
and skewness biases. Furthen-nore, Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) find that in random 
samples the control firms approach yields well-specified test statistics either 
by using 
CARs or BHARs to calculate the long-run abnormal returns. Thus, it minimizes the 
chances that the test statistics are mis-specified. 
Finally, previous researches in corporate takeovers have traditionally applied 
the CAR 
to calculate the long-run abnormal returns before 1997. However, since 
the study of 
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Loughran and Vijh (1997), people have started to apply the BHAR to examine the long- 
run abnormal returns in takeovers. Barber and Lyon (1997) favour the use of BHARs 
for two reasons. First, CARs are not able to reflect an investor's experience that holds a 
security for a long post-event period. Long-term investor experience is better captured 
by compounding short-term returns to obtain long-term buy-and-hold returns. Second, 
they find that CAR is a biased predictor of BHAR. However, Fama (1998) argue that 
theoretical and statistical consideration alike suggests that CARs rather than BHARs 
should be used. On balance, it seems that both CARs and BHARs have their own 
advantages and can be considered as complementary rather than competing approaches 
to calculating long-run abnormal stock returns. Thus, the best solution for us would be 
to use both and compare the results obtained from them. 
3.2. Control Firms Approach 
Control Firms Approach, i. e., matching sample finns to control firms of similar sizes 
and book-to-market ratios, advanced by Barber and Lyon (1997) has since been a very 
promising way to detect long-run abnormal stock returns. Its popularity arises from the 
inability of either the asset pricing model or the reference portfolio approach in 
detecting the long-run abnormal stock returns. The details of this method are as follows. 
1. In June of year t, we find all the market value of equity (size) of all the LSE 
listed 
finns. 
2. In December of year t-1, we calculate the book-to-market ratios of all these 
finns. 
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3. Sample firms are matched to a control firm on the basis of size and book-to-market 
ratio. (1) We identify all firms with a market value of equity (size) between 701/ o and 
130% of the market value of equity (size) of the sample firm. (2) From this set of firms, 
we choose the firm with the book-to-market ratio closest to that of the sample fin-n. 
We use the return on the control firm as the expected return for each sample firm; the 
same control firm is used throughout the horizon of analysis (three years). 
The Calculation ofLong-run Abnormal Stock Returns 
The tradition in much of the research on abnormal returns has been to sum either daily 
or monthly abnormal returns over time. Define Ri, as the month t simple return on a 
sample firm, Rj, is the return on the control fin-n matched on Size and Book-to-Market 
Ratio, we use it as the expected return for the sample firm throughout the horizon of 
analysis, i. e., E (Ri, )= Rjl. ARj, = R, I -E 
(Rj As the abnormal return in month t. 
Cumulating across T periods yields the cumulative abnormal return (CAR): 
CA. Rjr ARi, (1) 
In contrast, the BHAR is the return on a buy-and-hold investment 
in the sample fin-n 
less the return on a buy-and-hold investment in the control firm, E 
(Ri, )= Rj, 
TT 
BHAR, t = 
fl [I + R,, +E (Rij] (2) 
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3.3. The Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
In addition to the control firms approach, we also use the three-factor model developed 
by Fama and French (1993) as an alternative method, and compare the results obtained 
by these two approaches. The three-factor model is applied by regression the post-event 
monthly excess returns for firm i on a market factor, a size factor, and a book-to-market 
factor: 
Ril - Rft = cc i+0i 
(R,,,, 
- Rft) + si SAM, + hi HML, +6 it (3) 
Where Ri, is the simple return on the common stock of firm i, Rfi is the return on three- 
month treasury bills, Rmt is the return on a value-weighted market index, SMBt is the 
return on a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks less the return on a value-weighted 
portfolio of big stocks, and HML, is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high 
book-to-market stocks less the return on a value-weighted portfolio of low book-to- 
market stocks. The regression yields parameter estimates of (xi, Pi Si and hi. The error 
term in the regression is denoted by P-i,. The parameter of interest in this regression is 
the intercept, (xi. A positive (negative) intercept indicates that after controlling for 
market, size, and book-to-market factors in returns, a sample firm has performed better 
(worse) than expected. 
The SAIIB and HAIL in the model above are formed as follows according to Fama and 
French (1993,1996). At the end of June of each year t, LSE stocks are allocated to two 
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e ), 
groups (Small or Big) based on whether their June size is below or above the median 
size for LSE stocks. LSE stocks (with book-to-market ratios) are allocated in an 
independent sort to three book-to-market ratio groups based on the breakpoints for the 
bottom 30% (Low), middle 40% (Medium), and top 30% (High) of the values of book- 
to-market ratios for LSE stocks. Value-weighted monthly returns on the portfolios are 
calculated from July to the following June. SAIJB is the difference, each month, between 
the average of the returns on the small-stock portfolio and the average of the returns on 
the big-stock portfolio. HAff. is the difference, each month, between the average of the 
returns on the high book-to-market portfolio and the average of the returns on the low 
book-to-market portfolios. 
3.4. The Test Statistics 
We will apply both the parametric and the non-parametric tests into our empirical 
studies. The details are as follows. 
3.4.1. Conventional Parametric Student t-test 
For the control firms approach, the test statistics of the null hypothesis that the mean 
CARs and BHARs are equal to zero for a sample of n firms are as 
follows: 
CAR = CAR,, 
/(cy (CAR,, )1. -, 
In-) 
or 
(4) 
tBHAR = BHAki-, 
I'(cy (BHAR,, )lVn) (5) 
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Where CARt and BHAR,, are the sample averages and cy (CAR, ) and cy (BHAR, ) are 
the cross-sectional sample standard deviations of abnormal returns for the sample of n 
firms. 
For the Fama-French three-factor model, we follow the same application of Barber and 
Lyon (1997), the procedure is as follows: For a sample of n firms, we estimate n 
regressions, i. e., one for each sample firm. The intercept terms from these regressions 
(a s) are then averaged across the n sample firms. A parametric t-statistic is calculated 
by dividing the mean intercept term by the cross-sectional sample standard deviation of 
the intercept terms and multiplying by the square root of n. The mean intercept term is 
used to test the null hypothesis that the mean monthly abnormal return of sample firms 
is equal to zero. This application of the Fama-French three-factor model is conceptually 
equivalent to the tests based on cumulative abnon-nal returns (CARs). 
3.4.2. Nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test 
Parametric tests are based on specific assumptions about the distribution of abnormal 
returns. Alternative nonparametric tests are available in order to examine the abnormal 
returns during the investigation period. In practice, they are used in conjunction with the 
parametric tests to check the robustness of the results. In our case, the Sign 
Test and the 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are fit for our investigation. 
The Sign Test computes the differences between the two variables 
for all cases and 
classifies the differences as either positive, negative, or tied. 
If the two variables are 
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similarly distributed, the number of positive and negative differences will not differ 
significantly. The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test considers information about both the 
sign of the differences and the magnitude of the differences between pairs. Because the 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test incorporates more information about the data, it is more 
powerful than the sign test. Thus, we choose the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test as our 
nonparametric method to check the robustness of our parametric t-test. 
3.5. Conclusion 
In the present Chapter, we firstly discuss and analyze the misspecification problems 
associated with previous methodologies in detecting the long-run abnormal stock 
returns. We then introduce the Control Firms Approach advanced by Barber and Lyon 
(1997). Since the control firms approach minimizes the chances that the test statistics 
are missPecified, we will apply it as our main method to calculate both the CAR and the 
BHAR throughout the following empirical chapters. In addition to the control firms 
approach, the Fama-French three-factor model will also be used as an alternative to 
calculate the CAR. Finally, both the conventional parametric Mest and the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rand test will be applied as the test statistics 
throughout the following empirical chapters. 
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Chapter 4. Testing the Validity of the Control Firms Approach under Various 
Accounting Year Endings: the UK Evidence 
4.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 3, we have discussed that the control firms approach advanced by Barber 
and Lyon (1997) eliminates the new listing, the rebalancing, and skewness biases. Since 
it minimizes the chances that the test statistics are misspecified, it seems a very 
promising way in the studies of detecting the long-run abnormal stock returns. 
However, the control firms approach designed by Barber and Lyon (1997) may not be 
without questions while applying to the out-of-sample studies. In their approach, Barber 
and Lyon use June of year t to find the market value (size), and December of year t- I to 
calculate the book-to-market ratio. The use of December to calculate the book-to-market 
ratio is because that US firms have the same fiscal year ending in December. Thus, it is 
reasonable and convenient to calculate the book-to-market ratio at the same accounting 
year ending, i. e., December. However, the accounting year endings of UK firms are 
different months across the whole year, if we introduce the same approach (calculating 
the book-to-market ratio at December) into UK, we are not able to calculate the book- 
to-market ratio at the firms' accounting year endings for most of the UK firms. 
Due to UK firms accounting year endings vary from January to December, the control 
firms approach will not be exactly the same when we apply it in the UK. We may have 
two choices. First, we can still calculate the book-to-market ratio at December of year t- 
and find the size (market value) at June of year t by ignoring the difference of the 
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accounting year endings of all the UK firms. The advantage of this approach is that all 
the firms' sizes and book-to-market ratios are calculated at the same point in time, thus 
we can compare the sizes and the book-to-market ratios of different firms, and find the 
control firms for our sample firins. The shortcoming of this method is that the book-to- 
market ratios are not calculated according to firms accounting year endings as we 
usually do. However, Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) find 
that the control firms approach works well in random samples. Thus, if our sample 
firms are randomly chosen, and the accounting year endings of our sample firms are 
distributed randomly, we still can expect an unbiased test-statistic by using this 
matching method although more than half of book-to-market ratios are not calculated 
according to their accounting year endings. However, although it may not be biased, 
this matching issue may introduce noises to our empirical test. 
Second, if we intend to calculate the book-to-market ratios at different months 
according to sample firms accounting year endings, we are still able to match them with 
a matching sample that contains all the firms that have the same accounting year ending 
with the sample firm. For instance, we can find all the sample firms that have an 
accounting year ending at March, we then collect all the LSE listed firms that also have 
an accounting year ending at March. We calculate the book-to-market ratios at March 
and find the sizes in six month after, i. e., September for all these sample and matching 
firms. The advantage of this approach is that we calculate the book-to-market ratio of 
our sample and matching firms not only at the same point in time but also at the firms 
accounting year ending. It is the same approach applied by Barber and Lyon (1997). 
The shortcoming of this method is that we have reduced our matching sample from all 
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the listed finns to the firms with only an accounting year ending at March. Thus, our 
matching sample will be very small, and the control firm matched on size and book-to- 
market ratio may not be the exact match to the sample firm. Thus we have limited our 
choice for the control firm. 
In short, the two alternative ways ahead of us are both having advantages and 
shortcomings, we think the first approach will yield unbiased test statistics to our 
empirical test, but it may introduce noise at the same time. Although the second 
approach looks the same as what Barber and Lyon have used, it largely reduce the size 
of the matching sample and hence limit our choice for the control firm in a great deal. 
For convenience, we call the first way as the control finns approach under the 
December-June model, and name the second as the control firms approach under 
Various-Accounting-Year-Ending model. We will use both CAR and BHAR to 
calculate the long-run abnormal stock returns of our sample firms under both models, 
and test whether these long-run abnormal stock returns calculated under different 
approaches are significantly different. 
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4.2. Methodology 
Corporate takeover is one of the most researched areas in finance, and is a typical event 
for the event study. Examining the long-run abnormal stock returns of corporate 
takeovers has been a popular topic for several decades. Thus, due to its typical status 
and its popularity, we choose corporate takeover as our event, and test the control firms 
approach under the specific event of corporate takeovers. 
4.2.1. Control Firms Approach under December-June Model 
By applying the control firms approach under the December-June model [Barber and 
Lyon (1997)'s approach, details are discussed in Chapter 3], we ignore the difference of 
firms accounting year endings, and calculate all the book-to-market ratios at December 
of year t-1, and find their sizes (market value of equity) at June of year t. 
4.2.2. Control Firms Approach under Various-Year-Ending Model 
To use the control firms approach under the Various-Year-Ending model, we regroup 
the sample firms and matching firms into different sub-samples according to firms 
accounting year endings. For example, we put all the sample firms that have an 
accounting year ending at January into sample January, and put all the matching 
firms 
whose accounting year also ends at January into matching-sample January. 
We then 
calculate their book-to-market ratios at January of year t, and 
find the market value of 
equity (size) at July of year t. When we obtain all the sizes and 
book-to-market ratios, 
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we can match a firm in sample January with a firm in matching-sample January to find 
out the control firm. The details of this approach are listed as follows. 
1. In each calendar month of year t, we calculate the book-to-market ratios of all the 
LSE listed firms with an accounting year ending at this calendar month. 
2. At the sixth month after the calendar month (i. e., with 6 months lag), we find all the 
market value of equity (size) of all these firms. 
3. Sub-sample firms are matched to a control firm on the basis of size and book-to- 
market ratio of the sub-matching sample. (1) We identify all firms in the sub-matching 
sample with a market value of equity (size) between 70% and 130% of the market value 
of equity (size) of the sample firm. (2) From this set of firms, we choose the fin-n with 
the book-to-market ratio closest to that of the sample firm. (3) We use the return on the 
control firm as the expected return for each sample firm; the same control firm is used 
throughout the horizon of analysis. 
For the methods of calculating the long-run abnormal stock returns (both CAR and 
BHAR) and their test statistics, please refer to Chapter 3 for details. 
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4.3. Data and Sample Construction 
Fama and French (1992) document a significant relation between stock returns, firm 
size, and book-to-market ratios for non-financial firms. Because Fama and French 
exclude the financial firms from their analysis, they leave a large holdout sample of 
financial finns on which to test the relation between security returns, size and book-to- 
market ratios. Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that there is no reason to expect that firrn 
size and book-to-market ratios have different meanings for financial versus non- 
financial firms. By examining this holdout sample, Barber and Lyon find that both 
financial and non-financial firms exhibit a significant size and book-to-market premium. 
They document that the relation between stock return, firm size, and book-to-market 
ratios is similar for financial and non-financial firms. Based on these findings, we do 
not distinct the financial firms and non-financial firms from our sample finns. Thus our 
sample firms are mixed with both financial and non-financial firms. 
In our empirical test, we will examine the three-year pre-announcement period 
shareholder returns of both target and bidding firms, and will also examine the 
successful bidding firms (merged firms) three-year returns after the takeover. We have 
initially collected all the UK public target and bidding firms from various issues of 
Extel Financial and Acquisition Monthly for the ten-year period of 1991-2000. We set 
our selection criteria as follows. (1) We omit the firms that we are not able to 
find a 
company Code for it from the Datastream. (2) For examining the three-year pre- 
announcement abnormal returns, all the target and 
bidding firms must have a takeover 
announcement date; we exclude the fin-ns that the announcement 
date is not available. 
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For examining the three-year post-outcome abnormal returns, all the successful bidding 
fin-ris must have an outcome date; we exclude the firms that the outcome date is not 
available. (3) Since we are examining target and bidding fin-ns three-year pre- 
announcement stock returns and the successful bidding firms post-outcome three-year 
stock returns, all the selected firms must have whole three-year pre or post takeover 
stock price, we omit the firms that do not qualify for this requirement. (4) To apply the 
control firms approach to calculate the CARs and BHARs, all the sample firms selected 
after the above criteria must have both sizes (market value of equity) and book-to- 
market ratios at the event year t and year t- 1, we exclude the firms that do not meet this 
requirement. (5) In line with Lyon et al (1999), we finally delete the selected sample 
firms with a negative book value and a zero size (market value of equity is equal to 
zero). Finally, 472 target firms and 208 bidding firms are qualified for the three-year 
pre-takeover studies, and 212 bidding firms are selected for the post-takeover 
investigation. 
We choose all the firms that listed in the LSE in 1991-2000 as our matching firms, there 
are about 3,000 finns listed every year during this period. We try to find the size and 
book-to-market ratios for all of them. We find that most of the firms have the size 
(market value of equity) data, however, a difficulty encountered when trying to 
calculate the book-to-market ratios. There are nearly half of the 
finns that do not have a 
book value available on Datastream, thus we are not able to calculate the 
book-to- 
market ratios for them. Consequently, as shown 
in Table 4.1, there are less than 2,000 
firms in each year with both size and book-to-market ratio'. The situation improves 
through time, but still less than 2000 matching firms available for each year under 
investigation. Furthermore, we delete the firms that have a size of zero. In line with 
Lyon et al (1999), firms with negative book value of equity, although this is relatively 
rare, are excluded from the analysis. The number of matching firms for each year is also 
shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Matching firms in 1991-2000 
Matching firins are all the LSE listed firins with both sizes and book-to-market ratios (firms with negative 
book value and zero size are excluded). 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Matching 
1445 1381 1334 1340 1427 1491 1612 1740 1702 1593 
Firms 
We have so far collected all the takeover sample firms and the matching finns for each 
year. To apply the control firms approach under December-June model, we can directly 
find the control firm by matching sample firm to the matching firms on the basis of size 
and book-to-market ratio. However, to use the control firms approach under the 
Various-Year-Encling model, we have to re-organize both the sample fin-ns and 
matching firms of each year into 12 sub-samples on the basis of their year endings, and 
match the sub-sample firms with the relevant sub-matching samples. Thus, we need to 
construct 12 sub-samples and 12 sub-matching samples every year on the 
basis of firms 
accounting year endings. 
I The book-to-market ratio is not available directly from the Datastream; 
however, the Datastream 
provides the market-to-book ratio 
(Datastream code MTBV). Thus, we calculate the book-to-market ratio 
by I/MTBV for each firm that their market-to-book ratios 
(MTBV) are available. 
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We need firstly construct 12 sub-matching samples each year according to the firrns 
accounting year endings. As Table 4.1 shows above, we have already obtained the 
matching samples for each year; our next job is to construct sub-matching samples for 
these years. For example, in 199 1, we have 1445 matching firms; we find the 
accounting year endings of all these firms. If one finn's accounting year ends at 
January, we put it into matching sample January, if a firm's accounting year ending is 
August, we put it into matching sample August, and so on. Thus, we can build 12 sub- 
matching samples every year according to which calendar month the firm's accounting 
year ends at. We use this approach to construct the sub-matching samples for every year 
from 1991 to 2000. Table 4.2 shows the number of sub-matching samples for each 
calendar month (firms accounting year ending) from 1991 to 2000. As we can see that 
nearly half of firms have an accounting year ending at December, on average, 43.7% 
matching firms have an accounting year ending at December for this ten years period. 
The second largest month is March, there are on average 21.25% matching firms have 
an accounting year ending at March. The next significant months are September and 
June, they on average consist 8.19% and 7.53% matching firms respectively. Thus, sub- 
matching samples of December, March, September, and June consist on average 
80.7% 
firms of the whole matching sample. All the other 8 sub-matching samples are relatively 
small with the largest percentage less than 4%. 
Before we construct Table 4.2, we originally think that except 
December firms might be 
evenly distributed into sub-matching samples 
(i. e., the relevant calendar months) at each 
year. However, Table 4.2 tells us 
that are not the case. December shares nearly half of 
the firms, followed by March with more 
than 20%, June and September share around 
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8% respectively. Other sub-matching samples are quite small, all less than 4% and with 
the extreme case of November that shares only 0.93% of the total firms. 
We originally plan to examine the difference of abnormal returns calculated under the 
December-June model and the Various-Year-Ending model. If the matching firms are 
evenly distributed into sub-matching samples as we initially think, there will be more 
than 100 firms in each sub-matching sample. Thus, although the sub-matching samples 
are relatively small, we still have more than 100 firms to be matched with a sample 
firm. For instance, one sample firm has the accounting year ending at February, thus we 
need to match it with the sub-matching sample February that consists all the firms with 
an accounting year ending at February in a given year. If the sub-matching sample of 
February consists more than 100 firms (though relatively small), we may still be able to 
find a close control firm for the sample firrn with the choice of more than 100 firms. 
However, in fact, sub-matching sample February only on average consists 30 firms (2% 
firms of the whole matching sample), thus this sub-matching sample is too small for us 
to find a close match for the sample firm. Consequently, we are not going to examine 
the difference of abnormal returns calculated under the December-June model (i. e., a 
sample firm with an accounting year ending at February, we ignore its accounting year 
ending and calculate its book-to-market ratio at December and size at June, and then 
match it with the whole matching sample of around 1,500 firms on the basis of size and 
book-to-market ratio calculated at June and December respectively) and the Various- 
Year-Ending model (i. e., calculate the sample firm's book-to-market ratio at February 
according to the accounting year ending, and 
find the size with six-month lag at July, 
and then match it with the sub-matching sample 
February of around 30 firms on the 
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basis of book-to-market ratios and size calculated at February and July respectively). 
We think that the control firm (i. e., the expected return) that one chosen from 1,500 
firms and the other chosen from 30 firms will make the expected return significantl,,,, 
different, and result in significant different abnormal returns. 
Based on the discussion above, we will not examine the difference of abnormal returns 
calculated under December-June model and the Various-Year-Ending model with a sub- 
matching sample that on average has less than 100 matching firms in the ten-year 
period. Table 4.2 tells us that four calendar months (i. e., four sub-matching samples) in 
each year are qualified for the investigation; they are December (with on average 656 
firms, 43.7%), March (319 firms, 21.25%), September (123 firms, 8.19%), and June 
(113 firms, 7.53%). Finns have the accounting year endings at December will have no 
problems to directly apply the December-June model, because the book-to-market ratios 
are just calculated according to their accounting year ending, i. e., December. And these 
firms nearly consist half of the matching sample, thus nearly half of LSE listed firms 
(with both sizes and book-to-market ratios) are fit for the December-June Model. 
Consequently, we will only examine the months of March, September, and June, we 
expect to find out whether the empirical results are significantly different by applying 
the control firms approach under the December-June model and the Various-Year- 
Ending model resPectively. 
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4.4. Empirical Results 
Our purpose of this research is to examine whether there is statistically significant 
difference in the long-run abnormal returns calculated by using the control firms 
approach under the December-June model (advanced by Barber and Lyon (1997)) and 
the Various-Accounting-Year-Ending model, and hence to find out whether firrns (such 
as firms in the UK) with different accounting year endings will significantly affect the 
validity of Barber and Lyon (1997) approach. In a word, we want to find out whether 
book-to-market ratios must be calculated and matched according to firms accounting 
year endings, i. e., whether firms accounting year endings will significantly affect our 
empirical results. 
4.4.1. Target Firms' Three Years Pre-Acquisition Stock Returns 
Table 4.3 reports the three-year pre-takeover average ARs (abnonnal returns) and 
average CARs of the target firms that have an accounting year ending at March. ARs 
and CARs in column 2 and 3 are calculated by applying the December-June model (i. e., 
we ignore the accounting year ending of March for these finns, and calculate the book- 
to-market ratios at December of year t- I and sizes at June of year t for these target 
firms). We match these sample fin-ns with all the LSE listed firms (with both book-to- 
market ratios and sizes calculated at the same time as above, around 1,500 matching 
firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). ARs and CARs in 
Column 4 and 5 are calculated by applying the March-September model (i. e., according 
to the accounting year ending of March, we calculated the book-to-market ratios at 
118 
March of year t and sizes at September (with 6 months lag) of year t for these target 
firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms that have an 
accounting year ending at March (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are calculated at 
the same time as above, around 300 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the 
control firms. Column 6 and 7 are the first difference of the Abnormal Returns (FDAR) 
and the t-statistic of the FDAR. Figure 4.1 plots the 36 monthly FDARs. 
Table 4.3. Target firms (with an accounting year ending at March) three-year pre-takeover 
abnormal returns and CARs 
Sample target firms (accounting year ends at March, 63 firms) three-year pre-takeover abnormal returns 
are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the March- 
September model respectively. The average AR (abnormal return) and CAR (cumulative abnormal 
return) for each month (from event months -36 to -1) are given below. We also calculate the FDAR (first 
difference of abnormal returns) and their t-statistics. 
December-June March-September Difference 
EM AR CAR AR CAR FDAR T-Stat 
Month -36 0.0105 0.0105 0.0127 0.0127 -0.0022 0.15 
Month -35 0.0126 0.0231 -0.0017 0.0111 0.0143 1.09 
Month -34 0.0146 0.0377 0.0027 0.0138 0.0119 0.71 
Month -33 -0.0052 0.0325 0.0133 0.0271 -0.0185 1.09 
Month -32 0.0009 0.0334 0.0074 0.0345 -0.0065 0.39 
Month -31 0.0034 0.0368 0.0012 0.0357 0.0022 0.13 
Month -30 0.0044 0.0412 -0.0015 0.0341 0.0059 0.43 
Month -29 -0.0148 0.0264 -0.0166 0.0175 0.0018 0.11 
Month -28 0.0150 0.0414 0.0061 0.0237 0.0089 0.56 
Month -27 0.0046 0.0461 0.0085 0.0322 -0.0039 0.27 
Month -26 -0.0143 0.0318 -0.0036 0.0285 -0.0107 0.61 
Month -25 -0.0098 0.0220 0.0086 0.0372 -0.0184 0.61 
Month -24 0.0295 0.0515 0.0426 0.0797 -0.0131 0.47 
Month -23 -0.0086 0.0429 -0.0069 0.0728 -0.0017 0.12 
Month -22 0.0230 0.0659 0.0104 0.0832 0.0126 0.83 
Month -21 -0.0048 0.0611 0.0006 0.0838 -0.0054 0.31 
Month -20 -0.0007 0.0603 -0.0146 0.0693 0.0139 0.88 
Month -19 -0.0365* 0.0239 -0.0324 0.0368 -0.0041 0.22 
Month -18 0.0050 0.0289 0.0032 0.0400 0.0018 0.11 
Month -17 0.0215 0.0504 0.0329* 0.0728 -0.0114 0.79 
Month -16 -0.0038 0.0466 -0.0087 0.0641 0.0049 0.25 
Month -15 0.0150 0.0616 0.0098 0.0739 0.0052 0.36 
Month -14 -0.0136 0.0479 0.0019 0.0758 -0.0155 0.75 
Month - 13 -0.0410* 0.0069 -0.0381 0.0377 -0.0029 0.18 
Month -12 -0.0060 0.0009 -0.0007 0.0307 0.0010 0.05 
Month -11 -0.0166 -0.0157 0 0.0308 -0.0166 0.82 
Month -10 0.0013 -0.0144 -0.0375 -0.0067 0.0388 1.12 
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Month -9 -0.0109 -0.0253 -0.0405 -0.0472 0.0296 1.15 
Month -8 -0.0087 -0.0340 -0.0002 -0.0474 -0.0085 0.33 
Month -7 0.0119 -0.0221 -0.0056 -0.0530 0.0175 1.13 
Month -6 0.0092 -0.0130 -0.0238 -0.0768 0.0330 1.76 
Month -5 -0.0159 -0.0288 -0.0180 -0.0949 0.0021 0.12 
Month -4 -0.0093 -0.0381 -0.0241 -0.1190 0.0148 0.64 
Month -3 0.0086 -0.0295 0.0089 -0.1101 -0.0003 0.01 
Month -2 0.0192 -0.0103 0.0288 -0.0813 -0.0096 0.63 
Month -1 0.0460* 0.0357 0.0546* -0.0268 -0.0086 0.50 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided test. 
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Figure 4.1. The first differences of target firms average 
abnormal returns (AR) between December-June model and 
March-September model 
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Event Month -36 to -1 
Table 4.4 shows, under the December-June modelq target firms experience a small 
positive but insignificant abnormal return of 3.57% in three-year prior to the takeover 
announcement. However, under the March-September model, target firms suffer a small 
negative but insignificant abnonnal return of -2.68% in three-year prior to the takeover 
announcement. The first difference of the two CARs is about 6%, but it is statistically 
insignificant different from zero. 
Table 4.4. Target firms (with an accounting year ending at March) three-year pre-takeover CARs 
Sample target firms (accounting year ends at March, 63 firms) three years pre-takeover average CARs are 
calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the March-September 
model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the CARs and the corresponding P-values calculated 
by using 
the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given in the table. 
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CAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June 0.0357 0.291 0.406 
March-September -0.0268 -0.248 0.954 
Difference 0.0625 0.581 0.488 
Table 4.5 presents the three-year pre-takeover average BHARs of sample target firms 
that have an accounting year ending at March. BHAR in row 1 is calculated by applying 
the December-June model (i. e., we ignore the accounting year ending of March for 
these firms, and calculate the book-to-market ratios at December of year t- I and sizes at 
June of year t for these target finus). We match these sample firms with all the LSE 
listed firms (with both book-to-market ratios and sizes calculated at the same time as 
nu above, around 1,500 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control finns). 
BHAR in row 2 is calculated by applying the March-September model (i. e., according 
to the accounting year ending of March, we calculated the book-to-market ratios at 
March of year t and sizes at September (with 6 months lag) of year t for these target 
firms). We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms that have an 
accounting year ending at March (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are calculated at 
the same time as above, around 300 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the 
control finns. 
As we can see from Table 4.5, under the December-June model, target firms experience 
a very small negative but insignificant abnormal return of -0.08% in three-year prior to 
the takeover announcement. Under the March-September model, target firms suffer a 
small negative but insignificant abnormal return of -4-28% in three-year prior to the 
takeover announcement. The first difference of the two BHARs is about 
4%, but it is 
statistically insignificant different from zero. 
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Table 4.5. Target firms (with an accounting year ending at March) three-year pre-takeover BHARs 
Sample target firms (accounting year ends at March, 63 firms) three years pre-takeover average BHARs 
(buy-and-hold abnormal returns) are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December- 
June model and the March-September model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the BHARs and the 
corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given 
in the table. 
BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June -0.0008 -0.007 0.518 
March-September -0.0428 -0.406 0.937 
Difference 0.0420 0.370 0.474 
Table 4.6 reports the three-year pre-takeover average ARs (abnormal returns) and 
average CARs of the target firms that have an accounting year ending at June. ARs and 
CARs in column 2 and 3 are calculated by applying the December-June model (i. e., we 
ignore the accounting year ending of March for these firms, and calculate the book-to- 
market ratios at December of year t- I and sizes at June of year t for these target firms. 
We match these sample fin-ns with all the LSE listed firms (with both book-to-market 
ratios and sizes calculated at the same time as above, around 1,500 firms each year) to 
find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). ARs and CARs in Column 4 and 5 are 
calculated by applying the June-December model (i. e., according to the accounting year 
ending of June, we calculated the book-to-market ratios at June of year t and sizes at 
December (with 6 months lag) of year t for these target firms. We match these sample 
finns with all the LSE listed firms that have an accounting year ending at June (their 
book-to-market ratios and size are calculated at the same time as above, around 100 
firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). Column 6 and 
7 are 
the first difference of the Abnormal Returns (FDAR) and the t-statistic of the FDAR. 
Figure 4.2 plots the 36 monthly FDARs. 
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Table 4.6. Target firms (with an accounting year ending at June) three-year pre-takeover abnormal 
returns and CARs 
Sample target firms (accounting year ends at June, 10 firms) three-year pre-takeover abnormal returns are 
calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the June-December 
model respectively. The average AR (abnon-nal return) and CAR (cumulative abnormal return) for each 
month (from event months -36 to -1) are given below. We also calculate the FDAR (first difference of 
abnormal returns) and their t-statistics. 
December-June June-December Difference 
EM AR CAR AR CAR FDAR T-Stat 
Month -36 -0.0199 -0.0199 -0.0157 -0.0157 -0.0042 0.09 
Month -35 -0.1149 -0.1348 -0.1093 -0.1249 -0.0056 0.29 
Month -34 0.0612 -0.0736 0.0958 -0.0291 -0.0346 0.97 
Month -33 -0.0043 -0.0779 -0.0675 -0.0965 0.0632 1.11 
Month -32 0.0251 -0.0528 0.0249 -0.0716 0.0002 0.01 
Month -31 0.0531 0.0003 0.0607 -0.0109 -0.0076 0.27 
Month -30 -0.0255 -0.0252 -0.0289 -0.0398 0.0034 0.06 
Month -29 0.0458 0.0205 0.0001 -0.0397 0.0457 1.36 
Month -28 -0.0138 0.0067 -0.0275 -0.0672 0.0137 0.56 
Month -27 -0.0110 -0.0043 0.0436 -0.0236 -0.0546 1.14 
Month -26 0.0230 0.0187 0.0319 0.0083 -0.0089 0.13 
Month -25 -0.0330 -0.0143 0.0115 0.0198 -0.0445 1.01 
Month -24 -0.0707 -0.0850 -0.0558 -0.0360 -0.0149 0.28 
Month -23 0.0338 -0.0511 0.0380 0.0020 -0.0042 0.13 
Month -22 0.0518 0.0007 0.0300 0.0320 0.0218 0.42 
Month -21 0.0337 0.0344 -0.0025 0.0295 0.0362 0.79 
Month -20 -0.0600 -0.0255 -0.1560* -0.1265 0.0960 1.58 
Month -19 0.0589 0.0334 0.0534 -0.0731 0.0055 0.04 
Month -18 -0.0873 -0.0539 -0.0942 -0.1672 0.0069 0.17 
Month -17 -0.1023 -0.1562 -0.0039 -0.1711 -0.0984* 
2.22 
Month - 16 -0.0377 -0.1939 -0.0223 -0.1934 -0.0154 
0.41 
Month -15 -0.0712 -0.2651 -0.0807 -0.2741 0.0095 
0.21 
Month -14 -0.0465 -0.3116 -0.0855 -0.3596 0.0390 
1.13 
Month -13 0.0749 -0.2368 0.1352 -0.2244 -0.0603 
0.96 
Month -12 0.0358 -0.2010 -0.0096 -0.2341 
0.0454 0.75 
Month -11 -0.0297 -0.2307 0.0060 -0.2281 -0.0357 
1.32 
Month -10 0.0203 -0.2104 -0.0460 -0.2742 
0.0663 1.63 
Month -9 0.0311 -0.1793 0.0603 -0.2139 -0.0292 
0.62 
Month -8 -0.0580 -0.2373 0.0827 -0.1312 -0.1407 
1.91 
Month -7 0.0758 -0.1615 0.0641 -0.0672 
0.0117 0.36 
Month -6 0.0310 -0.1305 -0.0460 -0.1132 
0.0770* 2.86 
Month -5 0.0073 -0.1231 0.0537 -0.0594 -0.0464 
1.27 
Month -4 0.0096 -0.1135 0.0192 -0.0403 -0.0096 
0.36 
Month -3 0.0122 -0.1013 0.0135 -0.0268 -0.0013 
0.05 
Month -2 -0.0341 -0.1354 -0.0298 -0.0566 -0.0043 
0.11 
Month -1 -0.0079 -0.1433 0.0050 -0.0516 -0.0129 
0.41 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided test. 
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Figure 4.2. The first differences of target firms average 
abnormal returns (AR) between December-June model and 
June-December model 
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Table 4.7 shows, under the December-June model, target firms suffer a large negative 
but insignificant abnormal return of -14.33% in three-year prior to the takeover 
announcement. However, under the June-December model, target firms suffer a small 
negative but insignificant abnormal return of -5.16% in three-year prior to the takeover 
announcement. The first difference of the two CARs is about 9%, but it is statistically 
insignificant different from zero. 
Table 4.7. Target firms (with an accounting year ending at June) three-year pre-takeover CARs 
Sample target firms (accounting year ends at June, 10 firms) three years pre-takeover average CARs are 
calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the June-December 
model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the CARs and the corresponding P-values calculated by using 
the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given in the table. 
CAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June -0.1433 -0.497 0.221 
June-December -0.0516 -0.243 0.683 
Difference 0.0917 0.373 0.721 
Table 4.8 presents the three-year pre-takeover average BHARs of the target finns that 
have an accounting year ending at June. BHAR in row I is calculated by applying the 
December-June model (i. e., we ignore the accounting year ending of March for these 
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firms, and calculate the book-to-market ratios at December of year t- I and sizes at June 
of year t for these target firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed 
firms (with both book-to-market ratios and sizes calculated at the same time as above, 
around 1,500 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). BHAR 
in row 2 calculated by applying the June-December model [i. e., according to the 
accounting year ending of June, we calculated the book-to-market ratios at June of year 
t and sizes at December (with 6 months lag) of year t for these target firms. We match 
these sample firms with all the LSE listed fin-ns that have an accounting year ending at 
June (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are calculated at the same time as above, 
around 100 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms]. 
As we can see from Table 4.8. under the December-June model, target firrns experience 
a large negative but insignificant abnormal return of -15.93% in three-year prior to the 
takeover announcement. Under the June-December model, target firms also suffer a 
large negative but insignificant abnonnal return of -18.65% in three-year prior to the 
takeover announcement. The first difference of the two BHARs is about 3%, but it is 
statistically insignificant different from zero. 
Table 4.8. Target firms (with an accounting year ending at June) three-year pre-takeover BRARs 
Sample target firms (accounting year ends at June, 10 firms) three years pre-takeover average BHARs 
(buy-and-hold abnormal returns) are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December- 
June model and the June-December model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the BHARs and the 
corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given 
in the table. 
BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June -0.1593 -0.765 0.221 
June-December -0.1865 -0.921 0.610 
Difference 0.0272 0.106 0.878 
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Table 4.9 reports the three-year pre-takeover average ARs (abnormal returns) and 
average CARs of the target firms that have an accounting year ending at September. 
ARs and CARs in column 2 and 3 are calculated by applying the December-June model 
(i. e., we ignore the accounting year ending of September for these firms, and calculate 
the book-to-market ratios at December of year t-I and sizes at June of year t for these 
target firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms (with both 
book-to-market ratios and sizes calculated at the same time as above, around 1,500 
firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). ARs and CARs in 
Column 4 and 5 are calculated by applying the September-March model (i. e., according 
to the accounting year ending of September, we calculated the book-to-market ratios at 
September of year t and sizes at March (with 6 months lag) of year t+1 for these target 
firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms that have an 
accounting year ending at September (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are 
calculated at the same time as above, around 100 firms for each year) to find the closest 
match, i. e., the control firms). Column 6 and 7 are the first difference of the Abnormal 
Returns (FDAR) and the t-statistic of the FDAR. Figure 4.3 plots the 36 monthly 
FDARs. 
Table 4.9. Target firms (with an accounting year ending at September) three-year pre-takeover 
abnormal returns and CARs 
Sample target firms (accounting year ends at September, 6 firms) three-year pre-takeover abnormal 
returns are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the 
September-March model respectively. The average AR (abnormal return) and CAR (cumulative abnormal 
return) for each month (from event months -36 to -1) are given below. We also calculate the FDAR (first 
difference of abnormal returns) and their t-statistics. 
December-June September-March Difference 
EM AR CAR AR CAR FDAR T-Stat 
Month -36 -0.0446 -0.0446 -0.0278 -0.0278 -0.0168 0.33 
Month -35 -0.0087 -0.0534 0.0218 -0.0060 -0.0305 1.12 
Month -34 -0.0459 -0.0993 -0.0357 -0.0418 -0.0102 0.19 
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Month -33 -0.0405* -0.1397 -0.0337 -0.0755 -0-0068 0.27 Month -32 -0.0115 -0.1512 0.0303 -0.0451 -0.0418 1.01 Month -31 -0.0428 -0.1940 0.0338 -0.0113 -0.0766 1.39 Month -30 -0.0207 -0.2147 -0.0251 -0.0365 0.0044 0.18 
Month -29 -0.0043 -0.2190 0.0541 0.0176 -0.0584 2.27 Month -28 -0.0084 -0.2274 -0.0773 -0-0597 0.0689 1.30 
Month -27 -0.0099 -0.2372 0.0398 -0.0199 -0.0497 1.63 Month -26 -0.0315 -0.2688 -0.0698 -0.0897 0.0383 0.44 
Month -25 -0.0693 -0.3381 -0.0559 -0.1456 -0-0134 0.53 
Month -24 0.0352 -0.3029 -0.0007 -0.1463 0.0359 1.04 
Month -23 0.0731 -0.2298 0.0961 -0-0502 -0.0230 0.45 
Month -22 -0.0109 -0.2407 -0.0273 -0.0775 0.0164 0.98 
Month -21 0.0266 -0.2141 0.0629 -0.0146 -0.0363 1.34 
Month -20 -0.0105 -0.2246 -0.0250 -0.0396 0.0145 0.24 
Month -19 0.0513 -0.1733 0.0201 -0.0195 0.0312 0.83 
Month -18 -0.0058 -0.1791 0.0196 0.0001 -0.0254 0.70 
Month -17 -0.0494 -0.2286 0.0652* 0.0653 -0.1146 1.83 
Month -16 -0.0513 -0.2799 -0.0497 0.0156 -0.0016 0.02 
Month -15 0.0894* -0.1905 0.0384* 0.0540 0.0510 1.20 
Month -14 -0.0306 -0.2211 -0.0341 0.0199 0.0035 0.06 
Month -13 -0.1393 -0.3605 -0.0552 -0.0353 -0.0841 1.32 
Month -12 0.0479 -0.3126 0.0174 -0.0178 0.0305 0.89 
Month -11 0.0663* -0.2463 -0.0349 -0.0528 0.1012* 3.83 
Month - 10 0.0183 -0.2280 -0.0007 -0.0535 0.0190 0.77 
Month -9 -0.0048 -0.2328 0.0945* 0.0411 -0.0993 2.00 
Month -8 -0.1017 -0.3344 -0.1308 -0.0898 0.0291 0.69 
Month -7 0.0007 -0.3337 0.0585* -0.0313 -0.0578 1.07 
Month -6 -0.0720 -0.4057 -0.0709* -0.1022 -0.0011 0.04 
Month -5 0.0164 -0.3893 -0.0579 -0.1601 0.0743 1.48 
Month -4 0.0269* -0.3623 -0.0643 -0.2244 0.0912 1.53 
Month -3 0.0361 -0.3262 0.0185 -0.2059 0.0176 0.27 
Month -2 0.0650 -0.2612 0.0996 -0.1063 -0.0346 0.87 
Month -1 0.0278 -0.2334 0.0668 -0.0396 -0.0390 0.97 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided test. 
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Figure 4.3. The first differences of target firms average 
abnormal returns (AR) between December-June model and 
September-March model 
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Table 4.10 shows, under the December-June model, target firms suffer a large negative 
but insignificant abnormal return of -23.34% in three-year prior to the takeover 
announcement. However, under the September-March model, target fin-ns experience a 
small negative but insignificant abnormal return of -3.96% in three-year prior to the 
takeover announcement. The first difference of the two CARs is economically large 
about 20 %, but it is statistically insignificant different from zero. 
Table 4.10. Target firms (with an accounting year ending at Sept) three-year pre-takeover CARs 
Sample target firms (accounting year ends at September, 6 firms) three year pre-takeover average CARs 
are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the September- 
March model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the CARs and the corresponding P-values calculated by 
using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given in the table. 
CAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June -0.2334 -1.075 0.529 
September-March -0.0396 -0.156 1.000 
Difference -0.1938 -0.577 0.600 
Table 4.11 presents the three-year pre-takeover average BHARs of the target finns that 
have an accounting year ending at September. BHAR in row I is calculated by applying 
the December-June model (i. e., we ignore the accounting year ending of March for 
these firms, and calculate the book-to-market ratios at December of year t- I and sizes at 
June of year t for these target firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE 
listed firms (with both book-to-market ratios and size calculated at the same time as 
above, around L500 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control finns). 
BHAR in row 2 calculated by applying the September-March model (i. e., according to 
the accounting year ending of September, we calculated the book-to-market ratios at 
September of year t and sizes at March (with 6 months lag) of year t+1 for these target 
firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms that have an 
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accounting year ending at September (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are 
calculated at the same time as above, around 100 firms each year) to find the closest 
match, i. e., the control firms). 
Table 4.11. Target firms (with an accounting year ending at Sept) three-year pre-takeover BHARs 
Sample target firms (accounting year ends at September, 6 firms) three years pre-takeover average BHARs (buy-and-hold abnormal returns) are calculated by using the control firms approach under the 
December-June model and the September-March model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the BHARs 
and the corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are 
also given in the table. 
BRAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June -0.2585 -1.100 0.529 
September-March -0.2464 -0.896 0.295 
Difference -0.0121 -0.032 0.753 
As we can see from Table 4.11, under the December-June model, target firms 
experience a large negative but insignificant abnormal return of -25.85% in three-year 
prior to the takeover announcement. Under the September-March model, target firms 
also suffer a large negative but insignificant abnormal return of -24.64% in three-year 
prior to the takeover announcement. The first difference of the two BHARs is about I%, 
but it is statistically insignificant different from zero. 
4.4.2 Bidding Firms' Three Years Pre-Acquisition Stock Returns 
Table 4.12 reports the three-year pre-takeover average ARs (abnon-nal returns) and 
average CARs of the bidding firms that have an accounting year ending at March. ARs 
and CARs in column 2 and 3 are calculated by applying the December-June model (i. e., 
we ignore the accounting year ending of March for these finns, and calculate the book- 
to-market ratios at December of year t- I and sizes at June of year t for these target 
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firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms (with both book-to- 
market ratios and sizes calculated at the same time as above, around 1,500 matching 
firins each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). ARs and CARs in 
Column 4 and 5 are calculated by applying the March-September model (i. e., according 
to the accounting year ending of March, we calculated the book-to-market ratios at 
March of year t and sizes at September (with 6 months lag) of year t for these target 
firms. We match these sample fin-ns with all the LSE listed firms that have an 
accounting year ending at March (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are calculated at 
the same time as above, around 300 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the 
control firms). Column 6 and 7 are the first difference of the Abnormal Returns 
(FDAR) and the t-statistic of the FDAR. Figure 4.4 plots the 36 monthly FDARs. 
Table 4.12. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at March) three-year pre-takeover 
abnormal returns and CARs 
Sample bidding firms (accounting year ends at March, 31 firms) three-year pre-takeover abnon-nal returns 
are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the March- 
September model respectively. The average AR (abnormal return) and CAR (cumulative abnormal 
return) for each month (from event months -36 to -1) are given below. We also calculate the FDAR (first 
difference of abnormal returns) and their t-statistics. 
December-June March-Sep tember Difference 
EM AR CAR AR CAR FDAR T-Stat 
Month -36 0.0210 0.0210 0.0417* 0.0417 -0.0207 1.35 
Month -35 0.0196 0.0406 0.0008 0.0425 0.0188 1.32 
Month -34 0.0153 0.0560 -0.0006 0.0419 0.0159 0.94 
Month -33 -0.0208 0.0351 -0.0036 0.0383 -0.0172 1.21 
Month -32 -0.0197 0.0154 -0.0078 0.0305 -0.0119 0.96 
Month -31 0.0004 0.0158 -0.0035 0.0270 0.0039 0.23 
Month -30 -0.0176 -0.0018 -0.0141 0.0129 -0.0035 0.26 
Month -29 0.0021 0.0003 -0.0036 0.0093 0.0057 0.41 
Month -28 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0341 -0.0248 0.0342 1.81 
Month -27 0.0401* 0.0405 0.0429* 0.0181 -0.0028 0.20 
Month -26 -0.0103 0.0302 -0.0236 -0.0055 0.0133 0.80 
Month -25 0.0320 0.0622 0.0109 0.0054 0.0211 1.15 
Month -24 0.0156 0.0779 -0.0062 -0.0008 0.0218 1.60 
Month -23 0.0089 0.0868 -0.0071 -0.0079 0.0160 
1.09 
Month -22 0.0157 0.1025 0.0068 -0.0011 0.0089 
0.73 
Month -21 0.0128 0.1153 -0.0221 -0.0232 0.0349 
1.94 
Month -20 0.0133 0.1287 0.0020 -0.0212 
0.0113 0.72 
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Month -19 0.0133 0.1420 -0-0059 -0.0270 0.0192 1.02 
Month -18 -0.0149 0.1271 -0.0028 -0.0298 -0-0121 0.97 Month - 17 0.0216 0.1487 0.0111 -0-0186 0.0105 0.59 
Month -16 0.0053 0.1540 0.0077 -0-0109 -0-0024 0.14 Month -15 0.0173 0.1713 0.0178 0.0069 -0.0005 0.02 
Month -14 -0.0273 0.1440 -0.0177 -0-0108 -0.0096 0.73 Month -13 -0.0275 0.1165 -0.0147 -0.0255 -0.0128 0.99 
Month -12 0.0037 0.1202 -0.0052 -0.0307 0.0089 0.48 
Month -11 0.0133 0.1335 0.0205 -0.0102 -0.0072 0.30 
Month -10 0.0192 0.1527 -0.0076 -0.0178 0.0268 1.50 
Month -9 -0.016 0.1368 -0.0106 -0.0284 -0.0054 0.27 
Month -8 0.0443* 0.1811 0.0285 0.0001 0.0158 0.99 
Month -7 0.0087 0.1897 -0.0143 -0.0142 0.0230 1.16 
Month -6 0.0347* 0.2244 0.0212 0.0071 0.0135 1.03 
Month -5 -0.0351 0.1894 -0.0108 -0.0038 -0.0243 0.86 
Month -4 -0.009 0.1804 0.0224 0.0187 -0.0314 1.56 
Month -3 -0.0042 0.1762 -0.0002 0.0184 -0.0040 0.21 
Month -2 0.0092 0.1853 0.0090 0.0275 0.0002 0.01 
Month -1 -0.0011 0.1842 -0.0123 0.0152 0.0112 0.66 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided test. 
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Figure 4.4. The first differences of bidding firms (pre-takeover) 
average abnormal returns (AR) between December-June model 
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T--ý rI- 
5ý 
v5p Iý "P 
'11ý '11ý1 
ýý 
lllý 
If 
IN, 
) 
Event Month -36 to -1 
Table 4.13 shows, under the December-June model, bidding firms experience a large 
positive but insignificant abnormal return of 18.42% in three-year prior to the takeover 
announcement. However, under the March-September model, bidding firms have a 
small positive but insignificant abnormal return of 1.52% in three-year prior to the 
takeover announcement. The first difference of the two CARs is about 17%, but it is 
statistically insignificant different from zero. 
131 
Table 4.13. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at March) three-year pre-takeo'V, er CARs 
Sample bidding firms (accounting year ends at March, 31 firms) three years pre-takeover average CARs 
are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the March- September model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the CARs and the corresponding P-values 
calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given in the table. 
CAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June 0.1842 1.517 0.244 
March-September 0.0152 0.184 0.702 
Difference 0.1690 1.549 0.222 
Table 4.14 presents the three-year pre-takeover average BHARs of sample bidding 
firms that have an accounting year ending at March. BHAR in row I is calculated by 
applying the December-June model (i. e., we ignore the accounting year ending of 
March for these firms, and calculate the book-to-market ratios at December of year t- I 
and sizes at June of year t for these target firms. We match these sample firins with all 
the LSE listed firms (with both book-to-market ratios and sizes calculated at the same 
time as above, around 1,500 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control 
firms). BHAR in row 2 is calculated by applying the March-September model (i. e., 
according to the accounting year ending of March, we calculated the book-to-market 
ratios at March of year t and sizes at September (with 6 months lag) of year t for these 
target firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms that have an 
accounting year ending at March (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are calculated at 
the same time as above, around 300 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the 
control firins). 
As we can see from Table 4.14, under the December-June model, Bidding finns 
experience a large positive but insignificant abnormal return of 17.47% in three-year 
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prior to the takeover announcement. Under the March-September model, bidding firms 
gain a small positive but insignificant abnormal return of 3.28% in three-year prior to 
the takeover announcement. The first difference of the two BHARs is about 14%, but it 
is statistically insignificant different from zero. 
Table 4.14. Bidding flrms (with an accounting year ending at March) three-year pre-takeover 
BHARs 
Sample Bidding firms (accounting year ends at March, 31 firms) three year pre-takeover average BHARs 
(buy-and-hold abnormal returns) are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December- 
June model and the March-September model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the BHARs and the 
corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given 
in the table. 
BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June 0.1747 1.241 0.286 
March-September 0.0328 0.330 0.776 
Difference 0.1419 1.139 0.230 
Table 4.15 reports the three-year pre-takeover average ARs (abnon-nal returns) and 
average CARs of the bidding firms that have an accounting year ending at June. ARs 
and CARs in column 2 and 3 are calculated by applying the December-June model (i. e., 
we ignore the accounting year ending of March for these firms, and calculate the book- 
to-market ratios at December of year t- I and sizes at June of year t for these target 
firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms (with both book-to- 
market ratios and sizes calculated at the same time as above, around 1,500 firms each 
year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). ARs and CARs in Column 4 and 
5 are calculated by applying the June-December model (i. e., according to the accounting 
year ending of June, we calculated the book-to-market ratios at June of year t and sizes 
at December (with 6 months lag) of year t for these target 
firms. We match these sample 
firms with all the LSE listed fin-ns that have an accounting year ending at 
June (their 
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book-to-market ratios and size are calculated at the same time as above, around 100 
firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). Column 6 and 7 are 
the first difference of the Abnonnal Returns (FDAR) and the t-statistic of the FDAR. 
Figure 4.5 plots the 36 monthly FDARs. 
Table 4.15. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at June) three-year pre-takeover 
abnormal returns and CARs 
Sample bidding firms (accounting year ends at June, 10 firms) three-year pre-takeover abnormal returns 
are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the June- 
December model respectively. The average AR (abnormal return) and CAR (cumulative abnormal return) 
for each month (from event months -36 to -1) are given below. We also calculate the FDAR (first 
difference of abnormal returns) and their t-statistics. 
December-June June-December Difference 
EM AR CAR AR CAR FDAR T-Stat 
Month -36 -0.0179 -0.0179 0.0015 0.0015 -0.0194 0.47 
Month -35 -0.0078 -0.0256 0.0138 0.0153 -0.0216 1.20 
Month -34 -0.0907 -0.1163 -0.1321 -0.1168 0.0414 0.62 
Month -33 0.0266 -0.0897 0.0333 -0.0834 -0.0067 0.30 
Month -32 0.0205 -0.0693 0.0156 -0.0678 0.0049 0.08 
Month -31 -0.0500 -0.1193 0.0162 -0.0516 -0.0662 1.68 
Month -30 -0.0795 -0.1988 -0.0237 -0.0753 -0.0558 1.72 
Month -29 -0.0765 -0.2753 -0.0435 -0.1189 -0.0330 0.93 
Month -28 -0.0156 -0.2909 -0.0178 -0.1366 0.0022 0.05 
Month -27 -0.0494 -0.3403 -0.0850 -0.2216 0.0356 0.39 
Month -26 -0.0046 -0.3449 0.0200 -0.2016 -0.0246 1.13 
Month -25 -0.0291 -0.3739 -0.0175 -0.2191 -0.0116 0.44 
Month -24 0.0167 -0.3572 -0.0021 -0.2212 0.0188 0.44 
Month -23 0.0593 -0.2979 0.0619 -0.1593 -0.0026 
0.10 
Month -22 -0.0117 -0.3096 -0.0123 -0.1716 0.0006 
0.02 
Month -21 0.0920* -0.2176 0.0427 -0.1289 0.0493 
0.87 
Month -20 -0.0301 -0.2477 0.0270 -0.1019 -0.0571 
0.92 
Month -19 0.0185 -0.2291 -0.0224 -0.1243 
0.0409 0.75 
Month -18 -0.0955* -0.3246 -0.0376 -0.1619 -0.0579* 
3.36 
Month -17 0.0300 -0.2947 0.1203* -0.0417 -0.0903 
1.13 
Month - 16 0.0461 -0.2486 0.0716 
0.0300 -0.0255 0.90 
Month - 15 0.0159 -0.2327 -0.0345 -0.0045 
0.0504 1.42 
Month - 14 0.0717 -0.1611 0.0330 
0.0285 0.0387 0.98 
Month -13 0.0518 -0.1092 0.0452 
0.0737 0.0066 0.16 
Month -12 -0.0040 -0.1132 -0.0178 
0.0560 0.0138 0.30 
Month -11 0.0323 -0.0809 0.0384 
0.0944 -0.0061 0.21 
Month - 10 0.0178 -0.0631 -0.0084 
0.0860 0.0262 0.92 
Month -9 -0.0203 -0.0835 
0.0574 0.1434 -0.0777 1.95 
Month -8 -0.0561* -0.1396 -0.0352 
0.1082 -0.0209 0.63 
Month -7 0.0322 -0.1074 
0.0211 0.1293 0.0111 0.27 
Month -6 0.0219 -0.0854 
0.0808 0.2102 -0.0589 1.80 
Month -5 0.0901* 0.0046 
0.0479 0.2580 0.0422 0.81 
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Month -4 -0.0105 -0.0058 0.0614 0.3195 -0.0719 0.85 Month -3 0.0489 0.0431 0.0800 0.3994 -0 0311 0.56 Month -2 0.1159* 0.1590 0.0581 0.4575 0 0578 1.70 
Month -1 0.0591 0.2181 0.0734 0.5310 -0-0143 0.25 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided test. 
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Figure 4.5. The first differences of bidding firms (pre-takeover) 
average abnormal returns (AR) between December-June model 
and June-December model 
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Table 4.16 shows, under the December-June model, bidding firms experience a large 
positive but insignificant abnormal return of 21.8 1% in three-year prior to the takeover 
announcement. Under the June-December model, biding finns gain a very large positive 
but insignificant abnonnal return of 53.1% in three-year prior to the takeover 
announcement. The first difference of the two CARs is about 31%, but it is statistically 
insignificant different from zero. 
Table 4.16. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at June) three-year pre-takeover CARs 
Sample bidding firms (accounting year ends at June, 10 firms) three years pre-takeover average CARs are 
calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the June-December 
model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the CARs and the corresponding P-values calculated by using 
the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given in the table. 
CAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June 0.2181 1.199 0.308 
June-December 0.5310 2.177 0.083 
Difference -0.3129 -1.071 0.441 
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Table 4.17 presents the three-year pre-takeover average BHARs of the bidding finns 
that have an accounting year ending at June. BHAR in row I is calculated by applying 
the December-June model (i. e., we ignore the accounting year ending of March for 
these firms, and calculate the book-to-market ratios at December of year t- I and sizes at 
June of year t for these target firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE 
listed firms (with both book-to-market ratios and sizes calculated at the same time as 
ab-ove, around 1,500 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). 
BHAR in row 2 calculated by applying the June-December model (i. e., according to the 
accounting year ending of June, we calculated the book-to-market ratios at June of year 
t and sizes at December (with 6 months lag) of year t for these target firms. We match 
these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms that have an accounting year ending at 
June (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are calculated at the same time as above, 
around 100 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). 
As we can see from Table 4.17, under the December-June model, target firms 
experience a large positive but insignificant abnormal return of 33.38% in three-year 
prior to the takeover announcement. Under the June-December model, target firms gain 
a large positive but insignificant abnormal return of 45.49% in three-year prior to the 
takeover announcement. The first difference of the two BHARs is about 12%, but it is 
statistically insignificant different from zero. 
Table 4.17. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at June) three-year pre-takeover 
BHARs 
Sample bidding firms (accounting year ends at June, 10 firrns) three years pre-takeover average BHARs 
(buy-and-hold abnormal returns) are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December- 
June model and the June-December model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the BHARs and the 
corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given 
in the table. 
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BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June 0.3338 1.060 0.610 
June-December 0.4549 1.818 0.103 
Difference -0.1211 -0.542 0.594 
Table 4.18 reports the three-year pre-takeover average ARs (abnormal returns) and 
average CARs of the bidding firins that have an accounting year ending at September. 
ARs and CARs in column 2 and 3 are calculated by applying the December-June model 
(i. e., we ignore the accounting year ending of September for these firms, and calculate 
the book-to-market ratios at December of year t-I and sizes at June of year t for these 
target firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms (with both 
book-to-market ratios and sizes calculated at the same time as above, around 1,500 
firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). ARs and CARs in 
Column 4 and 5 are calculated by applying the September-March model (i. e., according 
to the accounting year ending of September, we calculated the book-to-market ratios at 
September of year t and sizes at March (with 6 months lag) of year t+1 for these target 
firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms that have an 
accounting year ending at September (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are 
calculated at the same time as above, around 100 firms for each year) to find the closest 
match, i. e., the control firms). Column 6 and 7 are the first difference of the Abnonnal 
Returns (FDAR) and the t-statistic of the FDAR. Figure 4.6 plots the 36 monthly 
FDARs. 
Table 4.18. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at September) three-year pre-takeover 
abnormal returns and CARs 
Sample bidding firms (accounting year ends at September, 20 firms) three-year pre-takeover abnon-nal 
returns are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and 
the 
September-March model respectively. The average AR (abnormal return) and CAR 
(cuniulatk e abnormal 
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return) for each month (from event months -36 to -1) are given below. We also calculate the FDAR (first difference of abnormal returns) and their t-statistics. 
December-June September-March Difference 
EM AR CAR AR CAR FDAR T-Stat 
Month -36 -0.0130 -0.0130 -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0091 0.59 
Month -35 0.0264 0.0134 0.0335 0.0295 -0.0071 0.54 
Month -34 0.0186 0.0319 0.0182 0.0477 0.0004 0.02 
Month -33 -0.0052 0.0267 -0.0306 0.0171 0.0254 1.31 
Month -32 0.0027 0.0294 -0.0256 -0.0084 0.0283 1.67 
Month -31 -0.0068 0.0226 -0.0056 -0.0140 -0.0012 0.04 
Month -30 -0.0277 -0.0051 -0.0008 -0.0148 -0.0269 1.57 
Month -29 0.0239 0.0189 0.0281 0.0133 -0.0042 0.13 
Month -28 0.0021 0.0209 0.0087 0.0221 -0.0066 0.51 
Month -27 -0.0210 -0.0001 0.0222 0.0443 -0.0432 1.27 
Month -26 -0.0038 -0.0039 0.0324* 0.0766 -0.0362* 2.17 
Month -25 -0.0007 -0.0047 -0.0073 0.0694 0.0066 0.42 
Month -24 -0.0416* -0.0462 -0.0248 0.0446 -0.0168 0.73 
Month -23 -0.0227 -0.0689 -0.0331 0.0115 0.0104 0.78 
Month -22 -0.0091 -0.0780 0.0114 0.0229 -0.0205 0.94 
Month -21 0.0271 -0.0509 0.0223 0.0452 0.0048 0.24 
Month -20 0.0140 -0.0369 -0.0132 0.0321 0.0272 1.18 
Month - 19 -0.0271 -0.0640 -0.0226 0.0095 -0.0045 0.18 
Month -18 -0.0199 -0.0839 -0.0285 -0.019 0.0086 0.47 
Month -17 -0.0148 -0.0986 -0.0131 -0.0320 -0.0017 0.07 
Month -16 0.0206 -0.0781 0.0056 -0.0265 0.0150 0.79 
Month -15 -0.0194 -0.0974 -0.0089 -0.0353 -0.0105 0.54 
Month -14 -0.0019 -0.0994 -0.0020 -0.0373 0.0001 0.002 
Month -13 0.0475* -0.0518 -0.0127 -0.0500 0.0602 1.75 
Month -12 0.0148 -0.0370 0.0101 -0.0399 0.0047 0.24 
Month -11 0.0260 -0.0110 0.0058 -0.0341 0.0202 1.07 
Month -10 0.0393 0.0283 0.0284 -0.0058 0.0109 0.68 
Month -9 0.0410 0.0693 0.0007 -0.0050 0.0403 1.66 
Month -8 -0.0467 0.0226 -0.0092 -0.0142 -0.0375 1.02 
Month -7 -0.0326 -0-0100 -0.0350 -0.0492 0.0024 0.08 
Month -6 -0.0223 -0.0323 -0.0316* -0.0808 0.0093 0.60 
Month -5 0.0090 -0.0233 0.0298 -0.0509 -0.0208 1.09 
Month -4 0.0243 0.0010 0.0054 -0.0456 0.0189 0.74 
Month -3 0.0012 0.0023 -0.0068 -0.0524 0.0080 0.33 
Month -2 0.0387 0.0409 -0.0091 -0.0615 0.0478 1.13 
Month -1 0.0671 0.1081 0.0548 -0.0067 0.0123 
0.46 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided test. 
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Figure 4.6. The first differences of biding firms (pre-takeover) 
average abnormal returns (AR) between December-June model 
and September-March model 
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Table 4.19 shows, under the December-June model, bidding firms earn a positive but 
insignificant abnormal return of 10.81% in three-year prior to the takeover 
announcement. However, under the September-March model, bidding firms experience 
a small negative but insignificant abnormal return of -0.67% in three-year prior to the 
takeover announcement. The first difference of these two CARs is about II%, but it is 
statistically insignificant different from zero. 
Table 4.19. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at Sept) three-year pre-takeover CARs 
Sample Bidding firms (accounting year ends at September, 20 firms) three year pre-takeover average 
CARs are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the 
September-March model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the CARs and the corresponding P-values 
calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given in the table. 
CAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June 0.1081 0.742 0.588 
September-March -0.0067 -0.041 0.779 
_Difference 
0.1148 0.863 0.554 
Table 4.20 presents the three-year pre-takeover average BHARs of the bidding firms 
that have an accounting year ending at September. BHAR in row I is calculated by 
applying the December-June model (i. e., we ignore the accounting year ending of 
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Event Month -36 to -1 
March for these firms, and calculate the book-to-market ratios at December of year t- 
and sizes at June of year t for these target firms. We match these sample firms with all 
the LSE listed finns (with both book-to-market ratios and size calculated at the same 
time as above, around 1,500 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control 
firms). BHAR in row 2 calculated by applying the September-March model (i. e., 
according to the accounting year ending of September, we calculated the book-to- 
market ratios at September of year t and sizes at March (with 6 months lag) of year t+1 
for these target firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firrns that 
have an accounting year ending at September (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are 
calculated at the same time as above, around 100 firms each year) to find the closest 
match, i. e., the control firms. 
Table 4.20. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at Sept) three-year pre-takeover BHARs 
Sample bidding firms (accounting year ends at September, 20 firms) three years pre-takeover average 
BHARs (buy-and-hold abnormal returns) are calculated by using the control firms approach under the 
December-June model and the September-March model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the BHARs 
and the corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are 
also given in the table. 
BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June 0.2521 1.107 0.695 
September-March 0.1016 0.367 0.896 
Difference 0.1505 0.705 0.554 
As we can see from Table 4.20, under the December-June model, 
bidding firms 
experience a large positive but insignificant abnormal return of 25.21% 
in three-year 
prior to the takeover announcement. Under the September-March mode15 
biding firms 
also earn a positive but insignificant abnormal return of 10.16% 
in three-year prior to 
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the takeover announcement. The first difference of the two BHARs is about 15%, but it 
is statistically insignificant different from zero. 
4.4.3. Bidding Firms' Three Years Post Acquisition Stock Returns 
Table 4.21 reports the three-year post-takeover average ARs (abnormal returns) and 
average CARs of the bidding firms that have an accounting year ending at March. ARs 
and CARs in column 2 and 3 are calculated by applying the December-June model (i. e., 
we ignore the accounting year ending of March for these firms, and calculate the book- 
to-market ratios at December of year t- I and sizes at June of year t for these target 
firms. We match these sample fin-ns with all the LSE listed fin-ns (with both book-to- 
market ratios and sizes calculated at the same time as above, around 1,500 matching 
firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). ARs and CARs in 
Column 4 and 5 are calculated by applying the March-September model (i. e., according 
to the accounting year ending of March, we calculated the book-to-market ratios at 
March of year t and sizes at September (with 6 months lag) of year t for these target 
firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms that have an 
accounting year ending at March (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are calculated at 
the same time as above, around 300 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the 
control firms). Column 6 and 7 are the first difference of the Abnon-nal Returns 
(FDAR) and the t-statistic of the FDAR. Figure 4.7 plots the 36 monthly FDARs. 
Table 4.21. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at March) three-year post-takeover 
abnormal returns and CARs 
Sample bidding firms (accounting year ends at March, 33 firms) three-year post-takeover abnormal 
returns are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the 
March-September model respectively. The average AR (abnormal return) and CAR (cumulaM'e abnormal 
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return) for each month (from event months I to 36) are given below. We also calculate the FDAR (first difference of abnormal returns) and their t-statistics. 
December-June March-Sep tember Difference 
EM AR CAR AR CAR FDAR T-Stat 
Month 1 0.0008 0.0080 0.0071 0.0071 0.0009 0.05 
Month 2 -0.0071 0.0009 -0.0135 -0.0064 0.0064 0.33 
Month 3 -0.0265 -0.0256 -0.0365* -0.0429 0.0100 0.65 
Month 4 -0.0112 -0.0369 0.0028 -0.0401 -0.0140 1.00 
Month 5 0.0194 -0.0174 0.0151 -0.0251 0.0043 0.31 
Month 6 -0.0180 -0.0354 -0.0091 -0.0341 -0.0089 0.60 
Month 7 -0.0014 -0.0368 -0.0107 -0.0449 0.0093 0.73 
Month 8 0.0133 -0-0234 -0.0235 -0.0684 0-0368* 2.21 
Month 9 0 -0.0235 0.0334 -0.0349 -0.0334 1.74 
Month 10 -0.0183 -0.0418 -0.0216 -0.0565 0.0033 0.19 
Month 11 0.0066 -0.0351 0.0079 -0.0486 -0.0013 0.09 
Month 12 -0.0247 -0.0599 -0.0097 -0.0583 -0.0150 0.85 
Month 13 -0.0247 -0.0845 -0.0041 -0.0624 -0.0206 1.30 
Month 14 0.0148 -0.0698 0.0444 -0.0180 -0.0296 1.45 
Month 15 -0.0100 -0.0798 -0.0018 -0.0198 -0.0082 0.42 
Month 16 0.0028 -0.0770 0.0221 0.0023 -0.0193 0.87 
Month 17 0.0271 -0.0499 0.0143 0.0166 0.0128 0.69 
Month 18 -0.0023 -0.0522 0.0220 0.0386 -0.0243 1.49 
Month 19 0.0055 -0.0467 0.0018 0.0404 0.0037 0.19 
Month 20 0.0635* 0.0167 0.0239 0.0643 0.0396 1.69 
Month 21 -0.0175 -0.0008 -0.0013 0.0630 -0.0162 0.56 
Month 22 -0.0483 -0.0491 -0.0381 0.0249 -0.0102 0.43 
Month 23 -0.0140 -0.0631 -0.0269 -0.0020 0.0129 0.62 
Month 24 -0.0326 -0.0958 -0.0374 -0.0394 0.0048 0.25 
Month 25 0.0582* -0.0376 0.0371 -0.0023 0.0211 1.08 
Month 26 0.0072 -0.0304 0.0144 0.0121 -0.0072 0.29 
Month 27 0.0147 -0.0157 -0.0138 -0.0017 0.0285 1.42 
Month 28 -0.0069 -0.0226 -0.0068 -0.0085 -0.0001 0.01 
Month 29 0.0377 0.0151 -0.0178 -0.0263 0.0555* 2.09 
Month 30 0.0361 0.0512 0.0040 -0.0223 0.0321 1.55 
Month 31 0.0098 0.0610 -0.0131 -0.0354 0.0229 0.97 
Month 32 0.0178 0.0788 0.0299 -0.0055 -0.0121 0.53 
Month 33 0.0476 0.1264 0.0675* 0.0620 -0.0199 0.53 
Month 34 0.0133 0.1397 0.0328 0.0948 -0.0195 1.09 
Month 35 -0.0227 0.1170 -0.0244 0.0705 0.0017 
0.06 
Month 36 -0.0210 0.0960 -0.0549* 0.0156 
0.0339 1.25 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided test. 
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Figure 4.7. The first differences of bidding firms (post-takeover) 
average abnormal returns (AR) between December-June model 
and March-September model 
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Table 4.22 shows, under the December-June model, bidding firms experience a positive 
but insignificant abnormal return of 9.6% in three-year after the takeover. However, 
under the March-September model, bidding firms have a small positive but insignificant 
abnonnal return of 1.56% in three-year after the takeover. The first difference of the two 
CARs is about 8%, but it is statistically insignificant. 
Table 4.22. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at March) three-year post-takeover 
CARs 
Sample bidding firms (accounting year ends at March, 33 firms) three year post-takeover average CARs 
are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the March- 
September model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the CARs and the corresponding P-values 
calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given in the table. 
CAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June 0.0960 0.724 0.532 
March-September 0.0156 0.115 0.555 
Difference 0.0804 0.713 0.969 
Table 4.23 presents the three-year post-takeover average BHARs of sample bIdding 
firms that have an accounting year ending at March. BHAR in row I is calculated by 
applying the December-June model (i. e., we ignore the accounting year ending of 
March for these firms, and calculate the book-to-market ratios at December of year t- I 
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and sizes at June of year t for these target firms. We match these sample firms with all 
the LSE listed firms (with both book-to-market ratios and sizes calculated at the same 
time as above, around 1,500 firms each year) to find the closest match3 i. e., the control 
firms). BHAR in row 2 is calculated by applying the March-September model (i. e.. 
according to the accounting year ending of March, we calculated the book-to-market 
ratios at March of year t and sizes at September (with 6 months lag) of year t for these 
target firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms that have an 
accounting year ending at March (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are calculated at 
the same time as above, around 300 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the 
control firms). 
Table 4.23. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at March) three-year post-takeover 
BHARs 
Sample Bidding firms (accounting year ends at March, 33 firms) three years post-takeover average 
BHARs (buy-and-hold abnormal returns) are calculated by using the control finns approach under the 
December-June model and the March-September model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the BHARs 
and the corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are 
also given in the table. 
BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June 0.0757 0.606 0.421 
March-September -0.0129 -0.098 0.642 
Difference 0.0886 0.731 0.829 
As we can see from Table 4.23, under the December-June model, bidding firms 
experience a positive but insignificant abnormal return of 7.57% in three-year after the 
takeover. Under the March-September model, bidding firms experience a small negative 
but insignificant abnormal return of -1.29% in three-year after the takeover. 
The first 
difference of the two BHARs is about 9%, but it is statistically insignificant 
different 
from zero. 
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Table 4.24 reports the three-year post-takeover average ARs (abnon-nal returns) and 
average CARs of the bidding firms that have an accounting year ending at June. ARs 
and CARs in column 2 and 3 are calculated by applying the December-June model (i. e., 
we ignore the accounting year ending of March for these firms, and calculate the book- 
to-market ratios at December of year t-I and sizes at June of year t for these target 
firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms (with both book-to- 
market ratios and sizes calculated at the same time as above, around 1,500 firms each 
year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). ARs and CARs in Column 4 and 
5 are calculated by applying the June-December model (i. e., according to the accounting 
year ending of June, we calculated the book-to-market ratios at June of year t and sizes 
at December (with 6 months lag) of year t for these target firms. We match these sample 
firms with all the LSE listed firms that have an accounting year ending at June (their 
book-to-market ratios and size are calculated at the same time as above, around 100 
firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). Column 6 and 7 are 
the first difference of the Abnormal Returns (FDAR) and the t-statistic of the FDAR. 
Figure 4.8 plots the 36 monthly FDARs. 
Table 4.24. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at June) three-year post-takeover 
abnormal returns and CARs 
Sample bidding firms (accounting year ends at June, 12 firms) three-year post-takeover abnormal returns 
are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the June- 
December model respectively. The average AR (abnonnal return) and CAR (cumulative abnormal return) 
for each month (from event months I to 36) are given below. We also calculate the FDAR 
(first 
difference of abnormal returns) and their t-statistics. 
December-June June-December Difference 
EM AR CAR AR CAR FDAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0051 -0.0051 0.0332 
0.0332 -0.0383 1.04 
Month 2 -0.0203 -0.0254 -0.0031 
0.0301 -0.0172 0.53 
Month 3 -0.0070 -0.0323 -0.0488 -0.0186 
0.0418 0.78 
Month 4 -0.0142 -0.0465 -0.0313 -0.0499 
0.0171 0.26 
Month 5 -0.0443 -0.0908 -0.0992* -0.1491 
0.0549 1.31 
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Month 6 -0.0566 -0.1475 -0.0645 -0.2136 0.0079 0.21 
Month 7 0.0134 -0.1341 -0.1180 -0.3317 0-1314* 2.18 Month 8 -0.0265 -0.1606 -0.0504 -0.3821 0.0239 0.61 
Month 9 0.0678 -0.0928 0.0561 -0.3260 0.0117 0.27 
Month 10 0.0357 -0.0571 0.0662 -0.2598 -0.0305 0.86 Month 11 0.0288 -0.0283 -0.0487 -0.3085 0.0775* 2.39 
Month 12 0.0179 -0.0104 -0.0255 -0.3340 0.0434 0.92 
Month 13 0.0570 0.0466 0.0382 -0.2958 0.0188 0.57 
Month 14 -0.0315 0.0151 -0.0425 -0.3382 0.0110 0.24 
Month 15 0.0274 0.0425 -0.0213 -0.3596 0.0487 1.17 
Month 16 -0.0287 0.0138 0.0228 -0.3367 -0.0515 1.12 
Month 17 0.0210 0.0349 0.0328 -0.3040 -0.0118 0.34 
Month 18 -0.0067 0.0282 -0.0446 -0.3486 0.0379 1.17 
Month 19 0.0263 0.0545 -0.0849* -0.4334 0.1112* 2.45 
Month 20 0.0286 0.0831 0.0193 -0.4142 0.0093 0.24 
Month 21 0.0408 0.1238 0.0148 -0.3994 0.0260 0.32 
Month 22 0.0525 0.1763 0.0210 -0.3784 0.0315 0.88 
Month 23 -0.0477 0.1286 0.0049 -0.3736 -0.0526 0.57 
Month 24 -0.0407 0.0879 -0.0379 -0.4115 -0.0028 0.07 
Month 25 -0.0387 0.0492 -0.0458 -0.4573 0.0071 0.24 
Month 26 -0.0033 0.0459 -0.0497 -0.5070 0.0464 0.76 
Month 27 -0.0066 0.0393 0.0973 -0.4097 -0.1039 1.56 
Month 28 0.0170 0.0563 -0.0025 -0.4123 0.0195 0.50 
Month 29 -0.0679 -0.0116 -0.1024 -0.5147 0.0345 0.64 
Month 30 -0.0092 -0.0208 0.0185 -0.4961 -0.0277 0.74 
Month 31 -0.0739 -0.0947 -0.0314 -0.5275 -0.0425 1.44 
Month 32 0.0656 -0.0291 0.0447 -0.4828 0.0209 0.64 
Month 33 0.0381 0.0090 0.0553 -0.4274 -0.0172 0.37 
Month 34 0.0019 0.0108 -0.0158 -0.4432 0.0177 0.33 
Month 35 -0.1377* -0.1269 -0.1277 -0.5709 -0.0100 0.25 
Month 36 0.0350 -0-0919 0.0590 -0.5119 -0.0240 0.42 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided test. 
Figure 4.8. The first differences of bidding firms (post-takeover) 
average abnormal returns (AR) between December-June model 
and June-December model 
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Table 4.25 shows, under the December-June model, bidding firms experience a nqative 
but insignificant abnormal return of -9.19% in three-year after the takeover. Under the 
June-December model, biding firms suffer a very large negative but insIgnIficant 
'A Amonnal return of 51.19% in three-year after the takeover. The first difference of the 
two CARs is about 42%, but it is statistically insignificant different from zero. 
Table 4.25. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at June) three-year post-takeover CARs 
Sample bidding firms (accounting year ends at June, 12 firms) three years post-takeover average CARs 
are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the June- 
December model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the CARs and the corresponding P-values 
calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given in the table. 
CAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June -0.0919 -0.283 0.784 
June-December -0.5119 -1.539 0.126 
Difference 0.4200 1.268 0.182 
Table 4.26 presents the three-year post-takeover average BHARs of the bidding firins 
that have an accounting year ending at June. BHAR in row 1 is calculated by applying 
the December-June model (i. e., we ignore the accounting year ending of March for 
these firms, and calculate the book-to-market ratios at December of year t- 1 and sizes at 
June of year t for these target firms. We match these sample firms with all the 
LSE 
listed firms (with both book-to-market ratios and sizes calculated at the same time as 
above, around 1,500 firms each year) to find the closest match, 
i. e., the control firms). 
BHAR in row 2 calculated by applying the June-December model 
(i. e., according to the 
accounting year ending of June, we calculated the 
book-to-market ratios at June of year 
t and sizes at December (with 6 months 
lag) of year t for these target firins. We match 
these sample firms with all the LSE listed 
firms that have an accounting year ending at 
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June (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are calculated at the same time as above, 
around 100 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). 
As we can see from Table 4.26, under the December-June model, bidding finns suffer a 
large negative but insignificant abnormal return of -27.39% in three-year after the 
takeover. Under the June-December model, bidding firms also suffer a large negative 
but insignificant abnormal return of -53.79% in three-year after the takeover. The first 
difference of the two BHARs is about 26%, but it is statistically insignificant different 
from zero. 
Table 4.26. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at June) three-year post-takeover 
BHARs 
Sample bidding firms (accounting year ends at June, 12 firms) three years post-takeover average BHARs 
(buy-and-hold abnormal returns) are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December- 
June model and the June-December model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the BHARs and the 
corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given 
in the table. 
BRAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June -0.2739 -1.218 0.556 
June-December -0.5379 -1.883 0.078 
Difference 0.2640 0.955 0.328 
Table 4.27 reports the three-year post-takeover average ARs (abnormal returns) and 
average CARs of the bidding firms that have an accounting year ending at September. 
ARs and CARs in column 2 and 3 are calculated by applying the December-June model 
(i. e., we ignore the accounting year ending of September for these firms, and calculate 
the book-to-market ratios at December of year t-I and sizes at June of year t for these 
target firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firrns (xvith 
both 
book-to-market ratios and sizes calculated at the same time as above, around 
1,500 
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firrns each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control firms). ARs and CARs in 
Column 4 and 5 are calculated by applying the September-March model (i. e., according 
to the accounting year ending of September, we calculated the book-to-market ratios at 
September of year t and sizes at March (with 6 months lag) of year t+1 for these target 
firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms that have an 
accounting year ending at September (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are 
calculated at the same time as above, around 100 firms for each year) to find the closest 
match, i. e., the control firms). Column 6 and 7 are the first difference of the Abnon-nal 
Returns (FDAR) and the t-statistic of the FDAR. Figure 4.9 plots the 36 monthly 
FDARs. 
Table 4.27. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at September) three-year post-takeover 
abnormal returns and CARs 
Sample bidding firms (accounting year ends at September, 17 firms) three-year post-takeover abnormal 
returns are calculated by using the control finyis approach under the December-June model and the 
September-March model respectively. The average AR (abnormal return) and CAR (cumulative abnormal 
return) for each month (from event months I to 36) are given below. We also calculate the FDAR (first 
difference of abnormal returns) and their t-statistics. 
December-June September-March Difference 
EM AR CAR AR CAR FDAR T-Stat 
Month 1 0.0025 0.0025 -0.0205 -0.0205 0.0230 0.76 
Month 2 -0.0455* -0.0430 -0.0201 -0.0406 -0.0254 1.21 
Month 3 0.0307 -0.0123 0.0023 -0.0383 0.0284 1.20 
Month 4 0.0113 -0.0010 -0.0099 -0.0483 0.0212 0.99 
Month 5 -0.0165 -0.0175 -0.0058 -0.0541 -0.0107 0.35 
Month 6 -0.0475 -0.0650 0.0230 -0.0311 -0.0705 1.24 
Month 7 0.0094 -0.0557 -0.0012 -0.0323 0.0106 0.38 
Month 8 0.0324 -0.0232 0.0036 -0.0287 0.0288 0.89 
Month 9 -0.0134 -0.0366 -0.0200 -0.0487 0.0066 0.19 
Month 10 0.0201 -0.0165 0.0034 -0.0453 0.0167 0.61 
Month 11 0.0275 0.0110 0.0161 -0.0292 0.0114 0.63 
Month 12 0.0137 0.0247 -0.0473 -0.0765 0.0610 1.98 
Month 13 0.0046 0.0293 0.0328 -0.0437 -0.0282 1.14 
Month 14 0.0372 0.0665 0.0244 -0.0193 0.0128 0.48 
Month 15 0.0407 0.1073 -0.0222 -0.0415 0.0629* 2.36 
Month 16 0.0068 0.1141 0.0138 -0.0278 -0.0070 0.17 
Month 17 0.0387 0.1528 0.0050 -0.0227 0.0337 0.60 
Month 18 -0.0031 0.1497 
0.0062 -0.0165 -0.0093 0.28 
Month 19 0.0211 0.1707 0.0492 0.0327 -0.0281 0.54 
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Month 20 -0-0078 0.1629 0.0882* 0.1209 -0-0960* 3.42 Month 21 -0-0110 0.1519 0.0256 0.1465 -0-0366 1.07 Month 22 -0.0283 0.1236 -0.0388 0.1077 0.0105 0.20 Month 23 0.0034 0.1270 -0.0029 0.1049 0.0063 0.15 Month 24 0.0156 0.1426 -0.0058 0.0990 0.0214 0.80 Month 25 -0.0024 0.1401 0.0100 0.1091 -0.0124 0.44 Month 26 -0.0800 0.0601 -0.0083 0.1007 -0.0717 0.96 Month 27 0.0477* 0.1078 -0.0028 0.0980 0.0505 1.27 Month 28 -0.0056 0.1023 -0.0503 0.0476 0.0447 1.28 Month 29 0.0327 0.1349 0.0331 0.0807 -0.0004 0.01 Month 30 -0.0352 0.0998 -0.0314 0.0493 -0.0038 0.08 Month 31 0.0485 0.1482 -0.0250 0.0243 0.0735 1.89 
Month 32 -0.0070 0.1412 0.0341 0.0584 -0.0411 2.00 Month 33 0.0193 0.1605 0.0291 0.0875 -0.0098 0.47 Month 34 0.0123 0.1728 0.0438 0.1313 -0.0315 0.97 Month 35 0.0058 0.1786 0.0394 0.1707 -0.0336 1.23 Month 36 -0.0160 0.1626 -0.0320 0.1387 0.0160 0.46 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided test. 
-0 
0.1 
0.05 
0 
-0.05> 
-0.15 
Figure 4.9. The first differences of bidding firms (post-takeover) 
average abnormal returns (AR) between December-June model 
and September-March model 
IIIIIIIIIII TiI IIII 
Event Month -36 to -1 
Table 4.28 shows, under the December-June model, bidding firms earn a positive but 
insignificant abnormal return of 16.26% in three-year after the takeover. Under the 
September-March model, bidding firms experience a positive but insignificant abnormal 
return of 13.87% in three-year after the takeover. The first difference of these two 
CARs 
is about 2%, but it is statistically insignificant different from zero. 
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Table 4.28. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at Sept) three-year Post-takeover CARs 
Sample Bidding firms (accounting year ends at September, 17 firms) three year post-takeover average CARs are calculated by using the control firms approach under the December-June model and the September-March model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the CARs and the corresponding P-values 
calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given in the table. 
CAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June 0.1626 0.686 0.421 
September-March 0.1387 0.716 0.570 
Difference 0.0239 0.097 0.865 
Table 4.29 presents the three-year post-takeover average BHARs of the bidding finns 
that have an accounting year ending at September. BHAR in row I is calculated by 
applying the December-June model (i. e., we ignore the accounting year ending of 
March for these firms, and calculate the book-to-market ratios at December of year t- I 
and sizes at June of year t for these target firms. We match these sample firms with all 
the LSE listed firms (with both book-to-market ratios and size calculated at the same 
time as above, around 1,500 firms each year) to find the closest match, i. e., the control 
firms). BHAR in row 2 calculated by applying the September-March model (i. e., 
according to the accounting year ending of September, we calculated the book-to- 
market ratios at September of year t and sizes at March (with 6 months lag) of year t+1 
for these target firms. We match these sample firms with all the LSE listed firms that 
have an accounting year ending at September (their book-to-market ratios and sizes are 
calculated at the same time as above, around 100 firrns each year) to 
find the closest 
match5 i. e., the control firms). 
As we can see from Table 4.29, under the December-June model, 
bidding firms 
experience a small positive but insignificant abnormal return of 
1.06% in three years 
after the takeover. Under the September-March model, 
biding firms earn a positive but 
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insignificant abnonnal return of 13.61 % in three-year after the takeover. The first 
difference of the two BHARs is about 13%, but it is statistically insignificant different 
from zero. 
Table 4.29. Bidding firms (with an accounting year ending at Sept) three-year post-takeover 
BHARs 
Sample bidding firms (accounting year ends at September, 17 firms) three year post-takeover average 
BHARs (buy-and-hold abnormal returns) are calculated by using the control firms approach under the 
December-June model and the September-March model respectively. Relevant t-statistics of the BHARs 
and the corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are 
also given in the table. 
BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
December-June 0.0106 0.035 0.538 
September-March 0.1361 0.490 0.344 
_Difference -0.1255 -0.402 
0.865 
Finally, we will take a look at how close the sample firms are matched with the control 
firms on the basis of the book-to-market ratios (because we match the size in a fixed 
range, i. e., 70% to 130%, and we choose the closest book-to-market ratio from this 
range. Thus we will only look at the book-to-market ratios here). Table 4.30 tells us that 
the December-June model gets the closest book-to-market ratios in every case 
examined. It is because sample firms are matched with on average 1,500 firms to get the 
closest control firms (i. e., the expected return) under the December-June model. 
However, sample firms are only matched with on average 300 or 100 firms under other 
models examined. Thus, we get the closest control firms, i. e., the exact expected returns, 
from applying the December-June model. 
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Table 4.30. The Mean and Standard Deviation of the first differences of the B/M ratios bet-ween 
sample firms and control firms under different two models 
We calculate the absolute value of the first differences of the book-to-market ratios between all the 
sample firms and the control firins under each model examined. The mean of these differences and their 
standard deviations are given below. 
Table 4.30.1 Target Firms (pre-takeover) 
Mean Standard Deviation 
December-June 0.02 0.008 
March-September 0.07 0.02 
December-June 0.02 0.01 
June-December 0.12 0.04 
December-June 0.005 0.002 
September-March 0.31 0.17 
Table 4.30.2 Bidding Firms (pre-takeover) 
Mean Standard Deviation 
December-June 0.02 0.005 
March-September 0.07 0.014 
December-June 0.006 0.003 
June-December 0.08 0.03 
December-June 0.01 0.004 
September-March 0.21 0.05 
Table 4.30.3 Bidding Firms (post-takeover) 
Mean Standard Deviation 
December-June 0.02 0.005 
March-September 0.06 0.01 
December-June 0.008 0.003 
June-December 0.08 0.03 
December-June 0.02 0.005 
September-March 0.17 0.05 
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Finally, we have not tested the rest of 20% firms that have an accounting year ending at 
other eight months, because we have no need to test them. The matching samples for 
these eight months are too small (around 30 firms for each month), we believe that a 
sample firm matched with 1,500 matching firms under the December-June model will 
have no doubt to find a closer control firm, i. e., the expected return, than the same fin-n 
matched with a matching sample of 30 firms. 
Altogether, the tests results in Table 4.3-4.30 indicate that there is no statistically 
significant difference of the long-term abnormal returns calculated under the December- 
June model and the corresponding models of the control firms approach. And because 
of the close matching of the former, we think that following the December-June model 
of Barber and Lyon (1997) may lead to a better result. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter tests the validity of the control firms approach advanced by Barber and 
Lyon (1997) in the countries such as UK where the listed firms have various accountinl tl 
year endings. Firstly, we find that UK firms' accounting year endings are concentrated 
in four months. In the ten-year period of 1991-2000, there are on average 43.7% firms 
having an accounting year ending at December, 21.25% firms having an accounting 
year ending at March, 8.19% firms having an accounting year ending at September, and 
finally 7.53% firms accounting year ends at June. Thus, these four months share 80.7% 
of all the LSE listed firms. The accounting year endings of the rest 20% firms are fall 
into other eight months, with the highest shares 3.35% and lowest shares only 0.93%. 
Because 43.7% firms with an accounting year ending at December, it means that nearly 
half of the firms in the UK will have no problems for us to directly apply Barber and 
Lyon's control finns approach. However, how are the other firms especially the finns 
with an accounting year endings at March, June, and September (these three months 
share 37% of UK listed finus). Is the Barber and Lyon's control firms approach also fit 
for these firms? To find out, we test the differences of long-run abnormal stock returns 
calculated under Barber and Lyon's December-June model and other models according 
to firms accounting year endings (there are March-September model, June-December 
model5 and September-March model). 
We firstly calculate the target firms' three years pre-acquisition abnormal stock returns 
(both CARs and BHARs) by using Barber and Lyon's December-June model and other 
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corresponding models according to target firms accounting year endings. We then 
calculate and test the first difference between each paired models. We do not find any 
statistically significant difference from either the three-year pre-takeover CARs or the 
three-year pre-takeover BHARs calculated under the December-June model and other 
corresponding models. 
After examining the target firms, we apply the same methods to calculate the bidding 
firms three years pre-acquisition and three years post acquisition abnormal stock returns 
and test the differences of CARs and BHARs calculated under each paired models. We 
once again fail to find any statistically significant differences from either the CARs or 
the BHARs calculated under the December-June model and other corresponding models 
in both three-year pre-takeover and three-year post-takeover periods. 
Put them together, we conclude that, at least in our case, there is no statistically 
significant difference of the long-run abnormal returns calculated under Barber and 
Lyon's approach and the approaches that according to finns accounting year endings. In 
a word, we find that the difference of accounting year endings in the UK will not 
significantly affect the validity of Barber and Lyon's control firms approach. 
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Chapter Five: Long-run Post Acquisition Stock Returns: the Impact of 
Overlapping Returns, Takeover Premiums, and Methods of Payment 
5.1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions is one of the most researched areas in finance. It first became a 
topic of public policy debate during the greater merger waves in the U. K. and the U. S. 
at the end of the I gth century. To date, most research on the financial performance of 
mergers and acquisitions has focused on stock returns surrounding the takeover 
announcement and outcome dates. Virtually all researchers have reported large positive 
average abnormal returns to target firm shareholders, a result that is not surprising given 
the significant premiums paid in the takeovers. Most researchers also find that the 
bidding firm shareholders break even around the time of the takeovers. 
Parallel to the research on the announcement and outcome period stock returns, a small 
body of work has investigated the long-run post acquisition stock returns. The reason 
why researchers have paid relevant less attention to the post acquisition long-run stock 
returns might be the strong belief in market efficiency indicated what the results should 
be. However, a majority of studies, both in the UK and elsewhere, have documented a 
pattern of long-run negative post acquisition returns to the shareholders of the bidding 
fin-ns. Why merged firms on average suffer a significant wealth loss is an anomaly to 
us. As Jensen and Ruback (1983, P. 20) writes: "These post-outcome negative abnormal 
returns are unsettling because they are inconsistent with market efficiency and suggest 
that changes in stock prices overestimate the future efficiency gains from mergers. " 
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5. LI Previous Evidence 
Firstly, we shall have a brief look of the studies conducted in the UK. Firth (1979) 
shows the CAR (cumulative abnormal returns) of acquiring firms choosing cash offer 
decreases by 2.6%, and the CAR of acquiring firms offering equity decreases by 7.8% 
at the end of 24 months after the takeover announcement. Bames (1984), Dodds and 
Quek (1985) report a CAR of -6.3% and -6.8% over the 60 months following the 
takeover announcement, respectively. Franks and Harris (1989) examine a nearly 
exhaustive sample of 1,800 UK takeovers in the period 1955-1985, they find that 
successful bidding finns suffer significant wealth loss in the two years period after the 
completion of takeovers, the CAR by using the market model is -12.6% by 24 months 
after the merger. Limmack (1991) uses three benchmarks to compute the post- 
acquisition abnormal returns. All the benchmarks produce significant negative CARs by 
24 months following the completion of takeovers, and on average, the CAR is -9%. 
Kennedy and Limmack (1996) take into account of the size effect, they show that 
overall size adjusted returns are negative with bidder abnormal returns being a 
significant -4.92% for the period 12 to 24 months post bid. Gregory (1997) examines 
the post-merger performance of UK bidding companies by using six benchmarks. He 
finds the two years CARs between -11.8% to -18% under these six different models, all 
of which are statistically significant. 
The evidence of long-term significantly negative abnormal returns of the merged firms 
following takeovers is echoed in the US. Langetieg (1978) reports significant CARs 
between -2.23% and -2.62% over 70 months using four different statistical methods. 
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Asquith (1983) reports that the CAR decreases by 7.2% for the merged firms in the 240 
days following the merger completion date. Malatesta (1983) finds statistically 
significant CARs of -7.6% for the year after the first public announcement of the 
merger proposal. Jensen and Ruback (1983) survey seven previous studies of bidding 
firms' post-takeover performance and report an average CAR of -5.5% in 12 months 
after the takeover. Magenheim and Mueller (198 8) find a significantly negative CAR of 
2.4% over three years after the merger announcement. Lahey and Conn (1990) apply 
two benchmarks and report a CAR of -10.2% and -38.57% respectively by three years 
after the merger approval. Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) provide a thorough 
analysis of the post-merger share performance of acquiring firms by using a nearly 
exhaustive sample of US mergers over 30 years. They find that shareholders of bidding 
firms suffer a statistically significant wealth loss of about -10% over five years after the 
merger. Anderson and Mandelker (1993) report significant five-year CARs of -9.6% 
and -9.3% under a size and a size & book-to-market adjustment model, respectively. 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) find a statistically significant BHAR (buy-and-hold abnormal 
return) relative to a size and book-to-market control of -15.9%. Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) use the size and book-to-market adjustment method and report a statistical 
significant three-year CAR of -4%. Most recently, Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) review 22 
different papers of both UK and US examining the long-term post-acquisition stock 
returns, and conclude that merged firins' long-run performance is significantly negative 
following mergers. 
However, although the above evidence both in the UK and the US reports a significant 
negative long-run abnormal stock returns after the takeover, the findings are not all one 
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sided. Mandelker (1974) finds that shareholders of bidding firms suffer a wealth loss in 
the 40 months after the merger, the CAR decreases by 1.4%. However, it is 
economically small and no t-statistics are provided for this entire 40 months post- 
acquisition period, t-statistics for both aI 0-month and a 20-month period are 
insignificant. Malatesta (1983) finds statistically significant abnormal returns for the 
year after the takeover announcement but insignificant results for the year after the 
management approval. Using the same data but different methodologies, Magenheim 
and Mueller (1988) and Bradley and Jarrell (1988) reach opposite conclusion. MM find 
significant CAR over three years, while BJ find insignificant results over the same time 
period. 
Lahey and Conn (1990) find a negative CAR of -10.20% in three years after the 
acquisition but it is statistically insignificant. Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) 
investigate the post-merger share price performance of acquiring firms by using two 
single-factor benchmarks (the equally-weighted index and the value-weighted index) 
and two multi-factor benchmarks (the eight-portfolio benchmark and ten-factor 
benchmark). They find negative post-merger abnormal returns to the bidding firrn 
shareholders by using an equal-weighted index. However, the value-weighted 
benchmark yields positive post-merger performance. In contrast, the result generated by 
using multi-factor benchmarks especially the eight-portfolio benchmark reveal no 
statistically significant abnormal performance for the overall sample of bidding firms 
during post-merger period. Loderer and Martin (1992) find a negative five-year 
abnormal returns but it is not statistically different from zero. 
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Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) examine the post-acquisition share performance for 
the 50 largest U. S. mergers between 1979 and 1984. In order to avoid the inability of 
stock price performance studies to determine whether takeovers create real economic 
gains and to identify the sources of such gains. They examine the post-merger cash flow 
performance of successful bidding firms. Their findings indicate that merged firms have 
a significant improvement in operating cash flow returns after the merger, resulting 
from increases in asset productivity relative to their industries. Based on the similar 
method, Manson, Stark and Thomas (1994) in the UK find that operational cash flow 
gains after the takeovers. However, the evidence is not one-sided, Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1987) and Herman and Lowenstein (1988) report poor accounting performance 
after takeovers. 
As we can see from all the evidence above, although the negative long-run abnon-nal 
returns after the acquisition gains a support from the majority, the issue is not 
unambiguous. Some studies do not find significant underperformance after the takeover, 
and even the studies carried out by examining the accounting performance after 
takeovers are divided. Fundamentally, the question is whether these acquisitions really 
led to significant negative abnormal returns, or whether these results are the result of 
some type of specification error. In summary, acquiring firms long-run post acquisition 
stock returns is still an unsettled question that demands further investigation. 
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5.1.2. The Overpricing Interpretation 
One possible interpretation to the long-run negative post acquisition stock returns is that 
it represents a delayed market reaction to overpriced takeovers. That is bidding firms 
might have overvalued and paid too much premiums to the targets that leads to a 
delayed correction in their post acquisition period. There are two common reasons about 
it. One is that bidding companies might overestimate the value of the targets and have 
paid a higher price than their true values. The other is that managers of bidding 
companies might be too optimistic to think that they could improve the perfon-nance of 
the acquired firms sufficiently to recoup the higher premiums they paid for them. This is 
consistent with the performance extrapolation hypothesis advanced by Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998). Recent data shows that the average one-month premium of UK 
public takeovers is 40.6% between the years 1991-2000. (Acquisition Monthly2001) 
There are a few papers have studied some questions on takeover premiums. Jarrell et al 
(1988) find that target firm shareholders receive average premiums of 30% and peak 
value excess 100% for the sale of their shares in takeovers during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Alberts and Varaiya (1989) argue that the acquiring finns have on average failed to 
improve the financial performance of their acquirees sufficiently to recapture the high 
premiums paid to them. Hayward and Hambrick (1995) report that takeover premiums 
are positively correlated with proxies for past managerial performance such as recent 
organizational success and media praise for the CEO. 
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Although these studies have conducted some research in takeover premiums, there are 
no previous studies have fully investigated the impact of premiums to the bidding firms 
post-acquisition stock returns. In recognizing the importance of takeover premiums to 
the merged firms' post-acquisition performance, we shall thoroughly investigate the 
following questions: Firstly, what is on average the best premium region for bidding 
firms to takeover the targets? Or to ask the question another way, for the purpose of 
achieving the best post-takeover performance, how much premiums should the 
acquiring company offer? Secondly, is it the higher the premiums offered by bidding 
companies, the worse of their post-takeover performance? Thirdly, do the takeover 
premiums on average overestimate the targets' value, and whether this overestimation 
leads to their post-takeover underperformance? 
5.1.3. The Methodological Errors Interpretation 
Apart from the overpricing interpretation discussed above, an alternative explanation is 
that the phenomena are caused by methodological errors in calculating and interpreting 
the long-run stock returns. These errors may arise through choice of inappropriate 
control models and also the use of inappropriate test statistics. Indeed, the application of 
test statistics that reflect the non-normal properties of distributions of long-run returns 
do reduce the significance of results based on parametric tests. 
Attempts to provide what are deemed to be more appropriate models have been made in 
recent papers by Franks, Harris and Titman (1991), Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker 
(1992), and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) by using US data; and Gregory (1997) by using 
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UK data. In addition to potential errors arising from the inappropriate choice of control 
models, a number of researchers have most recently pointed out that the process used in 
the calculation of long-run returns is itself biased. 
Recent Papers by Kothari and Warner (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997) address 
biases in long-horizon event studies. Both document that for randomly chosen firms, the 
traditional Mest of abnormal performance is misspecified and indicates abnormal 
performance too frequently. Barber and Lyon (1997) find that the control firm approach 
yields well-specified test statistics in virtually all-sampling situations they considered. 
And in a following up paper, Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) report that using size/book- 
to-market control firms approach yields well-specified test statistic for the conventional 
t-statistic in all random samples. [Please refer to Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of 
n, k above issues] 
Since the control firms approach minimizes the chances that the test statistics are mis- 
specified, we will introduce the control firrns approach into our empirical studies, and 
expect to find out whether the previous evidence of significant negative long-run 
abnormal returns is due to the methodology errors, i. e., the mis-specification of test 
statistics. 
5.1.4. Methods ofPayment 
Furthermore, previous studies have consistently found that bidding firms shareholder 
returns are method of payment dependent. Almost all these papers 
have reported that 
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f rMS2. cash financed bidding firms consistently outperform the equity financed bidding I 
However, these studies have only concentrated on the cash offer and stock offer, few 
papers have investigated the other two alternative ways: alternative offer and combined 
offer. Alternative offer means that bidding firms deliver a choice to the targets, target 
firm shareholders can either choose a full cash offer or a full equity offer, this all 
depends on the preference of target firms shareholders. Combined offer means that the 
payment terms are neither pure stock nor pure cash; both stock and cash are jointly 
used. For instance, 2.7 WB ordinary shares plus 1,472p cash for every 10 JM ordinary 
shares. Since the alternative offer and combined offer are very common in these days 
and cannot be ignored, we will examine all these four kinds of payment and expect to 
find out whether cash offer outperfon-ns the other three. 
5.1.5. The Effect of Overlapping Returns 
Based on the work of Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997), Lyon, 
Barber, and Tsai (1999) conclude that mis specification of test statistics can be traced to 
(1) the new listing bias, (2) the rebalancing bias, (3) the skewness bias, (4) cross- 
sectional dependence, and (5) a bad model of asset pricing. 
We choosing to use the Control Finns Approach advanced by Barber and Lyon (1997) 
can not only avoid using a bad asset price model, but also eliminates the new listing, the 
rebalancing, and skewness biases. Thus the only problem left to the control 
firms 
approach is the cross-sectional dependence in sample observations. Cross-sectional 
2 See, for example, Travlos (1987), Huang and Walking (1987), Amihud, 
Lev, and Travlos (1990), 
Loughran and Vijh (1997), Gregory (1997), Draper and Paudyal (1999), 
Baker and Limmack (200 1). This 
list is by no means exhaustive. 
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dependence inflates test statistics because the number of sample firms overstates the 
number of independent observations. Two extreme sample situations of the problem of 
cross-sectional dependence are: 
Calendar clustering. It is reasonable to assume that the contemporaneous returns of 
firms are more likely to be cros s- sectionally related than returns from different periods. 
If true, the problem of cross-sectional dependence will be most severe when all sample 
firms share the same event date. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) find that the control 
firms approach control well for calendar clustering of event dates. 
Overlapping return calculation. A common problem in event studies that analyse long- 
run abnormal returns is overlapping periods of return calculation for the same firm. 
Because these returns share several months of overlapping returns, this is the most 
severe form of cross-sectional dependence in the event study of long-run abnon-nal 
returns. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) find that the lack of independence generated by 
overlapping returns yields misspecified test statistics, and suggest the only solution to 
this problem is to remove the sample of observations of overlapping returns. 
So far, it is only one possible source of bias left to us: the cross-sectional dependence. 
To reduce the problem caused by the cross-sectional dependence in sample 
observations. Firstly, we point out that in the takeover event, bidding firms in our 
sample have different takeover event date, they of course do not share the same event 
date, this makes the calendar clustering problem have little problem for our sample 
observations. Secondly, and the most severe problem is to eliminate the overlapping 
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return calculations. To do so, we will not only examine the whole sample, but also 
remove the overlapping bidding firms from our sample, i. e., we choose the bidding 
firms that only involved in one takeover event and do not have any other takeover 
activities during the entire post-takeover period (say, three years). Thus, we will have an 
independent sample of bidding firms that are free of overlapping return problem. We 
can also compare the results and the inferences between the whole sample (the sample 
contains overlapping firms) and the non-overlapping sample, and evaluate the impact of 
the overlapping returns. 
5.1.6. Summary 
In summary, our study differs from previous studies in five important ways. First, we 
apply the most up-to-date and reliable method (the control firms approach) into the 
investigation of long-run post acquisition stock returns; it minimizes the chances that 
our results are mis-specified. Second, we pioneer the investigation of the impact of 
takeover premiums to the long-run post takeover stock returns, and that can also be used 
to test the hypothesis of the delayed market reaction to overpriced takeovers. Third, to 
examine the impact of overlapping returns and to remove the possible bias caused by 
the cross-sectional dependence in sample observations, we examine all our empirical 
questions by using not only the whole sample but a corresponding sample that removes 
all the overlapping bidding firms. By doing so, we can test the impact of overlapping 
returns to the long-run post-acquisition returns, to the takeover premiums, and to the 
methods of payment. Fourth, we examine four kinds of payment instead of just two 
(cash and stock offer). As previous studies have consistently found that the cash 
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financing bidding firms outperform the stock financing firms, we examine whether cash 
financing also outperforms the other two (alternative and combined offer). Finally, we 
are among the first to use both the CAR and the BHAR to examine the long-run post- 
acquisition stock returns. 
5.2. Methodology 
We have mentioned above that we will adopt Barber and Lyon's control finns approach 
in our study. However, we must acknowledge that this approach may not be without 
questions while applying it in the UK. In their approach, Barber and Lyon use June of 
year t to find the market value (size), and December of year t-I to calculate the book-to- 
market ratio. The use of December to calculate the book-to-market ratio is because that 
US firms have the same fiscal year ending in December. Thus, it is reasonable and 
convenient to calculate the book-to-market ratio at the same accounting year ending, 
i. e., December. However, the accounting year endings of UK fin-ns are different months 
across the whole year, if we introduce the same approach into UK, we are not able to 
calculate the book-to-market ratio at the accounting year ending for most of the firms. 
This may lead to a biased result of our empirical study. 
In Chapter 4, we have tested the validity of the control firms approach under various 
accounting year endings through UK corporate takeovers. We find that there is no 
statistically significant difference of the long-run abnormal stock returns calculated 
under the Barber and Lyon (1997) approach and the approaches according to firms' 
accounting year endings, and we suggest that following the December-June model of 
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Barber and Lyon (1997) may lead to a better result. Based on these findings, we will use 
the same control firms approach applied by Barber and Lyon (1997). 
In addition to the control firms approach, we also use the three-factor model developed 
by Fama and French (1993) as an alternative method. According to Kothari and Warner 
(1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997), we would expect to see that the three-factor model 
leads to the mis-specification of test statistics by often indicating abnormal Performance 
when none is present. 
For the methods of calculating the long-run abnormal stock returns (both CAR and 
BHAR) and their test statistics, please refer to Chapter 3 for details. 
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5.3. Data and Sample Construction 
In our empirical test, we will examine the successful bidding firms three-year post 
acquisition stock returns. To reflect the up-to-date developments of acquisitions, all the 
data used in our study are in the 1990s. We have initially collected all the successful 
UK public bidding firms from various issues of Extel Financial and Acquisition 
Monthly for the eight-year period of 1991-1998. We apply the similar sample selection 
criteria as mentioned in Chapter 4, and finally, 179 successful bidding firms are 
qualified for the investigation in 1991-1998 periods. 
The descriptive statistics for the sample size and B/M ratio are presented in the 
following table and histograms. As we can see from the table, the mean size value is 
much higher than the median size and is very close to the size of the 3 rd quartile. It 
shows that 3 quarters of bidding firms have a size smaller than the mean, and 1 quarter 
bidding firms have a far large size than others. The histogram confirms the data and 
shows that the distribution of the sample size is positive skewed. The B/M ratio presents 
a similar pattern that more than 3 quarters of bidding firms have a B/M ratio smaller 
than one, with less than lquarter firms have a higher book value to their market 
capitalization. The histogram of B/M ratio also shows a positive skewed distribution. 
Descriptive statistics of sample size and B/M ratio 
Size (1991-1998) fmillion B/M Ratio (1991-1998) 
Mean 1748.36 Mean 0.61 
Standard Deviation 3283.17 Standard Deviation 0.44 
Minimum 4.28 Minimum 0.05 
1" Quartile 90.4 1" Quartile 0.28 
Median 332.9 Median 0.47 
P Quartile 1755.9 3rd Quartile 0.82 
Maximum 20824.3 Maximum 2.67 
Count 179 Count 179 
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In summary, the descriptive statistics shows that most of the sample firms are smaller 
than their mean size, and most of them have a smaller book value to their market value. 
For this unevenly distributed sample, equal-weighted return is more appropriate to be 
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applied in the empirical study. Thus, the small proportion of large size and B/M sample 
firms will not significantly affect the general results. 
People may argue that one of the selection criteria might cause the survivorship bias. 
Our sample selection criteria do potentially introduce some bias by imposing a period 
(say, three years) of survival post-acquisition. However, in fact, if we do not select the 
bidding firms with full three-year stock returns, the problem may be even worse. First, 
for instance, we have 10 sample firms: 8 survive for three years, 2 survive 15 months. 
We calculate the CARs of all these 10 firms, thus, if we do not exclude the 2 fin-ns that 
have not survived for three years, the average CAR of these ten firms will not reflect the 
average 36-month cumulative abnormal return, because two of them are 15-month 
CARs. Second, if these 2 non-survived firms are taken over by other firms after 15 
months, thus the CARs of these two firms will not be the abnormal returns caused by 
the single takeover event like other 8 firms, thus, the average CARs of these 10 finns 
will not be the single event cumulative abnormal returns. Fortunately, the consequences 
of our selection criteria are not serious for our analysis as few bidding firms (less than 
10 firms) are removed from the whole sample. 
Table 5.1. Matching firms in 1991-1998 
Matching firms are all the LSE listed firms with both sizes and book-to-market ratios (finns with negative 
book value and zero size are excluded). 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Matching 
1445 1381 1334 1340 1427 1491 1612 1740 
Firms 
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Table 5.1 shows the matching firms in 1991-1998 period, thus we have so far selected 
the whole sample of bidding firms and constructed the matching samples of each year 
from 1991 to 1998. Our next job is to construct the sub-samples based on the methods 
of payment and the takeover premiums. 
In referring to the methods of payment, we put all the bidding firms that choose a full 
cash offer into the Cash Offer sub-sample and a full stock offer into the Stock Offer 
sub-sample. Bidding firms that offer a full choice between cash and stock to the target 
firms are put into Alternative Offer sub-sample. Combined Offer sub-sample is the 
firms that contain the bidding firms that combine cash and stock together as the 
payment method, for instance, 2.7 VvIB ordinary shares plus 1,472p cash for every 10 
JM ordinary shares. 
In referring to the takeover premiums, we use the one-month takeover premiums'. It is 
the differences of the price per share offered by the bidder (i. e. offer price) to the trading 
price of the target stock one month before the offer. The one-month premium data are 
available from Acquisition Monthly since 1995, thus our sample period for the takeover 
premiums is from 1995 to 1998,109 bidding firms have the one-month premium data 
for this four years period. Bidding firms that offer a negative or zero premiums to the 
targets are put into sub-sample P 1. P2 contains the firms that offer a premium bigger 
3 Evidence shows that target firm share prices are largely and significantly changed only during the 
takeover announcement date and the day before. Our use of target prices one month before the 
announcement date can reflect the normal prices of target firms before the offer. See, for example, Dodd 
(1980), Asquith (1983), Dennis and McConnell (1986), Huang and Walkling (1987), Bradley et al (1988), 
Sudarsanam. et al (1996), Draper and Paudyal (1999). This list is by no means exhaustive. 
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than zero and less or equal to 30%. P3 contains the firms that offer a premium bigger 
than 30% but less or equal to 50%. All bidding firm that offer a premium bigger than 
50% are put into P4. 
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5.4. Empirical Results 
5.4.1. Long-run Post Acquisition Stock Returns and the Impact of Overlapping Returns 
We firstly examine the bidding firms three-year post acquisition abnormal stock returns 
for the whole sample from 1991 to 1998, this sample contains 179 bidding firms that 
involved in the acquisition at this period. 
Table 5.2 reports the three-year post-takeover average ARs (abnormal returns), average 
CARs, and their t-statistics of the 179 UK bidding firms from 1991 to 1998. As we can 
see that only 5 out of 36 average monthly ARs are significant at 5% two-sided test, most 
of the monthly average ARs are statistically insignificant different from zero. II out of 
14 CARs in the first 14 months are statistically significant different from zero. It shows 
that UK bidding firms suffer a significant negative abnormal returns in the first year 
after the takeover. The CARs are statistically insignificant from month 15 to month 36. 
Finally, the three-year CAR is economically small and statistically insignificant. 
Table 5.2. Bidding firms (1991-1998) three years post acquisition average ARs and CARs 
There are 179 UK bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1991-1998 periods. AR is the 
monthly average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnon-nal return 
of all the bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0089 -1.134 -0.0089 -1.134 
Month 2 -0.0105 -1.381 -0.0194 -1.724 
Month 3 -0.0255* -2.866 -0.0450* -3.283 
Month 4 0.0091 0.866 -0.0359* -2.062 
Month 5 -0.0106 -1.202 -0.0465* -2.269 
Month 6 -0.0057 -0.733 -0.0521* -2.246 
Month 7 -0.0068 -0.828 -0.0590* -2.235 
Month 8 -0.0002 -0.025 -0.0592* -2.041 
Month 9 -0.0105 -1.046 -0.0697* -2.138 
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Month 10 0.0045 0.535 -0.0652 -1.879 Month 11 -0.0163 -1.504 -0.0815* -2.272 Month 12 0.0048 0.643 -0.0767* -2.055 Month 13 -0.0033 -0.313 -0.0800* -2.100 Month 14 -0-0053 -0.542 -0.0854* -2.070 Month 15 0.0172* 1.981 -0.0682 -1.631 Month 16 0.0060 0.632 -0.0621 -1.437 Month 17 -0.0077 -0.628 -0.0699 -1.513 Month 18 0.0242* 2.423 -0.0457 -0.942 Month 19 -0.0024 -0.285 -0.0481 -1.003 Month 20 -0.0084 -0.785 -0.0564 -1.092 Month 21 0.0031 0.282 -0.0534 -1.002 Month 22 -0.0006 -0.052 -0.0539 -1.023 Month 23 -0.0042 -0.355 -0.0581 -1.083 Month 24 -0.0062 -0.630 -0.0643 -1.214 Month 25 -0.0048 -0.477 -0.0691 -1.266 Month 26 0.0234* 2.296 -0.0457 -0.832 Month 27 0.0113 0.943 -0.0344 -0.621 Month 28 0.0266* 2.514 -0.0077 -0.138 Month 29 0.0088 0.793 0.0011 0.018 
Month 30 0.0128 1.081 0.0139 0.237 
Month 31 0.0080 0.738 0.0219 0.369 
Month 32 0.0178 1.577 0.0396 0.662 
Month 33 -0.0006 -0.048 0.0391 0.636 
Month 34 0.0056 0.477 0.0447 0.721 
Month 35 0.0184 1.563 0.0631 1.016 
Month 36 -0.0145 -1.105 0.0486 0.750 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Figure 5.1 shows the 36 months CARs, as we can see that CARs are continually fallen 
from the event month to the month 14, and then start to go up and down until month 25. 
CARs are climbing up consistently from month 26 and become positive after month 29. 
From Table 5.2, we know that II out of 14 CARs in the first 14 months are statistically 
significant different from zero, and the CARs are statistically insignificant after the 
month 15. 
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Table 5.3.1 reports bidding firms three years post acquisition CARs and BHARs, their t- 
statistics and P-values. According to the t-value of CARs, UK bidding firms experience 
a statistically significant negative abnonnal returns in the first year after the takeover. 
On the other hand, bidding firms suffer a significant negative abnormal returns in two 
years after the completion of the takeover according to the t-values of BHARs. 
However, their corresponding P-values calculated by the nonparametric test show that 
neither the CARs nor the BHARs are statistically significant at the 5% significance 
level. Finally, Both three-year abnormal returns (three-year CAR and three-year BHAR) 
are positive and statistically insignificant different from zero. These contradict with the 
findings of most previous studies that report a significant negative long-run abnormal 
return. However, according to the results shown in Table 5.3.2, all the three intercept 
terms are statistically significant different from zero, with the implied CARs 4 far more 
striking than the CARs reported in Table 5.3.1. 
4 Gregory (1997) applies six benchmarks including the Fama-French three-factor model to examine the 
long-run post acquisition perfon-nance of UK bidding firms over the sample period 1984-1992. He reports 
a one-year post acquisition CAR of -10.63% and a two-year CAR of -18.01% by using the three-factor 
model, both are significant at 1% significance level in two-sided t-test. By comparing the results obtained 
from all the six benchmarks, the abnormal returns are particularly striking under the Fama-French three- 
factor model. 
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Table 5.3. Bidding firms (1991-1998) three years post acquisition average CARs and BHARs 
There are 179 UK bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1991-1998 periods. Table 5.3.1 
reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. Table 5.3.2 presents the result calculated 
by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return of all the 
bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. Ot is the 
mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean (x multiplying by 12, 
24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values calculated by 
using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table 5.3.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.0767* -2.055 0.127 
1 to 24 -0.0643 -1.214 0.167 
1 to 36 0.0486 0.750 0.390 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.0916* -2.510 0.056 
1 to 24 -0.1077* -2.026 0.120 
1 to 36 0.070 0.968 0.242 
Table 5.3.2 
EM T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0081* -3.182 0.014 -0.0972 
1 to 24 -0.0088* -5.172 0.000 -0.2112 
1 to 36 -0.0079* -5.429 0.000 -0.2844 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
As we know, from the statistic point of view, the mean of a group of sample 
observations will normally be significantly different from zero if most of these 
observations are larger or smaller than zero. If all the observations are evenly or near 
evenly randomly distributed up and down the zero line, it shows that these observations 
do not follow an obvious positive or negative trend (i. e., a systematic pattern), and the 
signs of these observations are unable to predict. Thus, the mean of these observations 
is statistically insignificant different from zero. 
As discussed above, Figure 5.2 and 5.3 show the 179 three-year CAR observations and 
the 179 three-year BHAR observations, respectively. (The whole sample contains 179 
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UK bidding finns; every firm has a CAR and a BHAR) As we can see that the CARs 
and BHARs are randomly hover around the zero line. No obvious return pattern can be 
found from these observations. That is the reason why the average three-year CAR of 
4.86% and the average three-year BHAR of 7% are statistically insignificant different 
from zero. 
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We have so far examined the bidding firms (1991-1998) three years post acquisition 
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abnon-nal returns. In contrast with most previous studies, we report a positive three-year 
CAR of 4.86%, and a positive three-year BHAR of 7%, they are both economically 
small and statistically insignificant different from zero. Thus, we have so far found a 
small positive but statistically insignificant three-year post acquisition abnormal returns. 
However, we must acknowledge that the sample (1991-1998) contains a proportion of 
overlapping firms, and the positive three-year abnormal returns found above might be 
due to these overlapping returns. Furthermore, as Lyon et al (1999) argue, the 
overlapping returns might also mis-specify the test statistics. Thus, we remove the 
potential bias of overlapping returns by excluding the overlapping bidding firms from 
the whole sample, and reexamine the non-overlapping bidding firms three years post 
acquisition abnonnal returns. 
Table 5.4. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1991-1998) three years post acquisition average ARs and 
CARs 
There are 133 UK non-overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1991-1998 periods. 
AR is the monthly average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average 
abnormal return of all the bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the 
table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0060 -0.618 -0.0060 -0.618 
Month 2 -0.0154 -1.716 -0.0214 -1.573 
Month 3 -0.0367* -3.325 -0.0580* -3.440 
Month 4 0.0073 0.548 -0.0507* -2.358 
Month 5 -0.0194 -1.755 -0.0701* -2.802 
Month 6 -0.0019 -0.195 -0.0720* -2.517 
Month 7 -0.0044 -0.431 -0.0765* -2.293 
Month 8 0.0076 0.633 -0.0689 -1.921 
Month 9 -0.0166 -1.301 -0.0855* -2.082 
Month 10 -0.0028 -0.279 -0.0883* -1.992 
Month 11 -0.0213 -1.538 -0.1096* -2.411 
Month 12 0.0009 0.097 -0.1087* -2.303 
Month 13 -0.0068 -0.499 -0.1155* -2.414 
Month 14 -0.0117 -0.922 -0.1272* -2.439 
Month 15 0.0258* 2.328 -0.1014 -1.911 
Month 16 0.0027 0.225 -0.0987 -1.800 
Month 17 -0.0112 -0.721 -0.1099 -1.891 
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Month 18 0.0274* 2.185 -0.0825 -1.347 Month 19 -0.0031 -0.304 -0.0856 -1.429 Month 20 -0-0195 -1.428 -0.1051 -1.620 Month 21 0.0057 0.461 -0.0994 -1.487 Month 22 0.0084 0.607 -0.0911 -1.363 Month 23 -0.0042 -0.310 -0-0953 -1.401 Month 24 -0.0163 -1.399 -0-1115 -1.667 Month 25 -0.0058 -0.476 -0.1174 -1.708 Month 26 0.0268* 2.164 -0.0906 -1.306 Month 27 0.0151 1.052 -0.0755 -1.084 Month 28 0.0302* 2.302 -0.0453 -0.645 Month 29 0.0081 0.607 -0.0371 -0.516 Month 30 0.0048 0.322 -0.0323 -0.441 Month 31 0.0225 1.730 -0.0098 -0.131 Month 32 0.0173 1.281 0.0075 0.101 
Month 33 -0.0043 -0.306 0.0032 0.041 
Month 34 0.0056 0.381 0.0088 0.114 
Month 35 0.0169 1.144 0.0257 0.334 
Month 36 -0.0134 -0.811 0.0123 0.154 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Table 5.4 presents the non-overlapping bidding firms three years post acquisition ARs 
and CARs. Five monthly average ARs are statistically significant at 5% two-sided Mest, 
II out of 14 monthly average CARs are statistically significant at 5% two-sided test in 
the first 14 months, and no CARs are significant from month 15 to month 36. This is 
remarkably consistent with the results reported in Table 5.2 even when we have 
removed the overlapping bidding firms. 
Figure 5.4 shows the three years post acquisition average CARs of the non-overlapping 
bidding firms. It follows a similar return pattern with the results of the whole sample as 
Figure 5.1 shows. The CARs are consistently negative until month 32, while the CARs 
become positive at month 29 for the whole sample shown in Figure 5.1.11 out of 14 
CARs are significant at 5% two-sided test in the first 14 months; CARs of the rest 
months are statistically insignificant. Comparing Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.1, we find that 
non-overlapping firms have a lower average CARs than that of the whole sample no 
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matter these CARs are significant or not. It might suggest that the overlapping returns 
have inflated the monthly average CARs of the whole sample. 
Figure 5.4. Non-overlapping bidding firms (91-98) three-year post 
acquisition average CARs 
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Table 5.5.1 shows that UK bidding firms, according to both t-value and p-value of 
CARs, suffer a statistically significant negative abnormal return in one year after the 
takeover. However, according to the t-values and p-values of BHARs, UK bidding firms 
experience a statistically significant negative abnormal return in two years after the 
takeover. Both the average three-year CAR and the average three-year BHAR are 
statistically insignificant different from zero at 5% significance level evaluated by either 
the parametric or the nonparametric tests. In Contrast, Table 5.5.2 presents three 
significant negative intercept terms with large implied negative CARs. 
Table 5.5. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1991-1998) tbree years post acquisition average CARs 
and BHARs 
There are 133 UK non-overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1991-1998 periods. 
Table 5.5.1 reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. Table 5.5.2 presents the 
result calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnormal 
return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding 
firms. (Y, is the mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean a 
multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P- 
values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
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Table 5.5.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.1087* -2.303 0.047 
1 to 24 -0.1115 -1.667 0.036 
1 to 36 0.0123 0.154 0.942 
EM BRAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.1298* -2.849 0.014 
1 to 24 -0.1760* -2.768 0.009 
1 to 36 0.0209 0.259 0.942 
Table 5.5.2 
EM T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0111 -3.434 0.004 -0.1332 
1 to 24 -0.0120* -5.865 0.000 -0.2880 
1 to 36 -0.0112* -6.339 0.000 -0.4032 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
By comparing Table 5.3 and Table 5.5, we can see that all the CARs, implied CARs, 
and BHARs in Table 5.3 are larger than their counterparts in Table 5.5. The higher 
average abnormal returns in Table 5.3 might be inflated by the overlapping returns. If 
we take a close look at their t-values and p-values, we find that the results are 
inconsistent in Table 5.3.1. The one-year CAR and the one- and two-year BHARs are 
statistically significant at 5% significance level based on their t-statistics, however, their 
p-values tell us they are not significant at the 5% significance level. On the contrary, 
after removing the overlapping returns, Table 5.5.1 presents a consistent story. Lyon et 
al (1999) argue that cross-sectional dependence inflates test statistics because the 
number of sample firms overstates the number of independence observations. Our 
evidence shows that overlapping returns might have inflated the parametric t-values in 
Table 5.3.1 by inflating the mean of abnormal returns. 
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To explore the impact of overlapping returns, we turn to examine the three years post 
acquisition abnormal returns of a sample that contains all the overlapping bidding firms. 
The long-run abnormal returns of overlapping bidding firms are essential for us to find 
out the overlapping returns effect. Table 5.6 reports the three years post acquisition 
average ARs and CARs of the overlapping UK bidding firms. Only two monthly 
average ARs are significant at 5% two-sided test. The average monthly CARs show a 
strong pattern of performance of overlapping firms, 29 out of 36 monthly average CARs 
are positive. However, all the CARs of the overlapping bidding finns are statistically 
insignificant different from zero. 
Table 5.6. Overlapping bidding firms (1991-1998) three years post acquisition average ARs and 
CARs 
There are 46 UK overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1991-1998 periods. AR is 
the monthly average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal 
return of all the bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0176 -1.362 -0.0176 -1.362 
Month 2 0.0036 0.256 -0.0139 -0.701 
Month 3 0.0066 0.519 -0.0073 -0.351 
Month 4 0.0142 1.047 0.0069 0.264 
Month 5 0.0150 1.304 0.0219 0.691 
Month 6 -0.0166 -1.619 0.0053 0.150 
Month 7 -0.0137 -1.127 -0.0084 -0.243 
Month 8 -0.0229 -1.276 -0.0313 -0.695 
Month 9 0.0073 0.601 -0.0240 -0.538 
Month 10 0.0256 1.662 0.0016 0.038 
Month 11 -0.0018 -0.137 -0.0002 -0.005 
Month 12 0.0161 1.415 0.0159 0.333 
Month 13 0.0066 0.490 0.0225 0.439 
Month 14 0.0130 1.195 0.0355 0.687 
Month 15 -0.0076 -0.753 0.0279 0.536 
Month 16 0.0155 1.257 0.0435 0.798 
Month 17 0.0024 0.152 0.0459 0.747 
Month 18 0.0147 1.063 0.0606 0.953 
Month 19 -0.0002 -0.015 0.0604 0.894 
Month 20 0.0239* 2.093 0.0843 1.217 
Month 21 -0.0045 -0.196 0.0798 1.104 
Month 22 -0.0264 -1.489 0.0534 0.787 
Month 23 -0.0042 -0.172 0.0492 0.709 
Month 24 0.0231 1.319 0.0722 1.060 
Month 25 -0.0017 -0.105 0.0705 0.980 
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Month 26 0.0135 0.790 0.0840 1.172 
Month 27 0.0006 0.027 0.0846 1.139 
Month 28 0.0161 1.004 0.1007 1.301 
Month 29 0.0108 0.554 0.1115 1.413 
Month 30 0.0359* 2.304 0.1474 1.824 
Month 31 -0-0339 -1.884 0.1134 1.396 Month 32 0.0191 0.949 0.1325 1.476 
Month 33 0.0104 0.534 0.1429 1.680 
Month 34 0.0055 0.337 0.1484 1.639 
Month 35 0.0227 1.362 0.1711 1.832 
Month 36 -0.0178 -0.957 0.1533 1.578 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Figure 5.5 shows the overlapping bidding finns three-year post acquisition CARs. The 
monthly average CARs rise consistently after the event month, and the vast majority of 
them (29 out of 36) are positive. Thus, though they are statistically insignificant, we can 
tell that the higher returns shown in Figure 5.1 comparing to Figure 5.4 are solely driven 
by the overlapping returns. 
Figure 5.5. Overlapping bidding firms (91-98) three-year post 
acquisition average CARs 
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Table 5.7.1 presents the overlapping bidding firms three years post acquisition average 
CARs and BHARs. Although they are statistically insignificant different from zero at 
5% significance level based on either the t-values or the p-values, we can tell that the 
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longer the period, the higher the CARs and the BHARs. Table 5.7.2 reports similar 
results, all three intercept terms are positive and insignificant different from zero at 5% 
significance level. This presents a strong pattern of performance of the overlapping 
bidding finns in three years after the takeover. Thus, we are able to confirm that the 
higher average three-years CARs and BHARs of the whole sample (overlapping plus 
non-overlapping bidding firms) comparing to that of the non-overlapping sample are 
inflated by the high positive average abnormal returns of the overlapping firms. 
Table 5.7. Overlapping bidding firms (1991-1998) three years post acquisition average CARs and 
BHARs 
There are 46 UK overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1991-1998 periods. Table 
5.7.1 reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. Table 5.7.2 presents the result 
calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnon-nal return 
of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. (x 
is the mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean Oc multiplying 
by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values 
calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table 5.7.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 0.0159 0.333 0.474 
1 to 24 0.0722 1.060 0.207 
1 to 36 0.1533 1.578 0.071 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 0.0189 0.375 0.481 
1 to 24 0.0895 0.994 0.117 
1 to 36 0.2118 1.359 0.039 
Table 5.7.2 
EM cc T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 0.0004 0.119 0.686 0.0048 
1 to 24 0.0006 0.244 0.785 0.0144 
1 to 36 0.0016 0.893 0.299 0.0576 
Figure 5.6 puts Figure 5.1,5.4, and 5.5 together and compares their long-run post 
acquisition stock returns. Overlapping bidding firms outperfonn the other two, and non- 
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overlapping bidding firms underperform the whole sample. It clearly shows that 
overlapping returns have inflated the average returns of the whole sample, and that may 
well inflate the test-statistics of the whole sample and leads to an over-rejection of the 
null hypothesis. 
Figure 5.6. Three years post acquisition average CARs of 
All, Overlapping and Non-overlapping bidding firms 1991- 
1998 
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We have so far examined the three-year post acquisition abnormal returns of a whole 
sample, a non-overlapping sample, and an overlapping sample of the UK bidding firms 
that involved in the acquisitions in 1991-1998 periods. To check the robustness of our 
results, i. e., to check our results are not acquired by chance, we use a sub-sample period 
to re-examine the UK bidding firms three-year post acquisition stock returns. We 
choose the period of 1995-1998 as our sub-sample period because: First, 1995-1998 
period contains more bidding finns than 1991-1994 period (112 vs. 67 firms). Second, 
we will later examine the impact of one-month takeover premiums to the bidding firms 
long-run post acquisition stock returns, and the one-month takeover premium data for 
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bidding firms is only available from 1995. Thus, we are going to investigate the impact 
of one-month takeover premiums for the period of 1995-1998. However, before we 
move to examine the premium effect, we would be better to firstly take a look at the 
three-year post acquisition stock returns of all the bidding finns in 1995-1998 period. 
This will provide us a general picture of the long-run stock returns of the bidding firms 
involved in a takeover in this four years period, and help us to find out later how these 
results are affected by the one-month takeover premiums. 
Because the investigation of the sub-sample period (1995-1998) follows the same 
procedures as we have done for the whole sample period, to avoid replicating the tables 
and the figures and to save space, we put the detailed results and discussions for 1995- 
1998 sub-sample periods into Appendix 1, and only report the main finding here. 
By examining the three years post acquisition stock returns of the whole sample, the 
non-overlapping sample and the overlapping sample of the UK bidding firms in 1995- 
1998 sub-sample periods, we find almost identical results with that reported in the 
whole sample period (1991-1998). Thus, our findings for the whole sample period are 
reinforced by the evidence of the sub-sample. 
We have so far investigated the three years post takeover stock returns of UK bidding 
firms in both 1991-1998 and 1995-1998 sample periods, and our findings in both 
sample periods are remarkably consistent. Firstly, by comparing the results derived 
from the two different approaches, we do find a lot of evidence that Fama-French three- 
factor model over-rejects the null hypothesis of no abnormal return. This is consistent 
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with the study of Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997). Due to the 
severe mis-specification problem of the three-factor model, we only use the results 
calculated by the control firms approach as our inference throughout the paper, and the 
three-factor model only serves the purpose of comparing the results calculated under 
these two different methods. 
Lyon et al (1999) argue that overlapping returns inflate test statistics. Our results based 
on the control firms approach demonstrate that overlapping returns do inflate the test 
statistics t ough inflating the average long-run post acquisition stock returns. To 
alleviate the overlapping effect, we rely on the results obtained from the non- 
overlapping sample as our inference. By examining the non-overlapping bidding finns 
(1991-1998 and 1995-1998 sample periods) three years post acquisition abnon-nal stock 
returns (CARs and BHARs), we find that it seems safe to say that UK bidding fin-ns do 
suffer a significant wealth loss in the first year after their completion of the acquisition. 
However, we do not find any significant abnormal returns for the bidding firms in three 
years after the takeover, because both the three-year average CAR and three-year 
average BHAR are economically and statistically insignificant different from zero. 
We conclude that UK bidding firms do not experience any significant three-year post 
acquisition abnormal returns in the 1990s. Our results are consistent with several recent 
studieS5 in resolving the previously reported anomalies, and give support to the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH). 
5A few researchers have recently retested the anomalies that were previously reported in the event 
studies. See, for example, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) does not find any statistically significant long-run 
anomalies in corporate takeovers; share repurchases, and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Brav et al 
(2000) have resolved the long-run anomalies associated with SEOs and IPO. Eckbo et al (2000) and 
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5.4.2. The Impact of Takeover Premiums to the Long-run Post Acquisition Stock Returns 
Table 5.8 reports bidding firms (1995-1998) three years post acquisition average 
monthly CARs based on the one-month takeover premiums that they have offered to the 
targets. As the table shows that bidding firms that belonging to the premium region of 
P2 (O<P2<=30%) outperform the bidding firms in the other three premium regions, 30 
out of 36 monthly average CARs are positive, and the CARs are statistically significant 
different from zero at 5% significance level from month 28 to month 36. 
Table 5.8. Bidding firms (1995-1998) three-year post acquisition average CARs, according to the 
one-month takeover premiums 
There are 112 UK bidding firms involved in the acquisition during 1995-1998 periods. According to the 
one-month premiums that they offered to the targets, bidding firms are grouped into four sub-samples 
based on four different premium regions. The premium regions are: PI <=O (i. e., offering zero or negative 
premium); O<P2<=30%; 30%<P3<=50%; P4>50% (i. e., the offer price is 50% higher than the target 
firm's stock price one-month before the takeover announcement). PI contains 12 bidding firms, P2 
contains 41 bidding firms, P3 contains 33 bidding firms, and P4 contains 23 bidding firms. T-statistics of 
the CARs are also given in the table. 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
EM Pi T-Stat P2 T-Stat P3 T-Stat P4 T-Stat 
1 -0.1046* -2.692 0.0042 0.314 -0.0096 -0.517 0.0005 0.023 
2 -0.1509* -2.510 0.0026 0.142 -0.0332 -1.258 -0.0226 -0.854 
3 -0.1626 -2.114 -0.0269 -0.936 -0.0617 -1.709 -0.0372 -1.244 
4 -0.1857 -1.703 -0.0399 -1.241 -0.0493 -1.143 0.0137 0.304 
5 -0.1862 -1.595 -0.0258 -0.687 -0.0513 -0.942 -0.0113 -0.204 
6 -0.2389 -1.643 -0.0167 -0.407 -0.0524 -0.895 -0.0275 -0.424 
7 -0.3090 -1.703 0.0005 0.011 -0.0690 -1.049 -0.0679 -1.014 
8 -0.3535 -1.876 0.0070 0.133 -0.0694 -0.877 -0.0572 -0.741 
9 -0.3940 -1.977 -0.0173 -0.296 -0.0765 -0.888 -0.0377 -0.410 
10 -0.3908 -1.805 -0.0132 -0.207 -0.0713 -0.781 -0.0759 -0.768 
11 -0.3646 -1.896 0.0193 0.296 -0.0924 -0.906 -0.1406 -1.181 
12 -0.3526 -1.970 0.0108 0.169 -0.0795 -0.696 -0.1434 -1.185 
13 -0.3223 -1.707 0.0222 0.327 -0.0840 -0.758 -0.1447 -1.129 
14 -0.3119 -1.446 0.0182 0.252 -0.0729 -0.613 -0.1695 -1.198 
15 -0.3258 -1.604 0.0558 0.718 -0.0572 -0.508 -0.1235 -0.807 
16 -0.3264 -1.693 0.0726 0.897 -0.0547 -0.454 -0.0547 -0.357 
17 -0.3050 -1.611 0.1010 1.230 -0.1415 -1.106 -0.0625 -0.378 
18 -0.2831 -1.385 0.1407 1.616 -0.1444 -1.118 0.0349 0.185 
19 -0.3405 -1.614 0.1442 1.667 -0.1415 -1.162 0.0455 0.243 
Eckbo and Norli (2000) have resolved the long-run anomalies associated with SEOs and IPO 
respectively. Gompers and Lerner (2001) have resolved the long-run anomalies associated with IPO. 
Boehme and Sorescu (2002) have resolved the anomalies following dividend initiations and resumptions. 
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20 -0.3651 -1.630 0.1521 1.752 -0-1812 -1.332 0.0099 0.053 
21 -0.3351 -1.448 0.1660 1.749 -0.2092 -1.540 0.0107 0.056 
22 -0.3887 -1.556 0.1588 1.687 -0.2070 -1.446 0.0426 0.227 
23 -0.4103 -1.706 0.1896 1.982 -0.2328 -1.550 -0.0274 -0.147 24 -0.3460 -1.389 0.1603 1.624 -0.1986 -1.433 -0.0017 -0.009 25 -0.3085 -1.255 0.1696 1.673 -0.2281 -1.596 -0.0637 -0.326 26 -0.2988 -1.349 0.1915 1.902 -0.2222 -1.486 -0.0136 -0.067 27 -0.2508 -1.050 0.1910 1.922 -0.1693 -1.070 -0.0560 -0.302 28 -0.2981 -1.180 0.2157* 2.095 -0.1016 -0.688 -0.0220 -0-115 29 -0.2328 -0.886 0.2441 * 2.441 -0.1242 -0.838 -0.0149 -0.071 30 -0.2107 -0.804 0.2467* 2.525 -0.0928 -0.587 -0.0117 -0.054 31 -0.2649 -1.033 0.2378* 2.387 -0.0574 -0.359 0.0115 0.051 
32 -0.2141 -0.928 0.2677* 2.480 -0.0327 -0.218 -0.0264 -0.115 
33 -0.2321 -0.983 0.2913* 2.782 -0.0379 -0.250 -0.0552 -0.251 
34 -0.2208 -0-915 0.3401 * 3.199 -0.0338 -0.225 -0.0804 -0.366 
35 -0.1076 -0.443 0.3461* 3.145 -0.0360 -0.247 -0.0696 -0.305 
36 -0.1153 -0.453 0.3524* 3.093 -0.0594 -0.420 -0.1687 -0.677 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Figure 5.7 shows UK bidding firms three years post acquisition average CARs based on 
four one-month premium regions. Sub-sample P2 (O<P2<=30%) consistently 
outperform the other three. Sub-sample P4 (P4>50%) outperforms sub-sample P3 
(30<P3<=50%) in 27 out of 36 months. Bidding firms offering a negative premium 
(Sub-sample P 1) experience the worst post acquisition returns. 
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Figure 5.7. Bidding firms (95-98) three-year post acquisition 
average CARs, according to the one-month takeover Premiums 
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Table 5.9.1 reports that all the bidding firms except the bidding firms of sub-sample P2 
experience negative one to three years post acquisition abnormal returns. Based on the t- 
statistics, the first year CAR and BHAR of the sub-sample PI are statistically 
significant at 10% significance level, however the corresponding p-values tell us they 
are not significant at 10%. It is consistent with our previous findings regarding the 
impact of overlapping returns to the t-statistics. On the other hand, bidding finns of the 
sub-sample P2 gain large and statistically significant three-year post acquisition 
abnonual. returns, the CAR is 35.24% and the BHAR is 45.28%, both are statistically 
significant different from zero at 5% significance level. Table 5.9.2 shows that all the 
four sub-samples experience negative one to three years post acquisition negative 
abnormal returns. This result is consistent with Table 5.9.1 except for sub-sample P2, 
bidding firms of sub-sample P2 suffer negative one to three years abnormal returns by 
using the three-factor model. However, consistent with Table 5.9.1, the three-year 
intercept term and its implied CAR of sub-sample P2 outperform the other three sub- 
samples. Thus, Table 5.9.1 and 5.9.2 tell us that sub-sample P2 outperform the other 
three sub-samples by either using the control firms approach or the Fama-French three- 
factor model to calculate the long-run abnormal stock returns. 
Table 5.9. Bidding firms (1995-1998) three-year post acquisition average CARs and BRARs, 
according to the one-month takeover premiums 
There are 112 UK bidding firms involved in the acquisition during 1995-1998 periods. According to the 
one-month premiums that they offered to the targets, bidding firms are grouped into four sub-samples 
based on four different premium regions. The premium regions are: PI <=O (i. e., offering zero or negative 
premium); O<P2<=30%; 30%<P3<=50%; P4>50% (i. e., the offer price is 50% higher than the target 
firm's stock price one-month before the takeover announcement). PI contains 12 bidding firms, P2 
contains 41 bidding firms, P3 contains 33 bidding firms, and P4 contains 23 bidding firms. Table 5.9.1 
reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. Table 5.9.2 presents the result calculated 
by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return of all the 
bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding finns. a -P 1, Ot -P2, 
a -P3, a -P4 are the mean intercept terms of Fama-French three-factor model of corresponding premium 
sub-samples. Implied CAR is the mean a multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of relevant CARs 
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and BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values calculated by using the nonparametric Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank test are also given in the table. 
Table 5.9.1 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
EM PI T-Stat P2 T-Stat P3 T-Stat P4 T-Stat 
1 to 12 -0.3526** -1.970 0.0108 0.169 -0.0795 -0.696 -0.1434 -1.185 (0.158) (0.464) (0.879) (0.248) 
1 to 24 -0.3460 -1.389 0.1603 1.624 -0.1986 -1.433 -0.0017 -0.009 (0.480) (0.156) (0.131) (0.605) 
1 to 36 -0.1153 -0.453 0.3524* 3.093 -0.0594 -0.420 -0.1687 -0.677 (0.638) (0.006) (0.574) (0.412) 
Buy-a nd-Hold Abnormal R eturns (BRARs) 
EM Pi T-Stat P2 T-Stat P3 T-Stat P4 T-Stat 
1 to 12 -0.2911 -1.906 -0.0326 -0.386 -0.0736 -0.776 -0.1451 -1.255 (0.158) (0.521) (0.728) (0.301) 
1 to 24 -0.4409 -1.462 0.0657 0.669 -0.1723 -1.399 -0.0275 -0.175 
(0.433) (0.231) (0.214) (0.503) 
1 to 36 -0.1917 -0.643 0.4528* 2.702 -0.0694 -0.677 -0.2056 -0.861 
(0.875) (0.002) (0.662) (0.362) 
Table 5.9.2 
EM a-P1 T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0171 -1.740 0.170 -0.2052 
1 to 24 -0.0044 -0.849 0.556 -0.1056 
1 to 36 -0.0082* -2.389 0.031 -0.2952 
EM oc-P2 T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0013 -0.278 0.786 -0.0156 
1 to 24 -0.0071* -2.427 0.043 -0.1704 
1 to 36 -0.0062* -2.214 0.105 -0.2232 
EM a-P3 T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0216* -2.879 0.012 -0.2592 
1 to 24 -0.0155* -3.632 0.001 -0.3720 
1 to 36 -0.0111* -3.334 0.002 -0.3996 
EM a-P4 T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0126 -1.762 0.104 -0.1512 
1 to 24 -0.0158* -2.936 0.009 -0.3792 
1 to 36 -0.0122* -2.743 0.013 -0.4392 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
* Indicate significant at 10%, two-sided Mest. 
a. P-values calculated by using the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given 
in the parenthesis. 
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As our previous findings show that overlapping returns inflate both the long-run stock 
returns and the t-statistics, we re-examine the premium issue by removing the 
overlapping firms to eliminate the bias caused by the overlapping returns. Table 5.10 
reports the non-overlapping UK bidding finns three years post acquisition monthly 
average CARs based on four different premium regions. The results are consistent with 
that reported in Table 5.8, bidding firms of sub-sample P2 outperform all the other three 
sub-samples in three-year after the acquisition. 
Table 5.10. Non-overlapping bidding flrms (1995-1998) three-year post acquisition average CARs, 
according to the one-month takeover premiums 
There are 89 UK non-overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisition during 1995-1998 periods. 
According to the one-month premiums that they offered to the targets, bidding firms are grouped into four 
sub-samples based on four different premium regions. The premium regions are: Pl<=O (i. e., offering 
zero or negative premium); O<P2<=30%; 30%<P3<=50%; P4>50% (i. e., the offer price is 50% higher 
than the target firm's stock price one-month before the takeover announcement). PI contains II bidding 
firms, P2 contains 33 bidding firms, P3 contains 25 bidding firms, and P4 contains 18 bidding firins. T- 
statistics of the CARs are also given in the table. 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
EM Pi T-Stat P2 T-Stat P3 T-Stat P4 T-Stat 
1 -0.1037* -2.436 0.0050 0.331 -0.0038 -0.190 0.0060 0.236 
2 -0.1632* -2.532 0.0014 0.068 -0.0369 -1.223 -0.0164 -0.499 
3 -0.1874* -2.349 -0.0472 -1.378 -0.0671 -1.541 -0.0352 -0.935 
4 -0.2322 -2.149 -0.0545 -1.417 -0.0629 -1.292 0.0122 0.212 
5 -0.2318 -1.969 -0.0497 -1.143 -0.0884 -1.444 -0.0179 -0.255 
6 -0.2853 -1.889 -0.0348 -0.738 -0.0752 -1.131 -0.0412 -0.503 
7 -0.3643 -1.925 -0.0054 -0.099 -0.0893 -1.164 -0.0915 -1.094 
8 -0.3953 -1.964 -0.0045 -0.073 -0.0526 -0.629 -0.0837 -0.879 
9 -0.4435 -2.097 -0.0413 -0.589 -0.0704 -0.759 -0.0563 -0.492 
10 -0.4447 -1.936 -0.0527 -0.695 -0.0768 -0.698 -0.0871 -0.711 
11 -0.4071 -1.981 -0.0292 -0.384 -0.1180 -0.964 -0.1560 -1.043 
12 -0.4063 -2.172 -0.0406 -0.545 -0.1232 -0.899 -0.1454 -0.960 
13 -0.3725 -1.869 -0.0224 -0.282 -0.1210 -0.937 -0.1472 -0.917 
14 -0.3568 -1.543 -0.0385 -0.458 -0.1126 -0.787 -0.1758 -0.988 
15 -0.3598 -1.640 0.0036 0.040 -0.0777 -0.570 -0.1174 -0.610 
16 -0.3673 -1.780 0.0152 0.162 -0.0942 -0.640 -0.0314 -0.165 
17 -0.3449 -1.701 0.0336 0.360 -0.1923 -1.248 -0.0322 -0.155 
18 -0.3349 -1.546 0.0804 0.788 -0.2089 -1.353 0.1181 0.509 
19 -0.4028 -1.824 0.0833 0.835 -0.1976 -1.364 0.1493 0.660 
20 -0.4293 -1.827 0.0898 0.910 -0.2515 -1.520 0.0986 0.434 
21 -0.3784 -1.519 0.1349 1.248 -0.2974 -1.789 0.1002 0.435 
22 -0.4268 -1.578 0.1256 1.127 -0.2721 -1.532 0.1469 0.651 
23 -0.4445 -1.705 0.1492 1.343 -0.2926 -1.544 0.0695 0.308 
24 -0.4007 -1.505 0.1134 0.989 -0.2891 -1.665 0.0960 0.422 
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25 -0.3588 -1.362 0.1275 1.080 -0.3095 -1.723 0.0411 0.172 
26 -0.3175 -1.314 0.1688 1.409 -0.3169 -1.706 0.0977 0.395 
27 -0.2831 -1.092 0.1819 1.531 -0.2579 -1.293 0.0462 0.210 
28 -0.3405 -1.248 0.2072 1.723 -0.1847 -1.003 0.0957 0.420 
29 -0.2671 -0.936 0.2129 1.800 -0.2078 -1.117 0.1192 0.481 
30 -0.2402 -0.842 0.1938 1.670 -0.1777 -0.893 0.1192 0.457 
31 -0.3115 -1.128 0.2117 1.778 -0.1173 -0.578 0.1568 0.598 
32 -0.2648 -1.074 0.2393 1.885 -0.1010 -0.532 0.1325 0.507 
33 -0.2874 -1.143 0.2569* 2.038 -0.1030 -0.540 0.0691 0.270 
34 -0.2752 -1.069 0.3025* 2.432 -0.0919 -0.482 0.0432 0.169 
35 -0.1471 -0.560 0.3066* 2.358 -0.1160 -0.631 0.0654 0.253 
36 -0.1462 -0.528 0.3259* 2.450 -0.1300 -0.726 -0.0488 -0.167 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Figure 5.8 shows that although we have removed the overlapping bidding firms, the 
results virtually remain the same as that presented in Figure 5.7. The same return pattern 
shown in Figure 5.8 might be due to that all the four sub-samples are equally likely to 
be affected by the overlapping returns. 
Figure 5.8. Non-overlapping bidding firms (95-98) three-year 
post acquistion average CARs, according to the one-month 
takeover Premiums 
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Table 5.11.1 shows that the results of non-overlapping sample remain virtually the same 
as presented in Table 5.9.1. After removing the overlapping returns, the first year 
negative CAR and BHAR of sub-sample PI are statistically significant different from 
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zero at 10% significance level, it shows that sub-sample PI significantly underperform 
other three sub-samples at least in the first year after the acquisition. Consistent with the 
results presented in Table 5.9.1, only the three-year positive CAR and BHAR of sub- 
sample P2 are statistically significant different from zero at 5% significance level. It 
once again confirms that bidding firms of sub-sample P2 outperforms other three sub- 
samples in three-year after the takeover. Finally the two-year negative BHAR of sub- 
sample P3 are statistically significant different from zero at 10% significance level, it 
provides evidence that sub-sample P4 outperform sub-sample P3 at least in two-year 
time after the acquisition. Consistent with Table 5.9.2, Table 5.11.2 reports one to three 
years' negative post acquisition abnormal returns for all the four sub-samples. This is 
inconsistent with the results presented in Table 5.11.1. However, Table 5.11.2 once 
again shows that the three-year intercept term and its implied CAR of sub-sample P2 
outperform the other three sub-samples. Thus, we are able to conclude that bidding 
firms of sub-sample P2 experience best post acquisition stock returns in three years after 
the completion of the takeover bids. 
Table 5.11. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1995-1998) three-year post acquisition average CARs 
and BHARs, according to the one-month takeover premiums 
There are 89 UK non-overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisition during 1995-1998 periods. 
According to the one-month premiums that they offered to the targets, bidding firms are grouped into four 
sub-samples based on four different premium regions. The premium regions are: Pl<=O (i. e., offering 
zero or negative premium); O<P2<=30%; 30%<P3<=50%; P4>50% (i. e., the offer price is 50% higher 
than the target firm's stock price one-month before the takeover announcement). Pl contains II bidding 
firms, P2 contains 33 bidding firms, P3 contains 25 bidding firms, and P4 contains 18 bidding firms. 
Table 5.11.1 reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. Table 5.11.2 presents the 
result calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnormal 
return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding 
finns. a -Pl, a -P2, Ot -P3, oc -P4 are the mean 
intercept terms of Fama-French three-factor model of 
corresponding premium sub-samples. Implied CAR is the mean a multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T- 
statistics of relevant CARs and BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values calculated by using the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given in the table. 
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Table 5.11.1 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
EM Pi T-Stat P2 T-Stat P3 T-Stat P4 T-Stat 
1 to 12 -0.4063** -2.172 -0.0406 -0.545 -0.1232 -0.899 -0.1454 -0.960 (0.075) (0.950) (0.476) (0.327) 
1 to 24 -0.4007 -1.505 0.1134 0.989 -0.2891 -1.665 0.0960 0.422 (0.328) (0.480) (0.069) (0.948) 
1 to 36 -0.1462 -0.528 0.3259* 2.450 -0.130 -0.726 -0.0488 -0.167 
(0.790) (0.030) (0.382) (0.811) 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BRARs) 
EM Pi T-Stat P2 T-Stat P3 T-Stat P4 T-Stat 
1 to 12 -0.3429** -2.178 -0.0966 -0.972 -0.138 -1.238 -0.1462 -1.017 
(0.075) (0.879) (0.300) (0.396) 
1 to 24 -0.5005 -1.545 0.0032 0.028 -0.292** -1.979 0.0775 0.423 
(0.328) (0.728) (0.051) (0.983) 
1 to 36 -0.2284 -0.705 0.4216* 2.075 -0.1739 -1.461 -0.0163 -0.068 
(1.000) (0.017) (0.211) (0.679) 
Table 5.11.2 
EM (X-P1 T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0177 -1.643 0.230 -0.2124 
1 to 24 -0.0041 -0.737 0.689 -0.0984 
1 to 36 -0.0085* -2.265 0.045 -0.3060 
EM a-P2 T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0013 -0.234 0.971 -0.0156 
1 to 24 -0.0080* -2.271 0.056 -0.1920 
1 to 36 -0.0078* -2.355 0.063 -0.2808 
EM a-P3 T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0255* -2.725 0.017 -0.3060 
1 to 24 -0.0180* -3.345 0.002 -0.4320 
1 to 36 -0.0132* -3.187 0.002 -0.4752 
EM a-P4 T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
I to 12 -0.0110 -1.258 0.258 -0.1320 
1 to 24 -0.0164* -2.485 0.024 -0.3936 
1 to 36 -0.0152* -2.778 0.017 -0.5472 
* indicate significant at 5% , two-sided Mest. 
* Indicate significant at 10%, two-sid ed Mest. 
a. P-values calculated by using the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given 
in the parenthesis. 
As we have mentioned before, due to the mis-specification problem of the Fama-French 
three-factor model, we give our inference only based on the control firms approach and 
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the three-factor model only serve the purpose for comparing the results acquired from 
these two different approaches. Because the results reported in Table 5.11.1 and Figure 
5.8 has removed the overlapping returns effect, we rely on the results reported in them 
as our inference. According to both three-year average CARs and BHARs, sub-sample 
P2 (O<P2<=30%) gain a very large and statistically significant positive abnormal return 
in three years after the completion of the acquisition. The three-year CARs and BHARs 
are all negative and statistically insignificant different from zero for the rest of three 
sub-samples, by comparing the three-year CARs and BHARs, we find that sub-sample 
P4 (P4>50%) outperforms sub-sample P3 (30%<P3<=50%), and sub-sample PI 
(P I <=O) experience the worst returns. 
Thus, we are able to answer the three questions raised in the introduction section 
regarding the impact of takeover premiums to the bidding firms long-run post 
acquisition stock returns. First, to achieve the best long run post acquisition 
performance, we find that the best or optimal one-month premium region for the 
bidding firms to takeover the targets is between 0 and 30%. Second, as the evidence 
shows, it is not the higher the premiums offered by the bidding firms the worse of their 
performance. Bidding firms offering a negative one-month takeover premium 
experience the worst returns, while the returns to the bidding firms that offering the 
highest premiums are not bad. Third, we reject the explanation that the previous 
evidence of long-run negative post acquisition abnormal returns are due to a delayed 
market reaction to overpriced takeovers 
6. We do not find any evidence that the negative 
long-run abnormal returns are related with overpricing. 
6 Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) also reject the same explanation in their recent review of 22 previous studies 
regarding bidding firms long-run post acquisition stock returns. 
198 
5.4.3. The Impact of the Method of Payment to the Long-run Post Acquisition Stock 
Returns 
Table 5.12 presents the bidding firms three-year post acquisition monthly average 
CARs based on four kinds of method of payment. As we can see from this table, though 
they are statistically insignificant different from zero, bidding firms that offering 
combined payment (stock plus cash) experience the best post takeover stock returns, 29 
out of 36 monthly average CARs are positive. 
Table 5.12. Bidding firms (1991-1998) three-year post acquisition average CARs, according to the 
method of payment 
There are 179 UK bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1991-1998 periods. According to the 
method of payment that bidding firms have chosen to pay the target firms shareholders, bidding firms are 
grouped into four sub-samples based on their financing methods. The monthly average CARs of these 
four sub-samples are listed in the table. Cash offer contains 58 bidding firms, stock offer contains 50 
bidding firms, alternative offer contains 37 bidding firms, and combined offer contains 25 bidding firms. 
T-statistics of the CARs are also given in the table. 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
EM CASH T-Stat STOCK T-Stat ALTER T-Stat COMB T-Stat 
1 -0.0109 -0.867 -0.0287 -1.726 0.0011 0.066 -0.0103 -0.636 
2 -0.0184 -1.018 -0.0519* -2.195 -0.0168 -0.712 0.0030 0.127 
3 -0.0426 -1.933 -0.0877* -2.629 -0.0369 -1.374 -0.0105 -0.419 
4 -0.0144 -0.552 -0.0796 -1.972 -0.0655 -1.647 0.0065 0.176 
5 -0.0209 -0.651 -0.1114* -2.376 -0.0758 -1.658 0.0396 0.998 
6 -0.0119 -0.331 -0.1327* -2.460 -0.1105* -2.227 0.0425 1.162 
7 -0.0286 -0.734 -0.1485* -2.328 -0.1193* -2.227 0.0695 1.697 
8 -0.0443 -1.034 -0.1386 -1.964 -0.1170 -1.992 0.0926 1.870 
9 -0.0631 -1.337 -0.1473 -1.889 -0.1121 -1.681 0.0640 1.081 
10 -0.0449 -0.947 -0.1422 -1.685 -0.1091 -1.496 0.0258 0.386 
11 -0.0750 -1.317 -0.1563 -1.961 -0.1336 -1.617 0.0714 1.018 
12 -0.0638 -1.048 -0.1708* -2.110 -0.1013 -1.185 0.0582 0.750 
13 -0.0679 -1.040 -0.1620* -2.067 -0.1045 -1.133 0.0310 0.393 
14 -0.0791 -1.138 -0.1640 -1.960 -0.1204 -1.193 0.0291 0.332 
15 -0.0599 -0.892 -0.1250 -1.385 -0.1278 -1.272 0.0347 0.389 
16 -0.0376 -0.571 -0.1648 -1.747 -0.1121 -1.072 0.0561 0.597 
17 -0.0650 -0.846 -0.1655 -1.723 -0.1268 -1.232 0.0589 0.570 
18 -0.0424 -0.538 -0.1362 -1.232 -0.0986 -0.994 0.0649 0.602 
19 -0.0470 -0.624 -0.1273 -1.114 -0.0908 -0.933 0.0560 0.534 
20 -0.0552 -0.656 -0.1515 -1.279 -0.0974 -0.894 0.0456 0.436 
21 -0.0649 -0.770 -0.1228 -0.984 -0.1022 -0.880 0.0393 0.391 
22 -0.0786 -0.976 -0.1367 -1-116 -0.0677 -0.571 0.0230 0.229 
23 -0.0799 -0.950 -0.1344 -1.121 -0.0629 -0.497 -0.0374 -0.380 
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24 -0.0705 -0.865 -0.1631 -1.317 -0.0663 -0.568 -0.0163 -0.160 25 -0.0712 -0.828 -0.1673 -1.342 -0.0955 -0.793 -0.0162 -0-157 26 -0.0684 -0.798 -0.1326 -1.072 -0.0238 -0.188 -0.0329 -0.300 27 -0.0349 -0.432 -0.1647 -1.428 0.0149 0.104 -0.0345 -0.283 28 -0.0204 -0.251 -0.1601 -1.342 0.0306 0.215 0.0629 0.576 29 -0.0225 -0.269 -0.1179 -0.967 0.0094 0.064 0.0747 0.650 30 -0.0080 -0.092 -0.1114 -0.937 0.0142 0.091 0.1048 0.928 31 -0.0185 -0.223 -0.0876 -0.691 0.0323 0.210 0.0947 0.796 32 0.0158 0.189 -0.0718 -0.562 0.0162 0.112 0.1228 0.896 33 0.0057 0.066 -0.0526 -0.408 -0.0058 -0.041 0.0934 0.716 34 0.0028 0.033 -0.0232 -0.177 0.0149 0.102 0.0662 0.509 35 0.0268 0.314 0.0044 0.033 0.0090 0.063 0.0936 0.673 
36 0.0280 0.314 0.0027 0.019 -0.0605 -0.408 0.0800 0.515 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
Figure 5.9 presents a clear picture of the three-year post acquisition average CARs 
based on four methods of payment. Sub-sample of combined offer outperforms the 
other three. Cash offer outperforms stock offer that is consistent with almost all the 
previous studies. Generally, alternative offer are ranked in the middle between cash 
offer and stock offer. However, most of the points shown in Figure 5.9 are statistically 
insignificant different from zero at 5% significance level. 
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Table 5.13.1 reports bidding firms three-year post acquisition average CAR and BHAR 
based on four methods of payment. Because the t-statistics and the p-values are 
inconsistent for the first year CAR and BHAR of stock offer bidding firms, it once 
again confirms our findings of the effects of overlapping returns to the t-statistics. It 
shows none of the three-year CARs and BHARs are statistically significant different 
from zero at either 5% or 10% significance level. However, we can see that stock offer 
suffer the worst return at least in two years after the acquisition. In contrast with Table 
5.13.1, Table 5.13.2 reports that all the three-year intercept terms and their implied 
CARs are negative and statistically significant different from zero. By comparing them, 
we also find that combined offer outperforms the other three, and cash offer 
outperforms the stock offer. 
Table 5.13. Bidding firms (1991-1998) three-year post acquisition average CARs and BHARs, 
according to the method of payment 
There are 179 UK bidding firms involved in the acquisition during 1991-1998 periods. According to the 
method of payment that bidding firms have chosen to pay the target firms shareholders, bidding firms are 
grouped into four sub-samples based on their financing methods. Cash offer contains 58 bidding firms, 
stock offer contains 50 bidding firms, alternative offer contains 37 bidding firms, and combined offer 
contains 25 bidding firms. Table 5.13.1 reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. 
Table 5.13.2 presents the result calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the 
average cumulative abnormal return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold 
abnormal return of all the bidding firms. (x -Cash, (x -Stock, Oc -Alter, (x -Comb is the mean intercept 
terms of Fama-French three-factor model of corresponding sub-samples. Implied CAR is the mean cc 
multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of relevant CARs and BHARs as well as the corresponding P- 
values calculated by using the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given in the table. 
Table 5.13.1 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs 
EM CASH T-Stat STOCK T-Stat ALTER T-Stat COMB T-Stat 
_ 1 to 12 -0.0638 -1.048 -0.1708* -2.110 -0-1013 -1.185 0.0582 0.750 
(0.612) (0.069) (0-118) (0.326) 
1 to 24 -0.0705 -0-865 -0.1631 -1.317 -0-0663 -0.568 -0.0163 -0.160 
(0.702) (0.087) (0.361) (0.946) 
1 to 36 0.0280 0.314 0.0027 0.019 -0.0605 -0.408 0.080 0.515 
(0.564) (0.942) (0.678) (0.313) 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BRARs) 
EM CASH T-Stat STOCK T-Stat ALTER T-Stat COMB T-Stat 
1 to 12 -0.0611 -1.056 -0.1672* -2.184 -0.135** -1.818 -0.0021 -0.020 
(0.543) (0.054) (0-053) (0.382) 
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1 to 24 -0.0903 -1.084 -0.2363** -1.983 -0.1168 -0-968 -0.0784 -0.747 (0.628) (0.088) (0.309) (0.563) 
1 to 36 0.0511 0.617 0.0736 0.552 -0.2359 -1.421 0.2646 0.985 (0.380) (0.579) (0.301) (0.264) 
Table 5.13.2 
EM a-Cash T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0082* -2.143 0.139 -0.0984 
1 to 24 -0.0074* -2.755 0.014 -0.1776 
1 to 36 -0.0072* -3.174 0.005 -0.2592 
EM a-Stock T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0107 -1.822 0.210 -0.1284 
1 to 24 -0.0128* -3.830 0.003 -0.3072 
1 to 36 -0.0113* -3.758 0.002 -0.4068 
EM a-Alter T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0130* -2.304 0.026 -0.1560 
1 to 24 -0.0117* -2.645 0.024 -0.2808 
1 to 36 -0.0098* -2.710 0.020 -0.3528 
EM a-Comb T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0031 -0.507 0.600 -0.0372 
1 to 24 -0.0061 -1.931 0.050 -0.1464 
1 to 36 -0.0063* -2.197 0.010 -0.2268 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
** Indicate significant at 10%, two-sided Mest. 
a. P-values calculated by using the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given 
in the parenthesis. 
In order to alleviate the impact of overlapping returns, Table 5.14 reports the non- 
overlapping bidding firms three-year post acquisition monthly average CARs based on 
four methods of payment. Although we have removed the overlapping bidding firms, 
the results, as we can see, virtually remain the same. 
Table 5.14. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1991-1998) three-year post acquisition average CARs, 
according to the method of payment 
There are 133 UK non-overlapping bidding firins involved in the acquisitions during 1991-1998 periods. 
According to the method of payment that bidding firms have chosen to pay the target firms shareholders, 
bidding firms are grouped into four sub-samples based on their financing methods. The monthly average 
CARs of these four sub-samples are listed in the table. Cash offer contains 39 bidding firms, stock offer 
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contains 42 bidding firrns, alternative offer contains 25 bidding finns, and combined offer contains 20 bidding firms. T-statistics of the CARS are also given in the table. 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
EM CASH T-Stat STOCK T-Stat ALTER T-Stat COMR T-. qtat- 
-i U. UU'I')ö U. 368 -0.0333 -1.789 0.0034 0.160 -0.0157 -0.817 2 -0.0186 -0.792 -0.0677* -2.666 -0.0022 -0.084 0.0042 0.144 3 -0.0542 -1.884 -0.1179* -3.142 -0.0286 -0.925 -0.0153 -0.500 4 -0.0286 -0.925 -0.1078* -2.326 -0.0754 -1.431 0.0109 0.236 5 -0.0483 -1.221 -0.1527* -2.911 -0.0934 -1.603 0.0541 1.103 6 -0.0270 -0.599 -0.1746* -2.872 -0.1326* -2.091 0.0573 1.308 7 -0.0366 -0.727 -0.1974* -2.722 -0.1485* -2.097 0.1041* 2.171 8 -0.0416 -0.860 -0.1866* -2.319 -0.1329 -1.676 0.1329* 2.358 9 -0.0606 -1.107 -0.2002* -2.220 -0.1479 -1.583 0.0994 1.450 10 -0.0506 -0.822 -0.2072* -2.147 -0.1441 -1.406 0.0531 0.692 11 -0.0861 -1.138 -0.2282* -2.556 -0.1867 -1.597 0.1119 1.427 12 -0.0853 -1.062 -0.2435* -2.684 -0.1577 -1.302 0.1093 1.250 13 -0.0767 -0.897 -0.2442* -2.832 -0.1722 -1.322 0.0752 0.801 14 -0.0991 -1.069 -0.2522* -2.740 -0.1957 -1.366 0.0701 0.665 15 -0.0657 -0.735 -0.2029 -2.001 -0.2041 -1.432 0.0789 0.743 16 -0.0464 -0.539 -0.2452* -2.303 -0.1856 -1.256 0.0968 0.878 17 -0.0762 -0.745 -0.2564* -2.416 -0.2018 -1.404 0.0869 0.720 18 -0.0579 -0.550 -0.2261 -1.812 -0.1594 -1.142 0.1094 0.906 19 -0.0705 -0.719 -0.2165 -1.676 -0.1427 -1.044 0.1112 0.997 20 -0.0914 -0.813 -0.2479 -1.859 -0.1690 -1.098 0.0874 0.810 21 -0.1031 -0.903 -0.2030 -1.454 -0.1886 -1.153 0.0816 0.784 22 -0.1010 -0.930 -0.2203 -1.575 -0.1203 -0.710 0.0671 0.651 23 -0.1196 -1.038 -0.2044 -1.475 -0.0865 -0.486 -0.0166 -0.173 24 -0.1162 -1.038 -0.2416 -1.696 -0.1137 -0.702 0.0091 0.090 25 -0.1029 -0.872 -0.2524 -1.763 -0.1565 -0.941 0.0127 0.123 26 -0.0883 -0.741 -0.2166 -1.521 -0.0845 -0.482 0.0012 0.010 27 -0.0572 -0.510 -0.2427 -1.844 -0.0111 -0.055 -0.0080 -0.064 28 -0.0389 -0.346 -0.2330 -1.717 -0.0020 -0.010 0.0910 0.872 
29 -0.0401 -0.347 -0.1981 -1.428 -0.0425 -0.206 0.1254 1.141 
30 -0.0453 -0.380 -0.1972 -1.459 -0.0469 -0.216 0.1647 1.483 
31 -0.0460 -0.396 -0.1655 -1.144 -0.0053 -0.025 0.1783 1.527 
32 -0.0087 -0.075 -0.1428 -0.982 -0.0378 -0.192 0.2029 1.623 
33 -0.0252 -0.208 -0.1273 -0.860 -0.0810 -0.419 0.1769 1.433 
34 -0.0403 -0.338 -0.1039 -0.701 -0.0303 -0.152 0.1546 1.264 
35 -0.0293 -0.250 -0.0797 -0.527 -0.0462 -0.236 0.2104 1.693 
36 -0.0166 -0.135 -0.0802 -0.517 -0.1211 -0.595 0.1946 1.268 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
Figure 5.10 shows that even we have removed the overlapping bidding firms from our 
investigation, the returns pattern of all the four methods of payment remain the same as 
shown in Figure 5.9. The same return pattern shown in Figure 5.9 might be due to that 
all the four sub-samples are equally likely to be affected by the overlapping returns, 
thus, the results are virtually remained the same when we remove the overlapping finns. 
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After removing the overlapping firms, Table 5.15.1 shows that except the combined 
offer, all the other three methods of payment lead to a negative post acquisition 
abnonnal return. The one and two years negative CARs and BHARs of stock offer are 
statistically significant at 5% or 10% significance level. It marks the stock offer as the 
worst performer in at least two years after the acquisition. Table 5.15.2 reports that all 
the three-year intercept terms and their implied CARs are negative and statistically 
significant different from zero. By comparing them, we can see that combined offer 
outperform the other three, and cash offer outperform the stock offer. 
Table 5.15. Non-overlapping bidding firm (1991-1998) three-year post acquisition average CARs 
and BHARs, according to the method of payment 
There are 133 UK non-overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisition during 1991-1998 periods. 
According to the method of payment that bidding firms have chosen to pay the target finns shareholders, 
bidding firrns are grouped into four sub-samples based on their financing methods. Cash offer contains 39 
bidding firms, stock offer contains 42 bidding firins, alternative offer contains 25 bidding firms, and 
combined offer contains 20 bidding firms. Table 5.15.1 reports the result calculated by using the control 
firms approach. Table 5.15.2 presents the result calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. 
CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and- 
hold abnormal return of all the bidding firins. (x -Cash, (Y -Stock, (X -Alter, a -Comb is the mean 
intercept terms of Fama-French three-factor model of corresponding sub-samples. Implied CAR is the 
mean (x multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of relevant CARs and BHARs as well as the 
corresponding P-values calculated by using the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are also given 
in the table. 
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Table 5.15.1 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs 
_ 
EM CASH T-Stat STOCK T-Stat ALTER T-Stat COMB T-Stat 
1 to 12 -0.0853 -1.062 -0.2435* -2.684 -0-1577 
_ 
-1.302 0.1093 1.250 (0.512) (0.015) (0.065) (0-117) 
1 to 24 -0.1162 -1.038 -0.2416** -1.696 -0.1137 -0.702 0.0091 0.090 (0.645) (0.025) (0-211) (0.970) 
1 to 36 -0.0166 -0.135 -0.0802 -0.517 -0.1211 -0.595 0.1946 1.268 (0.944) (0.604) (0.545) (0.135) 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) 
EM CASH T-Stat STOCK T-Stat ALTER T-Stat COMB T-Stat 
1 to 12 -0.092 -1.181 -0.2439* -2.891 -0.1943** -2.015 0.0388 0.306 (0.379) (0.009) (0.026) (0.135) 
1 to 24 -0.1359 -1.174 -0.3547* -2.688 -0.1590 -1.135 -0.0668 -0.637 (0.548) (0.010) (0.109) (0.654) 
1 to 36 -0.0045 -0.043 -0.0486 -0.347 -0.2578 -1.533 0.4104 1.303 (0.834) (0.750) (0.122) (0.100) 
Table 5.15.2 
EM a-Cash T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0094 -1.772 0.273 -0.1128 
1 to 24 -0.0085* -2.268 0.042 -0.2040 
1 to 36 -0.0095* -3.076 0.004 -0.3420 
EM a-Stock T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0142* -2.136 0.118 -0.1704 
1 to 24 -0.0160* -4.491 0.001 -0.3840 
1 to 36 -0.0138* -4.196 0.001 -0.4968 
EM a-Alter T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0216* -2.922 0.005 -0.2592 
1 to 24 -0.0184* -3.078 0.004 -0.4416 
1 to 36 -0.0162* -3.376 0.003 -0.5832 
EM a-Comb T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0026 -0.346 0.681 -0.0312 
1 to 24 -0.0065 -1.803 0.042 -0.1560 
1 to 36 -0.0078* -2.239 0.011 -0.2808 
indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
** indicate significant at 10%, two-sided t-test. 
a. P-values calculated by using the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given 
in the parenthesis. 
Finally, we use Table 5.15.1 as our inference (because it applies the control finns 
approach and removes the overlapping returns effect) to interpret the 
bidding firms 
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long-run post acquisition stock returns based on four kinds of method of payment. We 
find that the sub-sample of stock offer underperforms the other three sub-samples (Cash 
offer, Combined offer, and Alternative offer) in two years after the takeover. However, 
we do not find any statistically significant three-year post-acquisition abnon-nal stock 
returns for all the four sub-samples, and hence no statistically significant three-year post 
takeover under- or out-performance among the four sub-samples (sub-samples of four 
kinds of method of payment) has been detected. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter primarily applies the control firms approach (advanced by Barber and 
Lyon 1997) and uses the Fama-French three-factor model as an alternative to examine 
the impact of overlapping returns, takeover premiums, and methods of payment to the 
long-run post acquisition stock returns. To reflect the up-to-date development of 
corporate takeovers, we choose 1990s as our sample period. By comparing the results 
obtained from the control firms approach and from the Fama-French three-factor model, 
we do find a lot of evidence that the three-factor model is severely mis-specified by 
indicating abnormal performance too frequently. Thus, we give our inference only 
based on the control firms approach throughout this chapter, and the three-factor model 
only serve its purpose for comparing the results obtained from these two different 
approaches. 
Our main findings are as follows: Firstly, in contrast to most previous studies, we do not 
find any statistically significant three-year post acquisition abnormal stock returns for 
the UK bidding firms in the 1990s; our results are consistent with a few recent studies in 
resolving the previously reported anomalies, and give support to the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH). Secondly, we find that overlapping returns do inflate the test 
statistics as argued by Lyon et al (1999) through inflating the long-run post acquisition 
average stock returns. Thus, the overlapping returns will cause a serious mis- 
specification problem to the t-statistics if included in the investigation sample. Thirdly, 
after a full scale of investigation of takeover premiums, we find an optimal premium 
region for the bidding firms to takeover the targets; and because we do not find any 
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evidence that bidding firms long-run post acquisition negative abnormal returns are 
related to the overpricing, we reject the explanation that the previous evidence of long- 
run post acquisition negative abnormal returns is due to a delayed market reaction to 
overpriced takeovers. Fourthly, we find that stock offer underperforms the other three 
offers (cash offer, combined offer, and alternative offer) in two years after the takeover, 
however no statistically significant three-year under- or out-performance among these 
four kinds of method of payment has been detected. Finally, we conclude that previous 
findings of significant long-run post acquisition abnormal stock returns are more likely 
due to the five biases argued by Lyon et al (1999), and that leads to the mis- 
specification of the test statistics. 
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Chapter Six: Examining the Monitoring Role of Institutional Funds through Long- 
run Stock Returns of Corporate Takeovers: the UK Evidence 
6.1. Introduction 
Institutional funds have become increasingly prominent in the UK over the past two 
decades. In 1999, institutions held Pounds 2,477bn of funds, nearly three times the 1990 
total, and accounted for over 85% of total identified funds under management. 
Insurance and pension schemes account for the bulk of UK institutional funds, although 
unit trusts and money market funds are also a growing market (IFSL 2001). Fund 
managers invest funds on behalf of institutions. Their primary task is to invest the flow 
of cash from pension contributions, insurance premiums and personal savers in a 
portfolio of financial assets that will best meet clients' needs. In the UK, a substantial 
proportion of institutional funds are invested in equity. As a result, institutional 
investors account for a large proportion of shares in the UK than in most industrialized 
countries, nearly 60% in 1999 (IFSL 2001). UK institutional funds have traditionally 
favoured investment in equity since the 1960s, given the generally good long-term 
returns reflecting the higher growth of equity markets relative to other asset classes. In 
2000, an average of 49% of pension funds was allocated into UK equities with a further 
22% invested in overseas equity. This is higher than in most other industrial countries. 
Bonds and government securities accounted for around 20% of UK pension funds' 
investments. The remainder was held in cash and property. (IFSL 200 1). 
This far larger weighting in investing in higher volatility equities is due to the special 
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characteristics of UK pension funds. Comparing to the continental Europe and US, the 
UK pension funds face the smallest set of externally imposed restrictions and 
regulations on their investment behavior of any group of institutional investors 
anywhere in the world. Recently, the Pension Act 1995 has removed restrictions on 
what assets trustees can invest their pension fund resources in. This makes UK pension 
funds free to invest in almost any securities. 
6.1.1. Active Monitoring Hypothesis and the Evidence 
Being the largest shareholder in the UK, institutional funds are expected to play a 
significant role in the corporate governance and that may well enhance corporate 
efficiency. However, the issue of involvement of institutional funds in the running of 
companies is controversial. There are two main hypotheses regarding this issue. One is 
the "active monitoring hypothesis". Institutional funds hold substantial stakes in 
individual companies. The size of these stakes renders them particularly sensitive to the 
performance of firms in their portfolios, and provides them powerful incentives to 
monitor firm management, ensuring that managers choose investment strategies to 
maximize long-run value rather than to meet short-term earnings goals. This vigilant 
institutional monitoring enhances managerial efficiency and the quality of corporate 
decision-making. Such institutional monitoring may involve holding discussion with 
management on corporate plans and performance, supporting (opposing) the 
management's wealth enhancing (reducing) policies and decisions, and active 
participating in board elections and other voting issues. 
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Demsetz (1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), and Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) argue 
that owners of large blocks of shares have greater incentives to monitor managers. 
Jarrell et al (1985) and Bushee (1998) find a positive correlation between R&D 
expenditures and institutional ownership and, therefore, support the monitoring role. 
Nesbitt (1994) shows that companies targeted by large pension funds increase 
significantly their performance. Smith (1996) finds that pension funds are actively 
involved in the monitoring role, and their involvement is largely successful in changing 
governance structure and increasing shareholder wealth. Carleton et al (1998) report that 
pension nd is generally able to reach agreements with the firms it contacts, and most 
of that firms have generally followed up on the agreements by enacting changes 
requested by pension fund. They argue that pension fund has been very successful in 
inducing firms to adopt the changes it requests. Rajgopal et al (1998,1999) find 
evidence that is consistent with institutional investors providing a monitoring function. 
Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) find that shareholder (e. g., pension fund) proposals 
are followed by significant additional corporate governance activities and broad 
corporate change, such as asset sales and restructurings. More recently, Gompers and 
Metrick (2001) find that share returns are higher in companies with greater institutional 
ownership, and argue that greater institutional ownership implies more effective 
monitoring. Wahal and McConnell (2000) reports that expenditures for PP&E and R&D 
are higher in firins with a larger fraction of shares held by institutional investors, and 
these institutional investors play a significant monitoring role by allowing firms to 
invest more in projects with long-term returns. 
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6.1-2. Passive Voting Hypothesis and the Evidence 
However, on the other hand, it is well argued that institutional funds are incapable to 
monitor corporations due to their passivity, myopic goals, legal constraints and conflict 
of interests. 
Some argue that institutional funds are passive investors who are more likely to sell 
their holdings in poorly performing firms than to expand their resources in monitoring 
and improving their performance. It is further argued that institutional funds are short- 
termists, because fund managers are under considerable pressures from their clients to 
perform. For instance, nearly all of the pension schemes set target for their fund 
managers, it is commonly to beat one specific benchmark by one or two percent. A 
recent study conducted by the department of applied economics of Cambridge 
University shows that 21 out of 39 defined benefit pension schemes they investigated 
have changed fund managers within the past five years. The reason for many of these 
changes is dissatisfaction with the performance of existing fund managers. 
Accompanying with the replacement of fund managers, their assets under management 
have shrunk as well. For instance, Britain's 20 biggest fund management firms have lost 
14% of institutional assets under management in the past year (Pensions Week 200 1). In 
such circumstances, fund managers have to take a myopic view of their investments, 
guided solely by the short-term goal of outperforming some benchmark in the current 
quarter. According to this, they will frequently "chum" their portfolios for short-term 
financial gains. Consequently, they create managerial incentives to cut R&D spending 
to avoid reporting a decline in earnings. In addition, given their tax-exempt status, UK 
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pension funds are criticized for making companies pay high cash dividends that could 
be used to finance growth opportunities. 
Moreover, many funds are also concerned that they might incur some legal liability if 
they take on active roles. There is also free-rider problem associated with institutional 
funds activism or monitoring. This problem arises because small and passive 
shareholders realize the benefits of monitoring done by large institutions but they incur 
none of the costs. Thus monitoring will be possible only when the monitoring is 
sufficient to cover all the associated monitoring costs. In addition to that, institutional 
funds themselves may be subject to agency problems, because the vast majority of 
funds are externally managed by fund managers (in 2000, self-managed pension funds 
accounted for around only 2% of total identified UK funds under management, IFSL 
2001), there are possible conflicts of interests between the private and institutional 
clients and the fund managers. Thus they either always vote with management or sell 
their shares to avoid voting. This is referred to as the "passive voting hypothesis". 
Bergin (1988) shows that institutional investors were generally passive and routinely 
voted their proxies with management. Murphy and Van Nuys (1994) maintain that 
public pension funds are run by individual fund managers who do not have the proper 
incentives to maximize fund value. Romano (1994) and Admati et al (1994) argue that 
pension ftinds are not effective monitors because of the agency problem within the 
funds themselves. Wahal (1996) finds no evidence of significant long-terrn 
improvement in either stock price or accounting measures of corporate perfon-nance in 
the post-targeting period by pension funds, and casts doubt on the efficiency of pension 
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fund activism in improving firm performance. Karpoff et al (1996) obtain little evidence 
that firm values and operating performance of companies that are the targets of pension 
funds proposals improves. Duggal and Millar (1999) find no evidence that institutional 
investors as a group enhance efficiency in the market for corporate control, and question 
the monitoring abilities of institutional investors. More recently, Gillan and Starks 
(2000) find that shareholder proposals sponsored by public pension funds receive 
significantly more votes but appear to have small negative impact on stock prices. 
Faccio and Lasfer (2000) report that pension funds do not add value to the companies in 
which they hold large stakes and cast doubt on the monitoring role of pension funds. 
In sum, previous studies have provided us contradictory evidence on the monitoring 
issue. These mixed results make us difficult to judge the monitoring role of institutional 
funds. If we can find a new approach to examine these hypotheses, it will create and add 
fresh evidence on the existing findings. Thus, we believe that the testing of these 
hypotheses under a different framework is called for. In our study, we test the active 
monitoring and passive voting hypotheses through the corporate takeover markets by 
examining the bidding firms' (largely held or not held by institutional funds, say ý3%) 
long-run stock retUMS7. It is long argued that institutional funds are finance 
professionals with expertise in the area of investment management, if they are indeed 
monitoring corporations, then takeovers undertaken by bidding firms with high level of 
institutional funds ownership may be expected to be more wealth enhancing (higher 
stock returns) than those with low or without institutional funds ownership. 
7 The Companies Act (1985) (sections 198 and 199) requires that if a holding reaches or exceed 
3% ot'the 
company's capital it must be declared. We posit that the 
holding of 3% or above is significant to warrant 
monitoring and to allow us to test directly the monitoring role. 
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6.1.3. Summary 
In summary, our study differs from previous studies in five important ways. First, "-e 
investigate the monitoring role of institutional funds through a brand new framework - 
by examining and comparing the takeover bidding firms long-run stock returns. Second, 
we apply the most up-to-date and reliable method (the control firms approach) into the 
investigation of long-run post acquisition stock returns; it minimizes the chances that 
our results are mis-specified. Third, to remove the possible bias caused by the cross- 
sectional dependence in sample observations, we examine all our samples by using not 
only the whole sample but also a corresponding sub-sample that removes all the 
overlapping bidding firms. Finally, we are among the first to use both the CAR and the 
BHAR to examine the long-run pre- and post-acquisition stock returns, and apply the 
nonparametric test to double check our inferences. 
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6.2. Methodology 
In Chapter 4, we have tested the validity of the control finns approach under various 
accounting year endings through UK corporate takeovers. We find that there is no 
statistically significant difference of the long-run abnormal stock returns calculated 
under the Barber and Lyon (1997) approach and the approaches according to finns' 
accounting year endings, and we suggest that following the December-June model of 
Barber and Lyon (1997) may lead to a better result. Based on these findings, we will 
apply the same control firms approach applied by Barber and Lyon (1997). 
In addition to the control firms approach, we also use the three-factor model developed 
by Fama and French (1993) as an alternative method, and compare the results obtained 
by these two approaches. 
For the methods of calculating the long-run abnormal stock returns (both 
CAR and 
BHAR) and their test statistics, please refer to Chapter 3 for details. 
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6.3. Data and Sample Construction 
In our empirical test, we will examine the bidding firms three-year pre- and post- 
acquisition stock returns. To investigate the monitoring role of institutional funds, we 
have to collect the shareholding details of all the bidding firms. Fortunately, this 
shareholding details can be acquired from Hemscott, we are able to see all the 
shareholders and their holdings details for each bidding firms from this data source. 
However, the shareholding details from Hemscott only start from year 1994, there is no 
holding infonnation pre- 1994. And the database only contain the shareholding details of 
firms alive, there is no holding information for the dead firms. Thus, we are not able to 
examine the dead bidding firms and have to start our sample period from year 1994. 
Our mission is to investigate the monitoring role of institutional funds through the 
framework of corporate takeovers by comparing the long-run stock returns of bidding 
finns that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds and bidding finns that 
are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds. To say largely, we mean 
that bidding firms are held by at least one institutional fund for equal to or bigger than 
3%; to say consistently, we mean that bidding firms are held at least by one institutional 
fund in each year from the takeover completion year to three years prior to it (for the 
investigation of three-year pre-acquisition stock returns) or to three years after it (for the 
investigation of three-year post-acquisition stock returns). Thus, by saying largely and 
consistently, we mean that bidding firms are held 3% or more by at least one 
institutional fund for every year of the whole four-year period under investigation. 
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Because we need to know the shareholding details for four years (the acquisition 
completion year and three years before or after it), and we only have shareholding 
details from 1994, thus we only can start our sample period from year 1997 for the 
investigation of bidding firms three-year pre-acquisition stock returns, and from year 
1994 for the investigation of bidding finns three-year post-acquisition stock returns. 
Thus we choose 1997-2001 as our sample period for examining three-year pre- 
acquisition stock returns, and 1994-1998 as the sample period for the investigation of 
post-acquisition stock returns. We collect all the successful UK public bidding finns for 
the above periods from various issues of Extel Financial and Acquisition Monthly. 
Because the shareholding details are not available for dead companies at the time of the 
investigation, we have to omit the dead bidding firms. We apply the similar sample 
selection criteria as used in both chapter 4 and 5. Finally, 78 bidding firms are qualified 
for the investigation of 1997-2001 sample period, and 99 bidding finns are qualified for 
the investigation of 1994-1998 sample period. 
The descriptive statistics for the sample size and B/M ratio for both sample periods are 
presented in the following tables and histograms. We can tell from the tables and 
histograms of both pre- and post-acquisition sample periods, the distributions of size 
and B/M ratio are positively skewed (with the size far right skewed for both sample 
periods). This is quite similar to the descriptive statistics reported in Chapter 5. 
Thus, 
most of the sample firms are smaller than their mean size, and most of them 
have a 
smaller book value to market value. For this unevenly distributed sample, equal- 
weighted return is more appropriate to be applied in the empirical study. 
Because by 
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using equal-weighted return, the general results will not be significantly affected by the 
small proportion of very large size and B/M sample finns. 
Descriptive statistics of sample size and B/M ratio 
Size (1997-2001) fmillion B/M Ratio (1997-2001) 
Mean 2604.40 Mean 0.61 
Standard Deviation 6119.57 Standard Deviation 0.57 
Minimum 6.1 Minimum 0.04 
1" Quartile 113.6 1" Quartile 0.25 
Median 435.6 Median 0.46 
3 rd Quartile 1903.4 3rd Quartile 0.89 
Maximum 43169.3 Maximum 4.03 
Count 78 Count 78 
Histogram of firm size (1997-2001), 
with Normal Curve 
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Descriptive statistics of sample size and B/M ratio 
Size (1994-1998) fmillion B/M Ratio (1994-1998) 
Mean 2343.42 Mean 0.52 
Standard Deviation 3953.07 Standard Deviation 0.33 
Minimum 9.4 Minimum 0.07 
I't Quartile 140.3 1" Quartile 0.25 
Median 450.0 Median 0.43 
Yd Quartile 2643.8 3 rd Quartile 0.80 
Maximum 20824.3 Maximum 1.62 
Count 99 Count 99 
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Table 6.1. Matching firms in 1994-2001 
Matching firms are all the LSE listed firms with both sizes and book-to-market ratios (firms with negative book value and zero size are excluded). 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997- 19-98 19-99 -1000 2001 
Matching 
1340 1427 1491 1612 1740 1702 1593 1415 Firms 
Table 6.1 shows the matching firms in 1994-2001 period, thus we have so far selected 
the whole samples of bidding firms and constructed the matching samples of each year 
for the two sample periods of 1997-2001 and 1994-1998. The next step is to construct 
the sub-samples based on the shareholding details. 
To identify which shareholders are the institutional funds for each bidding finn, we use 
a name list of institutional funds provided by UK Fund Managers Association to define 
the holdings of institutional funds. 
For investigating the monitoring role of institutional funds in 1997-2001 sample period 
(i. e., pre-acquisition investigation), we identify two sub-samples. One sub-sample 
contains 36 bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds. 
The other sub-sample contains 42 bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently 
held by institutional funds. 
For examining the monitoring role of institutional funds in 1994-1998 sample period 
(i. e., post-acquisition investigation), we also identify two sub-samples. One sub-sample 
contains 43 bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds. 
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The other sub-sample contains 56 bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently 
held by institutional funds. 
223 
6.4. Empirical Results 
To investigate the monitoring role of institutional funds, we firstly examine bidding 
finns long-run stock returns in the pre-acquisition period. The findings will tell us 
whether institutional funds are actively involved in the corporate governance in the pre- 
acquisition stage. We then turn to examine bidding fin-ns long-run stock returns M the 
post-acquisition period. The results will not only tell us whether the institutional funds 
are actively monitoring the firms in the post-acquisition period, but also tell us whether 
they are playing a consistent role in both pre- and post-acquisition period. 
6.4.1. Do Institutional Funds Monitor Firms in the Pre-Acquisition Period? 
6.4.1.1. Bidding Firms'Long-Run Pre-Acquisition Stock Returns 
We hereby examine the three-year pre-acquisition stock returns of UK bidding firms 
that are either consistently held 3% or above by at least one institutional fund or held 
less than 3% by any institutional funds in the investigation period. Before we move to 
examine these two sub-samples, we firstly examine the bidding firms three-year pre- 
acquisition stock returns for the whole sample from 1997 to 2001, it will provide us a 
general story of the UK bidding firms pre-takeover stock returns, and help us to explain 
the results acquired from the two sub-samples subsequently. 
To take into account the overlapping returns problem argued in Chapter 5, we not only 
examine the three-year pre-acquisition stock returns of the whole sample, 
but a non- 
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overlapping sample and an overlapping sample. Because this investigation provides an 
overall view of returns and useful background material and does not test the monitoring 
role of institutional funds, we put the detailed results and discussions into Appendix 2, 
and only conclude the findings here. 
We find that there are no statistically significant three-year pre-takeover abnon-nal stock 
returns, and this finding is in contrast to the majority of previous studies 8 on bidding 
firms' long-run pre-acquisition stock returns. Previous studies have reported that 
bidding firms shareholders earn a small but significant positive abnormal returns from 
five to two years prior to the takeover announcement. We argue that previously reported 
significant long-run pre-acquisition positive abnormal returns might suffer the problems 
of misspecification of test statistics. We also find that after controlling the new listing, 
the rebalance, and the skewness biases overlapping returns deflate the average CARs of 
the whole sample, and that may cause the under rejection of the null hypothesis 
(empirical rejection rate less than the theoretical rejection rate), and hence leads to a 
biased test statistics. 
To serve our purpose of examining the monitoring role of institutional 
funds, we now 
have a general understanding of the bidding firins (1997-2001) three years pre- 
acquisition Stock returns. Thus, it is the time to move onto our primary 
investigation. 
8 See, for example, Ellert (1976), Dodd & Ruback 
(1977), Asquith (1983), Schipper and Thornpson 
( 19 8 3), etc., 
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6.4.1.2. Long-Run Pre-Acquisition Stock Returns of Bidding Firms with Large Level of 
Institutional Ownership vs. Bidding Firms with Low or without Institutional Ownership 
We are going to examine two groups of UK bidding firms, one group is largely (>=3%) 
and consistently (four years) held by institutional funds, the other group is not largely 
or/and consistently held by institutional funds. We want to explore the difference of the 
stock returns between these two groups, and test the monitoring role of institutional 
funds by comparing the performance of these two groups. 
We firstly examine the three years pre-acquisition stock returns of UK bidding firms 
that are largely and consistently held by the institutional funds. Table 6.2 shows the 
three years average ARs and CARs of these bidding firms. There are two ARs 
significant at 5% two-sided t-test, and none of the CARs are statistically significant 
different from zero. 
Table 6.2. Bidding firms (1997-2001, held>=3% by institutional funds) three years pre-acquisition 
average ARs and CARs 
There are 36 UK bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds involved in the 
acquisition during 1997-2001 periods. AR is the monthly average abnormal return of all the bidding 
firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly 
ARs and CARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month -36 -0.0026 -0.127 -0.0026 -0.127 
Month -35 0.0092 0.606 
0.0066 0.278 
Month -34 -0.0255 -1.075 -0.0189 -0.542 
Month -33 0.0250 1.451 
0.0061 0.139 
Month -32 -0.0289 -1.770 -0.0228 -0.439 
Month -31 0.0002 0.011 -0.0226 -0.376 
Month -30 -0.0322 -1.476 -0.0548 -0.844 
Month -29 -0.0236 -1-385 -0.0783 -1.109 
Month -28 -0.0177 -0.928 -0.0960 -1.183 
Month -27 -0.0061 -0.224 -0.1021 -1.120 
Month -26 -0.0426* -2.174 -0.1447 -1.425 
226 
Month -25 -0.0156 -0.583 -0.1603 -1.619 Month -24 -0.0001 -0-006 -0.1604 -1.677 Month -23 0.0344 1.047 -0-1260 -1.433 Month -22 -0.0148 -0.864 -0.1409 -1.498 Month -21 -0.0054 -0.262 -0.1463 -1.535 Month -20 0.0378 1.679 -0-1085 -1.113 Month -19 -0.0246 -0.997 -0.1330 -1.418 Month -18 0.0175 0.700 -0-1156 -1.169 Month -17 -0.0049 -0.200 -0.1205 -1.198 Month -16 0.0294 1.326 -0.0911 -0.905 Month -15 -0.0104 -0.341 -0-1015 -0.910 Month -14 0.0138 0.662 -0.0877 -0.773 Month -13 0.0567* 2.410 -0.0311 -0.255 Month -12 0.0438 1.661 0.0127 0.096 
Month -11 0.0071 0.200 0.0198 0.140 
Month -10 -0.0016 -0.053 0.0182 0.133 
Month -9 0.0332 1.341 0.0515 0.369 
Month -8 -0.0271 -1.070 0.0244 0.169 
Month -7 -0.0156 -0.727 0.0088 0.060 
Month -6 0.0041 0.250 0.0129 0.091 
Month -5 -0.0005 -0.025 0.0124 0.083 
Month -4 0.0105 0.417 0.0229 0.144 
Month -3 -0.0050 -0.230 0.0180 0.110 
Month -2 0.0303 1.179 0.0483 0.287 
Month -1 -0.0175 -0.613 0.0308 0.178 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Figure 6.1 shows that CARs fall consistently in the third year before the takeover 
announcement, and then rise consistently two years before the announcement. However, 
none of these monthly CARs are statistically significant different from zero at 5% 
significance level. 
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Figure 6.1. Bidding firms (97-01, held >=3% by institutional 
funds) three-year pre-acquisition averge CARs 
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Table 6.3.1 and Table 6.3.2 reports the one-, two- and three-year pre-acquisition CARs 
and BHARs of institutional holding bidding finns. Neither the CARs nor the BHARs 
are statistically significant at 5% significant level in two-sided t-test. All the parametric 
t-statistics are consistent with the non-parametric P-values. According to this, there are 
no long-run significant abnormal returns for the UK bidding finns that are largely and 
consistently held by institutional funds. 
Table 6.3. Bidding firms (1997-2001, held>=3% by institutional funds) three years pre-acquisition 
average CARs and BHARs 
There are 36 UK bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds involved in the 
acquisition during 1997-2001 periods. Table 6.3.1 reports the result calculated by using the control firrns 
approach. Table 6.3.2 presents the result calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is 
the average cumulative abnormal return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold 
abnormal return of all the bidding firms. cc is the mean intercept ten-n of Fama-French three-factor 
model. Implied CAR is the mean cc multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the 
BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed- 
Rank test are given in the table. 
Table 6.3.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.0618 0.613 0.519 
-24 to -1 0.1911 1.188 0.059 
-36 to -1 0.0308 0.178 0.540 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.1089 0.850 
0.480 
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Event Month -36 to -1 
-24 to -1 0.0134 0.027 0.099 
-36 to -1 -0.2388 -0.409 0.489 
Table 6.3.2 
EM T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
-12 to -1 0.0037 0.523 0.919 0.0444 
-24 to -1 0.0057 1.258 0.350 n i. *irR 
-Jb to -1 -0-0023 -0.750 0.242 --00898 
We then turn to examine the three years pre-acquisition stock returns of UK bidding 
firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds. Table 6.4 
shows the three years pre-acquisition average ARs and CARs, and FDCARs of UK 
bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds. 
Consistent with Table 6.2, there only three average ARs are significant at 5% 
significance level, and no monthly CARs are statistically significant, all the FDCARs 
are statistically insignificant different from zero. However, in contrast with Table 6.2, 
most of the CARs in Table 6.4 are positive. 
Table 6.4. Bidding firms (1997-2001, held<3% by institutional funds) three years pre-acquisition 
average ARs and CARs 
There are 42 UK bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds involved 
in the acquisition during 1997-2001 periods. AR is the monthly average abnormal return of all the bidding 
firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. FDCAR is the first 
difference of CARs between non-institutional holding bidding firms and institutional holding bidding 
firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs, CARs, and FDCARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat FDCAR T-Stat 
Month -36 0.0091 0.963 0.0091 0.963 0.0117 0.52 
Month -35 0.0035 0.297 0.0127 0.760 0.0061 0.21 
Month -34 -0.0072 -0.633 0.0054 0.320 0.0243 0.63 
Month -33 0.0099 0.653 0.0153 0.614 0.0092 0.18 
Month -32 0.0083 0.660 0.0236 0.828 0.0464 0.78 
Month -31 -0.0186 -1.466 0.0050 0.156 0.0276 
0.41 
Month -30 -0.0090 -0.617 -0.0040 -0.111 0.0508 
0.68 
Month -29 0.0055 0.358 0.0015 0.043 0.0798 
1.02 
Month -28 0.0050 0.333 0.0065 0.169 
0.1025 1.14 
Month -27 0.0022 0.170 0.0087 
0.204 0.1108 1.10 
Month -26 -0.0030 -0.187 0.0057 
0.134 0.1504 1.37 
Month -25 -0.0339* -2.206 -0.0283 -0.622 
0.1320 1.21 
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Month -24 0.0189 1.433 -0-0094 -0.209 0.1510 1.43 Month -23 0.0239 1.797 0.0145 0.295 0.1405 1.39 
Month -22 -0.0016 -0.090 0.0129 0.238 0.1538 1.42 
Month -21 0.0158 0.992 0.0288 0.531 0.1751 1.60 
Month -20 -0.0037 -0.189 0.0251 0.424 0.1336 1.17 
Month -19 -0.0008 -0.056 0.0242 0.399 0.1572 1.41 
Month -18 0.0188 1.520 0.0431 0.720 0.1587 1.37 
Month - 17 0.0213 1.249 0.0644 1.015 0.1849 1.55 
Month -16 -0.0042 -0.246 0.0601 0.921 0.1512 1.26 
Month -15 -0.0110 -0.609 0.0491 0.709 0.1506 1.15 
Month -14 -0.0022 -0.123 0.0469 0.616 0.1346 0.99 
Month - 13 -0.0283 -1.499 0.0186 0.235 0.0497 0.34 
Month -12 -0.0015 -0.105 0.0171 0.215 0.0044 0.03 
Month -11 0.0204 0.890 0.0375 0.479 0.0177 0.11 
Month -10 -0.0076 -0.462 0.0299 0.365 0.0117 0.07 
Month -9 -0.0014 -0.075 0.0285 0.322 -0.0230 -0.14 Month -8 -0.0379* -2.156 -0.0095 -0.106 -0.0339 -0.20 Month -7 0.0030 0.214 -0.0064 -0.069 -0.0152 -0.09 Month -6 0.0194 1.323 0.0129 0.138 0.0000 0.00 
Month -5 0.0260 1.512 0.0389 0.412 0.0265 0.15 
Month -4 0.0151 0.670 0.0541 0.603 0.0312 0.17 
Month -3 -0.0394 -1.925 0.0147 0.154 -0.0033 -0.02 Month -2 0.0563* 2.037 0.0710 0.773 0.0227 0.12 
Month -1 0.0566 1.338 0.1276 1.297 0.0968 0.49 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Figure 6.2 shows the 36 monthly CARs of UK bidding firms that are not largely or/and 
consistently held by institutional funds. The return pattern is somewhat different with 
previous figure. 31 out of 36 monthly CARs are positive. There is no obvious loss in the 
third year prior to the takeover announcement, and the CARs experience both rise and 
drop in two years before the announcement. However, none of them are statistically 
significant at 5% significant level of two-sided t-test. 
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Table 6.5.1 and Table 6.5.2 reports the one-, two- and three-year pre-acquisition CARs 
and BHARs of UK bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by 
institutional funds. All the CARs and BHARs are positive, but none of them are 
statistically significant at 5% significance level, this is consistent with the results 
reported in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.5. Bidding firms (1997-2001, held<3% by institutional funds) three years pre-acquisition 
average CARs and BHARs 
There are 42 UK bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds involved 
in the acquisition during 1997-2001 periods. Table 6.5.1 reports the result calculated by using the control 
firms approach. Table 6.5.2 presents the result calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. 
CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and- 
hold abnorinal return of all the bidding firms. a is the mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor 
model. Implied CAR is the mean (x multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the 
BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed- 
Rank test are given in the table. 
Table 6.5.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.1090 1.393 
0.358 
-24 to -1 0.1558 1.733 
0.263 
-36 to -1 0.1276 1.297 
0.712 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.2074 
1.629 0.204 
-24 to -1 0.1908 
1.894 0.108 
-36 to -1 0.1523 
1.256 0.553 
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Table 6.5.2 
ENT OL T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
-12 to -1 0.0104 1.701 0.299 0.1248 
-24 to -1 0.0018 0.669 0.764 0.0432 
-36 to -1 0.0000 0.019 0.812 0-0014 
Figure 6.3 shows that non-institutional holding firms outperfon-n the institutional 
holding firms in most of the months during three years prior to the takeover 
announcement. However, all the CARs shown in Figure 6.3 are statistically 
insignificant different from zero. Thus, we do not find any evidence so far that 
institutional funds monitor the firms that they hold large stakes and this monitoring 
leads to a better performance. 
Figure 6.3. Three years pre-acquisition average CARs of 
all, institutional holding and non-institutional holding 
bidding firms 1997-2001 
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A: All the bidding finns. 
H: Bidding firms largely and consistently held by institutional funds. 
N: Bidding firms not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds. 
However, the findings presented above might be affected by the overlapping returns, 
and the inference might also be misleading with the presence of overlapping 
firrns. 
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Thus, we re-examine it by removing the overlapping bidding firms from each of the 
above two samples. Table 6.6 reports the three years pre-acquisition average ARs and 
CARs of the institutional holding non-overlapping bidding firms. There is only one 
monthly average ARs significant at 5% significance level, and no CARs are significant 
different from zero, this is consistent with the results reported in Table 6.2 for the whole 
institution holding sample. However, in contrast with Table 6.2, most of CARs in Table 
6.6 are positive. 
Table 6.6. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1997-2001, held>=3% by institutional funds) three years 
pre-acquisition average ARs and CARs 
There are 24 UK non-overlapping bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional 
funds involved in the acquisition during 1997-2001 periods. AR is the monthly average abnon-nal return 
of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. T- 
statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month -36 0.0048 0.170 0.0048 0.170 
Month -35 0.0245 1.518 0.0293 1.005 
Month -34 -0.0034 -0.106 0.0259 0.578 
Month -33 0.0336 1.555 0.0595 1.050 
Month -32 -0.0339* -2.362 0.0255 0.410 
Month -31 -0.0152 -0.570 0.0103 0.136 
Month -30 -0.0119 -0.431 -0.0015 -0.019 
Month -29 -0.0064 -0.308 -0.008 -0.090 
Month -28 -0.0126 -0.506 -0.0206 -0.199 
Month -27 0.0270 1.245 0.0064 0.063 
Month -26 -0.0266 -1.095 -0.0202 -0.171 
Month -25 -0.0014 -0.039 -0.0216 -0.206 
Month -24 0.0052 0.244 -0.0164 -0.166 
Month -23 0.0435 0.990 0.0271 0.295 
Month -22 -0.0251 -1.149 0.0021 0.020 
Month -21 -0.0041 -0.151 -0.0021 -0.020 
Month -20 0.0436 1.544 0.0416 
0.366 
Month -19 -0.0415 -1.538 0.0001 
0.001 
Month -18 0.0444 1.466 0.0445 
0.374 
Month -17 -0.0244 -0.801 0.0201 
0.156 
Month -16 0.0052 0.228 0.0252 
0.193 
Month -15 -0.0341 -0.818 -0.0088 -0.059 
Month -14 0.0124 0.424 
0.0036 0.023 
Month -13 0.0502 1.674 
0.0537 0.322 
Month -12 0.0435 1.316 
0.0972 0.534 
Month -11 0.0245 0.475 
0.1218 0.622 
Month -10 -0.0361 -0.909 
0.0857 0.448 
Month -9 0.0190 0.555 
0.1047 0.543 
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Month -8 -0-0098 -0-329 0.0950 0.469 Month -7 -0.0207 -0.801 0.0742 0.359 Month -6 0.0047 0.216 0.0789 0.395 
Month -5 0.0072 0.326 0.0861 0.418 
Month -4 -0.0066 -0.201 0.0794 0.359 Month -3 -0.0162 -0-547 0.0632 0.278 Month -2 0.0363 1.507 0.0995 0.434 
Month -1 -0.0267 -0.641 0.0728 0.303 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Figure 6.4 shows the institutional holding non-overlapping bidding fin-ns three-year pre- 
acquisition average CARs. In contrast with Figure 6.1, most of the monthly CARs are 
positive, and the CARs do not experience consistent rise or fall. All the monthly CARs 
in Figure 6.4 outperform their corresponding one in Figure 6.1, however, they are 
statistically insignificant different from zero. 
Figure 6.4. Non-overlapping bidding firms (97-01, held 
>=3% by institutional funds) three-year pre-acquisition 
average CARs 
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Table 6.7.1 and Table 6.7.2 report that all the CARs and the BHARs either positn'e or 
negative are statistically insignificant different from zero. The t-statistics and the non- 
parametric P-values are consistent with each other. 
Table 6.7. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1997-2001, held>=3% by institutional funds) three Nears pre-acquisition average CARs and BRARs 
There are 24 UK non-overlapping bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds involved in the acquisition during 1997-2001 periods. Table 6.7.1 reports the result calculated bý, 
using the control firms approach. Table 6.7.2 presents the result calculated by using the Fama-French 
three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnon-nal return of all the bidding firins. BHAR is the 
average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. Ot is the mean intercept terin of Fama- 
French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean (x multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the 
CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table 6.7.1 
ENT CAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.0190 0.147 0.710 
-24 to -1 0.0944 0.435 0.209 
-36 to -1 0.0728 0.303 0.361 
ENT BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.0634 0.373 0.732 
-24 to -1 -0.2372 -0.321 0.376 
-36 to -1 -0.3131 -0.361 0.331 
Table 6.7.2 
EM (X T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
-12 to -1 0.0037 0.394 0.558 0.0444 
-24 to -1 0.0053 0.918 0.637 0.1272 
-36 to -1 -0.0003 -0.068 0.597 -0.0108 
Consistent with the finding of the whole sample of institutional holding biding firms, 
we do not find any statistical significant long-run abnormal stock returns for the non- 
overlapping institutional holding bidding firms. We now turn to examine the non- 
overlapping bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held 
by institutional 
funds. Table 6.8 presents the three years average ARs, CARs, and FDCARs of these 
non-overlapping bidding firms. Consistent with the results reported 
in Table 6.6, there 
are only two monthly ARs are statistically significant and none of 
the CARs are 
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statistically significant. All the FDCARs are statistically insignificant different from 
zero. 
Table 6.8. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1997-2001, held<3% by institutional funds) three years pre-acquisition average ARs and CARs 
There are 32 UK independent bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds involved in the acquisition during 1997-2001 periods. AR is the monthly average abnormal return 
of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of all the bidding firins. FDCAR is the first difference of CARs between non- institutional holding non-overlapping bidding firms and institutional holding non-overlapping bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs, CARs, and FDCARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat FDCAR T-Stat 
Month -36 0.0086 0.764 0.0086 0.764 0.0038 0.13 
Month -35 -0.0012 -0.082 0.0074 0.355 -0.0219 -0.61 Month -34 0.0101 0.887 0.0175 0.861 -0.0084 -0.17 Month -33 0.0090 0.493 0.0266 0.905 -0.0329 -0.52 Month -32 0.0195 1.319 0.0461 1.379 0.0206 0.29 
Month -31 -0.0336* -2.523 0.0125 0.314 0.0022 0.03 
Month -30 -0.0109 -0.626 0.0016 0.036 0.0031 0.03 
Month -29 -0.0014 -0.073 0.0002 0.004 0.0082 0.08 
Month -28 -0.0001 -0.006 0 0.001 0.0206 0.18 
Month -27 0.0026 0.159 0.0027 0.051 -0.0037 -0.03 
Month -26 0.0072 0.347 0.0098 0.190 0.0300 0.23 
Month -25 -0.0348 -1.808 -0.0250 -0.449 -0.0034 -0.03 
Month -24 0.0197 1.210 -0.0053 -0.098 0.0111 0.10 
Month -23 0.0216 1.465 0.0163 0.264 -0.0108 -0.10 
Month -22 -0.0071 -0.324 0.0092 0.134 0.0071 0.06 
Month -21 0.0160 0.800 0.0252 0.372 0.0273 0.22 
Month -20 0.0024 0.109 0.0277 0.382 -0.0139 -0.10 
Month -19 -0.0015 -0.085 0.0262 0.346 0.0261 0.19 
Month -18 0.0075 0.723 0.0337 0.444 -0.0108 -0.08 
Month -17 0.0182 0.867 0.0520 0.645 0.0319 0.21 
Month -16 -0.0060 -0.387 0.0459 0.576 0.0207 
0.14 
Month -15 -0.0148 -0.670 0.0312 0.362 
0.0400 0.23 
Month -14 0.0038 0.185 0.0350 0.375 
0.0314 0.17 
Month -13 -0.0299 -1.397 0.0050 0.050 -0.0487 -0.25 
Month - 12 0.0034 0.184 0.0084 
0.084 -0.0888 -0.43 
Month -11 0.0211 0.750 0.0295 
0.299 -0.0923 -0.42 
Month -10 -0.0276 -1.455 0.0019 
0.018 -0.0838 -0.39 
Month -9 0.0068 0.294 0.0086 
0.078 -0.0961 -0.43 
Month -8 -0.0429 -1.939 -0.0342 -0.306 -0.1292 -0.56 
Month -7 -0.0118 -0.763 -0.0461 -0.396 -0.1203 -0.51 
Month -6 0.0291 1.609 -0.0170 -0.145 -0.0959 -0.41 
Month -5 0.0329 1.524 
0.0159 0.134 -0.0702 -0.30 
Month -4 0.0317 1.134 
0.0476 0.425 -0.0318 -o. 13 
Month -3 -0.0479 -1.900 -0.0003 -0.002 -0.0635 -0.25 
Month -2 0.0759* 
2.189 0.0756 0.665 -0.0239 -0.09 
Month -1 0.0754 1.399 
0.1510 1.240 0.0782 0.29 
* Indicate signif"lcant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
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Figure 6.5. Non-overlapping bidding firms (97-01, held <3% by institutional funds) three-year pre-acquisition average 
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Figure 6.5 shows the three years pre-acquisition monthly CARs of the non-overlapping 
bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds. As the 
figure shows that these bidding firms experience a long-run small and positive abnormal 
returns in most months. However, all the CARs are statistically insignificant different 
from zero. 
Table 6.9.1 and Table 6.9.2 show the one-, two- and three-year pre-acquisition CARs 
and BHARs of non-overlapping bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently 
held by institutional funds. Consistent with Table 6.7, all the CARs and BHARs are 
statistically insignificant different from zero. Thus, we find that there is no statistically 
significant difference of the stock returns between the two groups of non-overlapping 
bidding firms. Hence, no monitoring roles have been observed so far. 
Table 6.9. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1997-2001, held<3% by institutional funds) three years 
pre-acquisition average CARs and BHARs 
There are 32 UK non-overlapping bidding firms that are not 
largely or/and consistentl% held by 
institutional funds involved in the acquisition during 1997-2001 periods. 
Table 6.9.1 reports the result 
calculated by using the control firms approach. Table 
6.9.2 presents the result calculated by using the 
Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return of all the 
bidding Fin-n-s. 
237 
BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. cc is the mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor model. Impli ied CAR is the mean (X II- multiplying by 12.24, and 36. T- 
statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-v alues calculated by using the non- 
parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table 6.9.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.1460 1.502 0.239 
_ -24 to -1 0.1760 1.567 0.331 
-36 to -1 0.1510 1.240 0.588 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.2687 1.658 0.121 
-24 to -1 0.2025 1.592 0.210 
-36 to -1 0.1570 1.026 0.681 
Table 6.9.2 
EM (X T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
-12 to -1 0.0124 1.604 0.405 0.1488 
-24 to -1 0.0018 0.553 0.933 0.0432 
-36 to -1 -0.0001 -0.054 0.701 -0.0036 
Figure 6.6 shows that non-overlapping firms of institutional holding and non- 
institutional holding experience similar returns in the third and second year prior to the 
takeover announcement, and institutional holding firms outperform the non-institutional 
holding firms in the one year prior to the announcement. However, as we have noticed 
before that none of the CARs shown in Figure 6.6 are statistically significant 
different 
from zero. 
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Figure 6.6. Three years pre-acquisition average CARs of all, institutional holding, non-institutional holding non- 
overlapping bidding firms 97-01 
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A: all the non-overlapping bidding firms. 
H: Non-overlapping bidding firms largely and consistently held by institutional funds. 
N: Non-overlapping bidding firms not largely or/and consistently held by institutional 
funds. 
We have so far examined the three years pre-acquisition stock returns of two sub- 
samples (held >=3% and held <3%) of the whole bidding firms and the two sub-samples 
(held >=3% and held <3%) of the non-overlapping bidding firms. We do not find any 
statistical significant long-run abnormal returns for all these sub-samples, and thus no 
statistically significant difference of the stock returns between the paired samples. Thus, 
there is no obvious monitoring role of institutional funds has been detected so far. 
However, how are the overlapping bidding firms, will they show a significant different 
between the pair samples? We turn to examine the two sub-samples of overlapping 
bidding finns. 
Table 6.10 reports the three years pre-acquisition average ARs and CARs of 
overlapping bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds. 
In contrast with previous sub-samples, all the CARs are negative and II of them are 
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statistically significant different from zero from month -26 to month - 16. It means that 
institutional holding overlapping bidding firms suffer a large and si ing loss duri 
the second year prior to the takeover announcement. 
Table 6.10. Overlapping bidding firms (1997-2001, held>=3% by institutional funds) three years pre-acquisition average ARs and CARs 
There are 12 UK overlapping bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds 
involved in the acquisition during 1997-2001 periods. AR is the monthly average abnon-nal return of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month -36 -0.0174 -0.676 -0.0174 -0.676 Month -35 -0.0214 -0.685 -0.0388 -0.998 Month -34 -0.0697* -2.459 -0.1085* -2.327 
Month -33 0.0078 0.269 -0.1007 -1.736 
Month -32 -0.0189 -0.462 -0.1196 -1.315 
Month -31 0.0311 1.301 -0.0884 -0.888 
Month -30 -0.0728 -2.151 -0.1612 -1.580 
Month -29 -0.0578 -2.073 -0.2190 -1.978 
Month -28 -0.0278 -0.949 -0.2468 -2.006 
Month -27 -0.0723 -1.082 -0.3191 -1.851 
Month -26 -0.0746* -2.297 -0.3938* -2.202 
Month -25 -0.0441 -1.106 -0.4379* -2.274 
Month -24 -0.0106 -0.410 -0.4485* -2.386 
Month -23 0.0162 0.347 -0.4323* -2.704 
Month -22 0.0056 0.203 -0.4267* -2.484 
Month -21 -0.0079 -0.263 -0.4346* -2.505 
Month -20 0.0260 0.679 -0.4086* -2.605 
Month -19 0.0093 0.182 -0.3993* -2.921 
Month -18 -0.0364 -0.884 -0.4357* -3.076 
Month -17 0.0340 0.817 -0.4017* -3-111 
Month -16 0.0780 1.651 -0.3237* -2.390 
Month -15 0.0368 0.994 -0.2869 -2.048 
Month -14 0.0165 0.702 -0.2704 -2-017 
Month -13 0.0697 1.801 -0.2007 -1.388 
Month -12 0.0444 0.976 -0.1563 -0.997 
Month -11 -0.0278 -1.034 -0.1840 -1.125 
Month - 10 0.0674 1.789 -0.1167 -0.763 
Month -9 0.0616 
2.138 -0.0551 -0.328 
Month -8 -0.0617 -1.302 -0.1168 -0.758 
Month -7 -0.0052 -0.132 -0.1220 -0.796 
Month -6 0.0031 
0.119 -0.1189 -0.755 
Month -5 -0.0160 -0.342 -0.1349 -0.762 
Month -4 0.0449 
1.210 -0.0901 -0.479 
Month -3 0.0176 
0.675 -0.0725 -0.374 
Month -2 0.0182 
0.294 -0.0542 -0.247 
Month -1 0.0009 
0.042 -0.0533 -0.255 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
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Figure 6.7 shows that institutional holding overlapping bidding fin-ris suffer a bi loss i in 
the third year prior to the announcement of takeover bids, and start to gain some ground 
after month -24. Most of the CARs in the second year prior to the takeover 
announcement are statistically significant different from zero. 
Figur6 6.7. Overlapping bidding firms (97-01, held >=3% by 
institutional funds) three-year pre-acquisition average 
CARs 
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Table 6.11.1 and Table 6.11.2 report the one-, two- and three-year pre-acquisition CARs 
and BHARs of institutional holding overlapping bidding firms. All the CARs and 
BHARs either positive or negative are statistically insignificant different from zero. The 
t-statistics and the P-values are consistent with each other. 
Table 6.11. Overlapping bidding firms (1997-2001, held>=3% by institutional funds) three years 
pre-acquisition average CARs and BHARs 
There are 12 UK overlapping bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds 
involved in the acquisition during 1997-2001 periods. Table 6.11.1 reports the result calculated by using 
the control finns approach. Table 6.11.2 presents the result calculated by using the Fama-French three- 
factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return of all the bidding 
firrns. BHAR is the 
average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. (x is the mean intercept term of 
Faina- 
French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean a multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the 
CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values calculated 
by using the non-paranietric 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
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Table 6.11.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.1474 - 0.919 0.638 
-24 to -1 0.3846 -1.817 0.158 
-36 to -1 -0.0533 -0.255 0.638 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.1999 1.068 0.480 
-24 to -1 0.5146 1.978 0.117 
-36 to -1 -0.0904 -0.298 0.814 
Table 6.11.2 
EM (I T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
-12 to -1 0.0039 0.348 0.556 0.0468 
-24 to -1 0.0067 0.858 0.456 0.1608 
-36 to -1 -0-0065 -1.464 0.196 -0.2340 
Table 6.12 reports the three years pre-acquisition average ARs, CARs, and FDCARs of 
overlapping bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional 
funds. Unlike Table 6.10, the results in Table 6.12 are consistent with previous findings 
that no CARs are statistically significant different from zero at 5% significance level. 
However, 9 out of 36 FDCARs are statistically significant different from zero at 5% 
significance level. It shows that non-institutional holding overlapping firins outperforin 
their institutional holding counterparts in these 9 months. 
Table 6.12. Overlapping bidding firms (1997-2001, held<3% by institutional funds) three years pre- 
acquisition average ARs and CARs 
There are 10 UK overlapping bidding firins that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional 
funds involved in the acquisition during 1997-2001 periods. AR is the monthly average abnormal return 
of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of all the bidding finns. FDCAR 
is the first difference of CARs between non-institutional holding overlapping bidding firms and 
institutional holding overlapping bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs, CARs, and FDCARs are 
also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat FDCAR T-Stat 
Month -36 0.0107 
0.605 0.0107 0.605 0.0281 0.90 
Month -35 0.0187 
0.980 0.0294 1.374 0.0682 1.54 
Month -34 -0-0628* -2.551 -0.0333 -1.262 
0.0752 1.40 
Month -33 0.0126 
0.485 -0.0208 -0.441 0.0799 1.07 
Month -32 -0-0276 -1.352 -0.0484 -0.970 
0.0712 0.69 
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rvionin -, 51 U. U296 1.062 -0.0188 -0.387 0.0696 0 63 Month -30 -0.0030 -0.110 -0.0218 -0.344 0.1394 
. 1 16 Month -29 0.0274 1.749 0.0056 0.082 0.2246 . 1.73 Month -28 0.0213 0.740 0.0270 0.384 0.2738 1.93 Month -27 0.0010 0.057 0.0280 0.404 0.3471 1.87 
Month -26 -0.0356* -2.808 -0.0076 -0.114 0.3862 2.02 Month -25 -0.0312 -1.486 -0.0388 -0.532 0.3991 1.94 Month -24 0.0164 0.807 -0.0224 -0.295 0.4261 2.10 Month -23 0.0311 0.999 0.0088 0.134 0.4411 * 2.55 
Month -22 0.0162 0.792 0.0250 0.368 0.4517* 2.44 
Month -21 0.0151 0.725 0.0401 0.547 0.4747* 2.52 
Month -20 -0.0234 -0.557 0.0167 0.175 0.4253* 2.32 Month - 19 0.0012 0.041 0.0179 0.206 0.4172* 2.57 
Month -18 0.0551 1.395 0.0730 1.050 0.5087* 3.22 
Month - 17 0.0310 1.210 0.1040 1.459 0.5057* 3.43 
Month -16 0.0016 0.030 0.1056 0.992 0.4293* 2.49 
Month - 15 0.0010 0.035 0.1066 1.092 0.3935* 2.30 
Month -14 -0.0215 -0.545 0.0851 0.692 0.3555 1.95 
Month -13 -0.0231 -0.551 0.0620 0.608 0.2627 1.48 
Month -12 -0.0172 -1.220 0.0448 0.457 0.2011 1.09 
Month -11 0.0183 0.493 0.0631 0.626 0.2471 1.29 
Month - 10 0.0565* 2.267 0.1196 1.173 0.2363 1.29 
Month -9 -0.0277 -0.934 0.0919 0.819 0.1470 0.73 
Month -8 -0.0222 -0.990 0.0697 0.573 0.1865 0.95 
Month -7 0.0506 1.729 0.1203 0.987 0.2423 1.24 
Month -6 -0.0118 -0.630 0.1086 0.886 0.2275 1.14 
Month -5 0.0041 0.190 0.1127 0.891 0.2476 1.14 
Month -4 -0.0378 -1.370 0.0749 0.596 0.1650 0.73 
Month -3 -0.0124 -0.410 0.0625 0.482 0.1350 0.58 
Month -2 -0.0064 -0.226 0.0561 0.407 0.1103 0.43 
Month -1 -0.0037 -0.093 0.0524 0.363 0.1057 0.42 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Figure 6.8 shows the three years pre-acquisition performance of overlapping bidding 
firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds. All the monthly 
CARs are positive in two years prior to the takeover announcement. 
However, all the 
CARs are statistically insignificant different from zero at 
5% significance level. 
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Figure 6.8. Overlapping bidding firms (97-01, held <3% by institutional funds) three-year pre-acquisition average 
CARs 
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Table 6.13.1 and Table 6.13.2 reports the one-, two- and three-year pre-acquisition 
CARs and BHARs of overlapping bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently 
held by institutional funds. Consistent with Table 6.11, all the CARs and BHARs are 
insignificant different from zero. 
Table 6.13. Overlapping bidding firms (1997-2001, held<3% by institutional funds) three years pre- 
acquisition average CARs and BRARs 
There are 10 UK bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds involved 
in the acquisition during 1997-2001 periods. Table 6.13.1 reports the result calculated by using the 
control firms approach. Table 6.13.2 presents the result calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor 
model. CAR is the average cumulative abnon-nal return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average 
buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. Ot is the mean intercept term of Fama-French 
three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean a multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs 
and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table 6.13.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 -0.0096 -0.092 
0.959 
-24 to -1 0.0912 
0.745 0.646 
-36 to -1 0.0524 
0.363 0.799 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 
0.0112 0.093 0.959 
-24 to 
0.1533 1.231 0.241 
in 0.1370 0.906 0.575 
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Table 6.13.2 
EM T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
-12 to -1 0.0042 0.553 0.838 0.0504 
-24 to -1 0.0017 0.402 0.683 0.0408 
-36 to -1 0.0002 0.084 0.838 0.0072 
Figure 6.9 shows that non-institutional holding overlapping bidding finns outperform 
the institutional holding overlapping bidding firms. All the monthly CARs of non- 
institutional holding overlapping bidding firms are statistically insignificant, however, 
most of the CARs of the institutional holding firms are significantly negative in the 
second year prior to the takeover announcement. Thus, the non-institutional holding 
overlapping bidding firms outperforms their counterparts at least in the second year 
prior to the takeover period, and this against the monitoring role of institutional funds. 
Figure 6.9. Three years pre-acquisition average CARs 
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A: all the overlapping bidding firms. 
H: overlapping bidding firms largely and consistently 
held by institutional funds. 
N: overlapping bidding firms not 
largely or/and consistently held by institutional 
funds. 
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In sum, after examining and comparing the three years pre-acquisition stock returns of 
three pairs of sub-samples (institutional holding bidding firms vs. non-institutional 
holding bidding finns; institutional holding non-overlapping bidding firms vs. non- 
institutional holding non-overlapping bidding firms; institutional holding overlapping 
bidding firms vs. non-institutional holding overlapping bidding firms), we do not find 
any evidence that institutional funds actively monitoring the firms that they hold large 
stakes and this monitoring leads to a better performance of these firms. We thus 
conclude that there is no obvious or significant monitoring role of institutional funds in 
three years pre-acquisition period. 
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6.4.2. Do Institutional Funds Monitor Firms in the Post Acquisition Period? 
6.4.2.1. Bidding Firms'Long-Run Post Acquisition Stock Returns 
There is so far no monitoring role of institutional funds has been observed in the three 
years pre-acquisition period. Will this finding be held in the three years post-acquisition 
period? We tum to explore it. 
Once again, we will firstly examine all the bidding firms in 1994-1998 as a whole 
before we move to investigate the sub-samples divided by the institutional funds 
holdings. It will provide us a general story before exploring the differences of the sub- 
samples. Again this investigation is not a test of the monitoring role of institutional 
funds, but provides useful context and information. For this reason, we once again put 
the detailed results and discussions into Appendix 3, and only conclude the results here. 
After examining the bidding firms (1994-1998 sample period) three years post-takeover 
abnormal stock returns, we do not find any statistically significant three-years abnormal 
returns. This is consistent with the results reported in Chapter 5. Thus, we now have a 
general understanding of the bidding finns three years post acquisition stock return in 
1994-1998 periods, it is time to move onto our primary investigation. 
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6.4.2.2. Long-Run Post Acquisition Stock Returns of Bidding Firms with Large Level of 
Institutional Ownership vs. Bidding Firms with Low or without Institutional Ownership IP 
Table 6.14 reports the three years post acquisition monthly average ARs and CARs of 
bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds. Two monthly 
ARs are significant at 5% significant level. All the CARs are negative and only two of 
them are statistically significant different from zero at 5% significance level. 
Table 6.14. Bidding firms (1994-1998, held>=3% by institutional funds) three years post acquisition 
average ARs and CARs 
There are 43 UK bidding finns that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds involved in the 
acquisitions during 1994-1998 periods. AR is the monthly average abnormal return of all the bidding 
firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly 
ARs and CARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0102 -0.671 -0.0102 -0.671 
Month 2 -0.0316 -1.888 -0.0418* -2.072 
Month 3 -0.0390* -2.039 -0.0807* -2.704 
Month 4 0.0021 0.075 -0.0786 -1.973 
Month 5 -0.0106 -0.562 -0.0892 -1.894 
Month 6 -0.0161 -0.798 -0.1053 -1.838 
Month 7 -0.0343 -1.403 -0.1396 -2.006 
Month 8 0.0133 0.578 -0.1263 -1.712 
Month 9 -0.0003 -0.012 -0.1266 -1.474 
Month 10 -0.0013 -0.079 -0.1280 -1.355 
Month 11 -0.0211 -0.739 -0.1491 -1.581 Month 12 0.0251 1.511 -0.1240 -1.317 Month 13 0.0036 0.152 -0.1204 -1.349 Month 14 -0-0160 -0.771 -0.1364 -1.400 Month 15 0.0134 0.759 -0.1230 -1.245 Month 16 0.0055 0.224 -0.1174 -1.167 Month 17 -0.0362 -1.322 -0.1537 -1.463 Month 18 0.0333 1.308 -0.1204 -1.082 Month 19 0.0082 0.404 -0.1121 -1.030 Month 20 -0.0308 -1.332 -0.1430 -1.275 Month 21 -0.0069 -0.252 -0.1499 -1.250 Month 22 -0.0275 -1.164 -0.1774 -1.529 Month 23 -0.0500 -1.697 -0.2275 -1.951 Month 24 0.0244 1.015 -0.2030 -1.815 Month 25 -0.0048 -0.226 -0.2079 -1.790 Month 26 0.0287 1.246 -0.1792 -1.588 Month 27 0.0255 1.501 -0.1537 -1.340 Month 28 0.0057 0.246 -0.1480 -1.211 Month 29 -0.0029 -0.113 -0.1508 -1.213 
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Month 30 0.0343 1.204 -0.1165 -0.886 
Month 31 0.0066 0.234 -0.1099 -0.853 
Month 32 0.0286 1.003 -0.0813 -0.631 
Month 33 -0.0642* -2.347 -0.1455 -1.125 
Month 34 0.0102 0.342 -0.1353 -1.053 
Month 35 -0.0159 -0.614 -0.1512 -1.199 
Month 36 -0.0723 -1.999 -0.2235 -1.748 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Figure 6.10 shows the three years post acquisition monthly CARs of bidding firms that 
are largely and consistently held by institutional funds. As we can see that institutional 
holding bidding firms suffer a loss immediately after completion of the takeover, and 
the CARs remain negative throughout the three years period. However, only the CARs 
of monthly 2 and 3 are significant, 34 out of 36 CARs are statistically insignificant 
different from zero. 
Figure 6.10. Bidding firms (94-98, held >=3% by institutional 
funds) three years post acquisition average CARs 
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Table 6.15.1 reports the one, two, and three years post acquisition CARs and BHARs of 
bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds. All the CARs 
and BHARs are negative and statistically insignificant different from zero, all the t- 
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Event Month 1 to 36 
values and P-values are consistent with each other. Table 6.15.2 presents three negative 
and significant intercept tenns, the t-values and P-values of two and three years (x are 
consistent with each other. Thus, institutional holding bidding firms experience a 
significant negative abnonnal returns in two or three years after the takeover based on 
the Fama-French three factor model. 
Table 6.15. Bidding firms (1994-1998, held>=3% by institutional funds) three years post acquisition 
average CARs and BHARs 
There are 43 UK bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds involved in the 
acquisition during 1994-1998 periods. Table 6.15.1 reports the result by using the control firms approach. 
Table 6.15.2 presents the result by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average 
cumulative abnormal return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return 
of all the bidding firms. a is the mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor model. Implied CAR 
is the mean (x multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the 
corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in 
the table. 
Table 6.15.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.1240 -1.317 0.612 
1 to 24 -0.2030 -1.815 0.080 
1 to 36 -0.2235 -1.748 0.169 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.1004 -1.172 0.546 
1 to 24 -0.2332 -1.933 0.084 
1 to 36 -0.2159 -1.560 0.328 
Table 6.15.2 
EM T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0-0103* -2.101 0.264 -0.1236 
1 to 24 -0.0134* -4.044 0.001 -0.3216 
1 to 36 -0.0125* -4.612 0.000 -0.4500 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
Table 6.16 reports the three years post acquisition average ARs, CARs, and FDCARs of 
bidding finns that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds. Four 
monthly average ARs are significant. Two CARs of month 35 and 36 are positive and 
statistically significant. 3 out of 36 FDCARs are statistically significant different from 
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zero at 5% significance level. It shows that non-institutional holding firms outperform 
their institutional holding counterparts at least in 3 months time. 
Table 6.16. Bidding firms (1994-1998, held <3% by institutional funds) three years post acquisition 
average ARs and CARs 
There are 56 UK bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds involved 
in the acquisitions during 1994-1998 periods. AR is the monthly average abnormal return of all the 
bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. FDCAR is the 
first difference of CARs between non-institutional holding bidding firms and institutional holding bidding 
firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs, CARs, and FDCARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat FDCAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0128 -0.984 -0.0128 -0.984 -0.0026 -0.13 
Month 2 -0.0077 -0.786 -0.0205 -1.377 0.0213 0.85 
Month 3 0.0002 0.013 -0.0203 -1.080 0.0604 1.71 
Month 4 0.0154 1.249 -0.0049 -0.221 0.0737 1.61 
Month 5 0.0109 0.890 0.0059 0.223 0.0951 1.76 
Month 6 0.0006 0.067 0.0065 0.236 0.1118 1.76 
Month 7 -0.0149 -1.274 -0.0084 -0.286 0.1312 1.74 
Month 8 -0.0256* -2.251 -0.0339 -1.021 0.0924 1.14 
Month 9 -0.0311 -1.875 -0.0651 -1.777 0.0615 0.66 
Month 10 0.0067 0.528 -0.0583 -1.525 0.0697 0.68 
Month 11 0.0238 1.751 -0.0345 -0.893 0.1146 1.12 
Month 12 0.0050 0.398 -0.0295 -0.672 0.0945 0.91 
Month 13 0.0309* 2.189 0.0015 0.031 0.1219 1.21 
Month 14 -0.0159 -1.124 -0.0144 -0.277 0.1220 1.10 
Month 15 0.0247 1.799 0.0103 0.198 0.1333 1.19 
Month 16 0.0159 1.055 0.0263 0.472 0.1437 1.25 
Month 17 0.0102 0.642 0.0365 0.617 0.1902 1.58 
Month 18 0.0201 1.625 0.0566 0.916 0.1770 1.39 
Month 19 -0.0092 -0.638 0.0473 0.748 0.1594 1.27 
Month 20 -0.0271 -1.912 0.0202 0.307 0.1632 1.26 
Month 21 0.0121 0.638 0.0323 0.481 0.1822 1.33 
Month 22 -0.0019 -0.140 0.0304 0.469 0.2078 1.56 
Month 23 0.0169 0.972 0.0473 0.712 0.2748* 2.05 
Month 24 0.0065 0.474 0.0538 0.785 0.2568 1.96 
Month 25 0.0041 0.285 0.0580 0.819 0.2659 1.95 
Month 26 0.0040 0.236 0.0620 0.858 0.2412 1.80 
Month 27 0.0077 0.495 0.0697 0.913 0.2234 1.62 
Month 28 0.0304* 2.200 0.1000 1.329 0.2480 1.73 
Month 29 -0.0003 -0.016 0.0998 1.308 0.2506 1.72 
Month 30 -0.0004 -0.022 0.0994 1.292 0.2159 1.42 
Month 31 0.0194 1.060 0.1188 1.518 0.2287 1.52 
Month 32 0.0197 1.240 0.1385 1.704 0.2198 1.44 
Month 33 0.0144 0.931 0.1528 1.900 0.2983 1.96 
Month 34 0.0132 0.767 0.1660 1.978 0.3013 1.96 
Month 35 0.0595* 2.810 0.2255* 2.543 0.3767* 2.44 
Month 36 0.0201 1.132 0.2456* 2.634 0.4691 * 2.96 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
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Figure 6.11 shows the three years post acquisition CARs of bidding finns that are not 
largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds. As the figure shows that CARs 
consistently rise after the completion of the takeover, and finally reach 25% at the end 
of the three years period. 34 out of 36 CARs are statistically insignificant different from 
zero. However, the CARs of month 35 and 36 are statistically significant different from 
zero at 5% significance level in a two-sided mest. 
Figure 6.11. Bidding firms (94-98, held<3% by institutional 
funds) three years post acquisition average CARs 
0.3 
(a 0.25 E 
0 0.2 
0 '< 0.15 mU 
(D 0.1 
> 
0.05 
75 0 E 
-0.05 
-0.1 
Event Month 1 to 36 
Table 6.17.1 reports the one, two, and three years CARs and BHARs of bidding firms 
that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds. Both the one and two 
years post acquisition CARs and BHARs are insignificant. However, both the three 
years CAR and BHAR are positive and statistically significant different from zero. 
Their t- and P-values are consistent with each other. Table 6.17.2 reports three small 
and negative intercept terms, they are statistically insignificant different from zero. 
Thus, comparing to Table 6.15, Table 6.17 presents some evidence that non-institutional 
holding bidding finns outperforrn the institutional holding bidding firms based either on 
the control finns approach or the Fama-French three factor model. 
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Table 6.17. Bidding firms (1994-1998, held<3% by institutional funds) three years post acquisition 
average CARs and BHARS 
There are 56 UK bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds involved 
in the acquisition during 1994-1998 periods. Table 6.17.1 reports the result calculated by using the 
control firms approach. Table 6.17.2 presents the result calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor 
model. CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average 
buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. a is the mean intercept term of Fama-French 
three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean a multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs 
and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table 6.17.1 
ENT CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.0295 -0.672 0.648 
1 to 24 0.0538 0.785 0.378 
1 to 36 0.2456* 2.634 0.013 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.0470 -0.846 0.596 
1 to 24 0.0651 0.850 0.458 
1 to 36 0.3950* 2.653 0.007 
Table 6.17.2 
EM T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0031 -0.806 0.342 -0.0372 
1 to 24 -0.0018 -0.670 0.355 -0.0432 
1 to 36 -0.0006 -0.310 0.636 -0.0216 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
Figure 6.12 shows that non-institutional funds holding bidding firms outperform the 
institutional holding bidding firms throughout the three years post acquisition period 
though most of the CARs are statistically insignificant different from zero. Thus, we 
have so far not found any evidence regarding the monitoring of institutional funds and 
the wealth enhance performance of their holding firms, on the contrary, we find some 
evidence that institutional holding firms underform non-institutional holding firms in 
three years after the acquisition. 
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Figure 6.12. Three years post acuclisition average CARs of 
of all, insititutional holding, and non-institutional holding 
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H: Bidding firms largely and consistently held by institutional funds. 
N: Bidding firms not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds. 
In line with our work at the pre-acquisition stage, we will once again examine the non- 
overlapping and overlapping sub-samples to enhance our findings. Table 6.18 reports 
the three years post acquisition average ARs and CARs of non-overlapping bidding 
firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds. Only 3 out of 36 
average ARs are statistically significant. All the CARs are negative, however only two 
of them are statistically significant different from zero 
Table 6.18. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1994-1998, held>=3% by institutional funds) three 
years post acquisition average ARs and CARs 
There are 33 UK non-overlapping bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional 
funds involved in the acquisitions during 1994-1998 periods. AR is the monthly average abnormal return 
of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. T- 
statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0037 -0.234 -0.0037 -0.234 
Month 2 -0.0393 -2.023 -0.0430 -1.875 
Month 3 -0.0512* -2.408 -0.0942* -2.705 
Month 4 0.0102 0.285 -0.0840 -1.750 
Month 5 -0.0308 -1.413 -0.1148* -2.043 
Month 6 0.0017 0.074 -0.1132 -1.670 
Month 7 -0.0134 -0.572 -0.1265 -1.655 
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Month 8 0.0260 0.957 -0.1006 -1.245 
Month 9 0.0059 0.236 -0.0946 -1.024 
Month 10 -0.0111 -0.549 -0.1057 -1.017 
Month 11 -0.0500 -1.688 -0.1557 -1.451 
Month 12 0.0226 1.117 -0.1331 -1.239 
Month 13 0.0033 0.120 -0.1298 -1.276 
Month 14 -0.0289 -1.369 -0.1587 -1.400 
Month 15 0.0350 1.696 -0.1238 -1.070 Month 16 -0.0037 -0.149 -0.1275 -1.056 Month 17 -0.0379 -1.140 -0.1654 -1.309 Month 18 0.0255 0.813 -0.1399 -1.021 Month 19 0.0031 0.129 -0.1369 -1.008 
Month 20 -0.0224 -0.916 -0.1593 -1.169 
Month 21 0.0009 0.035 -0.1584 -1.084 
Month 22 -0.0442 -1.995 -0.2026 -1.400 
Month 23 -0.0498 -1.570 -0.2523 -1.764 
Month 24 0.0024 0.089 -0.2500 -1.816 
Month 25 -0.0022 -0.088 -0.2522 -1.782 
Month 26 0.0250 0.858 -0.2272 -1.646 
Month 27 0.0327 1.672 -0.1944 -1.367 
Month 28 -0.0153 -0.583 -0.2097 -1.393 
Month 29 -0.0037 -0.123 -0.2134 -1.390 
Month 30 0.0596* 2.277 -0.1537 -0.965 
Month 31 0.0398 1.537 -0.1139 -0.713 
Month 32 0.0096 0.307 -0.1043 -0.673 
Month 33 -0.0920* -2.970 -0.1963 -1.241 
Month 34 0.0051 0.135 -0.1913 -1.219 
Month 35 -0.0186 -0.571 -0.2099 -1.357 
Month 36 -0.0792 -1.810 -0.2891 -1.859 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
Figure 6.13 shows the three years post acquisition CARs of non-overlapping bidding 
finns that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds. As the figure shows 
these bidding firms start to lose immediately after the completion of the acquisition, and 
none of the CARs are positive. However, 34 out of 36 CARs shown in the figure are 
statistically insignificant different from zero. 
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Figure 6.13. Non-overlapping Bidding firms (94-98, held 
>=3% by institutional funds) three years post acquisition 
average CARs 
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Table 6.19.1 reports the one, two, and three years post acquisition CARs and BHARs of 
non-overlapping bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional 
funds. All the CARs are negative and insignificant, and the one and three years BHARs 
are negative and insignificant. However, the two years BHARs are statistically 
significant different from zero at 5% significance level according to either the t- or the 
P-values. Table 6.19.2 reports three large and negative intercept terms, the two and 
three years (x s are statistically significant different from zero. Thus, based on either the 
control firms approach or the Fama-French three-factor model, we find evidence of 
statistically significant negative abnormal returns of the institutional holding non- 
overlapping bidding firms. We will now turn to examine the post acquisition stock 
returns of the non-overlapping bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently 
held by institutional funds. 
Table 6.19. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1994-1998, held>=3% by institutional funds) three 
years post acquisition average CARs and BHARs 
There are 33 UK non-overlapping bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional 
funds involved in the acquisition during 1994-1998 periods. Table 6.19.1 reports the result calculated by 
using the control firms approach. Table 6.19.2 presents the result calculated by using the Fama-French 
three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the 
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average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. (X is the mean intercept term of Fama- French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean (x multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-stat'stIcs of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table 6.19.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.1331 -1.239 0.448 
1 to 24 -0.2500 -1.816 0.095 
1 to 36 -0.2891 -1.859 0.088 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.1422 -1.379 0.357 
1 to 24 -0.3250* -2.211 0.044 
1 to 36 -0.2680 -1.828 0.140 
Table 6.19.2 
EM T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0113 -1.992 0.205 -0.1356 
1 to 24 -0.0158* -4.119 0.001 -0.3792 
1 to 36 -0.0141* -4.558 0.001 -0.5076 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Table 6.20 reports the three years post acquisition average ARs, CARs, and FDCARs of 
non-overlapping bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by 
institutional funds. 4 out of 36 monthly average ARs are significant, and only 2 out of 
36 monthly average CARs are statistically significant different from zero. 2 out of 36 
FDCARs are significant different from zero, it shows that non-institutional holding non- 
overlapping bidding firms outperforms their institutional holding counterparts at least in 
these two months time. 
Table 6.20. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1994-1998, held<3% by institutional funds) three years 
post acquisition average ARs and CARs 
There are 32 UK non-overlapping bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by 
institutional funds involved in the acquisitions during 1994-1998 periods. AR is the monthly average 
abnormal return of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of all the 
bidding firms. FDCAR is the first difference of CARs between non-institutional holding non-overlapping 
bidding firms and institutional holding non-overlapping bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs, 
CARs, and FDCARs are also given in the table. 
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EM AR I-Stat CAR T-Stat FDCAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0220 -1.110 -0.0220 -1.110 -0.0183 -0.73 Month 2 -0.0082 -0.615 -0.0302 -1.348 0.0128 0.40 Month 3 -0.0144 -0.738 -0.0447 -1.537 0.0495 1.09 Month 4 0.0049 0.299 -0.0398 -1.231 0.0442 0.76 Month 5 0.0070 0.400 -0.0328 -0.889 0.0820 1.22 Month 6 0.0003 0.025 -0.0325 -0.858 0.0807 1.04 Month 7 -0.0118 -0.835 -0.0443 -1.053 0.0822 0.94 Month 8 -0.0305 -1.964 -0.0748 -1.558 0.0258 0.27 Month 9 -0.0445 -1.649 -0.1193* -2.228 -0.0247 -0.23 Month 10 -0.0028 -0.188 -0.1221 * -2.232 -0.0164 -0.14 Month 11 0.0469* 2.491 -0.0751 -1.399 0.0806 0.67 Month 12 0.0008 0.042 -0.0744 -1.194 0.0587 0.47 Month 13 0.0357 1.759 -0.0386 -0.565 0.0912 0.74 Month 14 -0.0306 -1.421 -0.0693 -0.918 0.0894 0.66 Month 15 0.0412 1.950 -0.028 -0.373 0.0958 0.69 Month 16 0.0114 0.523 -0.0166 -0.207 0.1109 0.76 Month 17 0.0053 0.220 -0.0113 -0.134 0.1541 1.01 Month 18 0.0257 1.621 0.0144 0.167 0.1543 0.95 
Month 19 -0.0204 -1.016 -0.006 -0.070 0.1309 0.82 Month 20 -0.0629* -3.182 -0.0689 -0.797 0.0904 0.56 Month 21 0.0078 0.303 -0.0611 -0.714 0.0973 0.57 Month 22 0.0173 1.038 -0.0437 -0.507 0.1589 0.94 
Month 23 0.0222 0.925 -0.0216 -0.243 0.2307 1.37 Month 24 -0.0003 -0.018 -0.0219 -0.233 0.2281 1.37 
Month 25 0.0015 0.077 -0.0205 -0.217 0.2317 1.36 
Month 26 0.0203 0.944 -0.0002 -0.002 0.2270 1.34 
Month 27 -0.0068 -0.331 -0.0070 -0.067 0.1874 1.07 
Month 28 0.0467* 2.179 0.0398 0.388 0.2495 1.37 
Month 29 -0.0053 -0.226 0.0344 0.350 0.2478 1.36 
Month 30 -0.0137 -0.532 0.0207 0.212 0.1744 0.93 
Month 31 0.0391 1.517 0.0598 0.588 0.1737 0.92 
Month 32 0.0395 1.922 0.0993 0.973 0.2036 1.10 
Month 33 0.0123 0.579 0.1116 1.081 0.3079 1.63 
Month 34 -0.0097 -0.473 0.1019 0.978 0.2932 1.56 
Month 35 0.0838* 2.717 0.1857 1.687 0.3956* 2.08 
Month 36 0.0371 1.453 0.2229 1.928 0.5120* 2.64 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
Figure 6.14 shows three years post acquisition average CARs of non-overlapping 
bidding firms that are not large or/and consistently held by institutional funds. In 
contrast with Figure 6.13, most of the CARs in the third year after the acquisition are 
positive. However, 34 out 36 CARs are statistically insignificant different from zero. 
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Figure 6.14. Non-overlapping bidding firms (94-98, held <3% 
by insitutional funds) three years post acquisition average 
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Table 6.21 reports the three years post acquisition average CARs and BHARs, and the 
implied CARs of non-overlapping bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently 
held by institutional funds. All the results either based on the control finns approach or 
the Fama-French three-factor model are statistically insignificant different from zero. 
All the t-statistics and the P-values are consistent with each other. Thus, by comparing 
with Table 6.19 that reports some significant long-run negative abnormal returns with 
this table, we do not find any evidence that institutional funds holding non-overlapping 
bidding firms outperform their non-institutional holding counterparts, on the contrary, 
we even find some evidence against it. In a word, no monitoring role of institutional 
funds has been observed so far. 
Table 6.21. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1994-1998, held<3% by institutional funds) three years 
post acquisition average CARs and BHARs 
There are 32 UK non-overlapping bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by 
institutional funds involved in the acquisition during 1994-1998 periods. Table 6.21.1 reports the result 
calculated by using the control firms approach. Table 6.21.2 presents the result calculated by using the 
Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return of all the bidding firms. 
BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. a is the mean intercept 
term of Fama-French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean Cc multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T- 
statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values calculated by using the non- 
parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
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Table 6.21.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.0744 -1.194 0.360 
1 to 24 -0.0219 -0.233 0.765 
1 to 36 0.2229 1.928 0.150 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.1098 -1.314 0.295 
1 to 24 -0.0404 -0.397 0.489 
1 to 36 0.3368 1.588 0.155 
Table 6.21.2 
EM Oc T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0045 -0.803 0.427 -0.0540 
1 to 24 -0.0049 -1.476 0.110 -0.1176 
1 to 36 -0.0039 -1.369 0.116 -0.1404 
Figure 6.15 shows that non-institutional holding non-overlapping bidding firms 
outperform their institutional holding counterparts in almost all the months in three 
years after the acquisition. However, most of the CARs shown in Figure 6.15 are 
statistically insignificant different from zero. 
Figure 6.15. Three years post acquisition average CARs of 
all, institutional holding, and non-institutional holding non- 
overlapping bidding firms 1994-1998 
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A: All the non-overlapping bidding firms. 
H: Non-overlapping bidding finns largely and consistently held by institutional funds. 
N: Non-overlapping bidding firms not largely or/and consistently held by institutional 
funds. 
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We have so far examined the three years post acquisition stock returns of two sub- 
samples (held >=3% and held <3%) of the whole bidding firms and the two sub-samples 
(held >=3% and held <3%) of the non-overlapping bidding firms. We do not find any 
evidence in supporting the monitoring role of institutional funds, and we even find some 
evidence against it. Thus, there is no obvious monitoring role of institutional funds has 
been detected so far. However, how are the overlapping bidding firms, will they show a 
significant different between the pair samples? We turn to examine the two sub-samples 
of overlapping bidding firms. 
Table 6.22 reports the three years post acquisition average ARs and CARs of 
overlapping bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds. 
Only one monthly average AR is statistically significant at 5% significance level, none 
of the CARs are statistically significant different from zero. 
Table 6.22. Overlapping bidding firms (1994-1998, held>=3% by institutional funds) three years 
post acquisition average ARs and CARs 
There are 10 UK overlapping bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds 
involved in the acquisitions during 1994-1998 periods. AR is the monthly average abnormal return of all 
the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. T-statistics of 
the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0318 -0.773 -0.0318 -0.773 
Month 2 -0.0060 -0.182 -0.0378 -0.847 
Month 3 0.0014 0.033 -0.0364 -0.626 
Month 4 -0.0244 -0.645 -0.0608 -0.879 
Month 5 0.0562 1.915 -0.0046 -0.057 
Month 6 -0.0748 -1.793 -0.0794 -0.729 
Month 7 -0.1035 -1.478 -0.1828 -1.086 
Month 8 -0.0285 -0.683 -0.2114 -1.189 
Month 9 -0.0209 -0.323 -0.2322 -1.080 
Month 10 0.0309 1.061 -0.2014 -0.889 
Month 11 0.0742 1.072 -0.1272 -0.612 
Month 12 0.0333 1.241 -0.0939 -0.457 
Month 13 0.0045 0.094 -0.0894 -0.457 
Month 14 0.0268 0.480 -0.0626 -0.318 
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Month 15 -0-0578* -2.515 -0.1204 -0.611 Month 16 0.0362 0.523 -0-0842 -0.471 Month 17 -0.0308 -0.670 -0-115 -0.624 Month 18 0.0593 1.577 -0.0557 -0.338 Month 19 0.0253 0.623 -0.0305 -0.214 Month 20 -0.0587 -0.972 -0.0892 -0.483 Month 21 -0.0327 -0.377 -0.122 -0.625 Month 22 0.0276 0.390 -0-0943 -0.616 Month 23 -0-051 -0.678 -0.1454 -0.816 Month 24 0.0972 1.896 -0.0481 -0.302 Month 25 -0-0135 -0.318 -0.0617 -0.342 Month 26 0.0409 1.623 -0.0208 -0.123 Month 27 0.0016 0.047 -0.0192 -0.124 Month 28 0.0749 1.691 0.0557 0.337 
Month 29 -0.0002 -0.004 0.0555 0.334 Month 30 -0.0492 -0.578 0.0063 0.029 Month 31 -0.1030 -1.288 -0.0967 -0.530 Month 32 0.0914 1.392 -0-0053 -0.024 Month 33 0.0275 0.545 0.0222 0.114 
Month 34 0.0272 0.750 0.0494 0.255 
Month 35 -0.0068 -0.224 0.0426 0.235 Month 36 -0.0495 -0.815 -0.0069 -0.035 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
Figure 6.16 shows the three years post acquisition average CARs of institutional funds 
holding overlapping bidding firms. As the figure shows, these firms experience a quite 
volatile three years period after the acquisition, the CARs rise and fall for many times. 
Most of the CARs are negative, however, none of the 36 monthly CARs are statistically 
significant different from zero at 5% significance level. 
Figure 6.16. Overlapping bidding firms (94-98, held >=3% by 
institutional funds) three years post acquisition average 
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Table 6.23 reports the one, two, and three years average CARs, BHARs and the implied 
CARs of overlapping firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds. 
According to the table, none of the CARs and the BHARs either positive or negative are 
statistically significant different from zero at 5% significance level. All the t-statistics 
and the P-values are consistent with each other. 
Table 6.23. Overlapping bidding firms (1994-1998, held>=3% by institutional funds) three years 
post acquisition average CARs and BHARs 
There are 10 UK overlapping bidding firms that are largely and consistently held by institutional funds 
involved in the acquisition during 1994-1998 periods. Table 6.23.1 reports the result calculated by using 
the control firms approach. Table 6.23.2 presents the result calculated by using the Fama-French three- 
factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the 
average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. Oc is the mean intercept terin of Fama- 
French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean (x multiplying by 12,24,36. T-statistics of the 
CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table 6.23.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.0939 -0.457 0.508 
1 to 24 -0.0481 -0.302 0.721 
1 to 36 -0.0069 -0.035 0.508 
EM BRAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 0.0375 0.268 0.508 
1 to 24 0.0696 0.438 0.799 
1 to 36 -0.0439 -0.123 0.333 
Table 6.23.2 
EM a T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0071 -0.692 1.000 -0.0852 
1 to 24 -0.0055 -0.883 0.476 -0.1320 
1 to 36 -0.0072 -1.291 0.185 -0.2592 
Table 6.24 reports the three years post acquisition average ARs, CARs, and FDCARs of 
overlapping firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds. As 
the table clearly shows, none of the monthly average ARs and CARs of these firms are 
statistically significant different from zero, and none of the FDCARs are significant 
different from zero at 5% significance level. 
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Table 6.24. Overlapping bidding firms (1994-1998, held <3% by institutional funds) three years 
post acquisition average ARs and CARs 
There are 24 UK overlapping bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional 
funds involved in the acquisitions during 1994-1998 periods. AR is the monthly average abnormal return 
of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnon-nal return of all the bidding firms. FDCAR 
is the first difference of CARs between non-institutional holding overlapping bidding firms and 
institutional holding overlapping bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs, CARs and FDCARs are 
also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat FDCAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0006 -0.039 -0.0006 -0.039 0.0312 0.71 
Month 2 -0.0070 -0.479 -0.0076 -0.422 0.0302 0.63 
Month 3 0.0196 1.362 0.0121 0.616 0.0485 0.79 
Month 4 0.0294 1.562 0.0415 1.499 0.1023 1.37 
Month 5 0.0161 0.950 0.0576 1.614 0.0622 0.71 
Month 6 0.0010 0.084 0.0585 1.521 0.1379 1.19 
Month 7 -0.0190 -0.949 0.0396 1.057 0.2224 1.29 
Month 8 -0.0191 -1.130 0.0205 0.483 0.2319 1.27 
Month 9 -0.0132 -0.932 0.0073 0.165 0.2395 1.09 
Month 10 0.0194 0.866 0.0266 0.562 0.2280 0.99 
Month 11 -0.0071 -0.394 0.0196 0.362 0.1468 0.68 
Month 12 0.0108 0.620 0.0303 0.512 0.1242 0.58 
Month 13 0.0246 1.277 0.0549 0.916 0.1443 0.71 
Month 14 0.0038 0.243 0.0587 0.877 0.1213 0.58 
Month 15 0.0027 0.185 0.0614 0.880 0.1818 0.87 
Month 16 0.0220 1.077 0.0834 1.134 0.1676 0.87 
Month 17 0.0168 0.889 0.1002 1.251 0.2152 1.07 
Month 18 0.0126 0.632 0.1128 1.291 0.1685 0.90 
Month 19 0.0056 0.271 0.1184 1.258 0.1489 0.87 
Month 20 0.0207 1.322 0.1391 1.412 0.2283 1.09 
Month 21 0.0177 0.628 0.1568 1.512 0.2788 1.26 
Month 22 -0.0275 -1.279 0.1293 1.342 
0.2236 1.24 
Month 23 0.0099 0.387 0.1392 1.408 0.2846 1.40 
Month 24 0.0157 0.787 0.1548 1.585 0.2029 1.09 
Month 25 0.0077 0.338 0.1626 1.546 0.2243 1.07 
Month 26 -0.0176 -0.639 0.1449 
1.359 0.1657 0.83 
Month 27 0.0269 1.138 0.1718 1.540 0.1910 1.00 
Month 28 0.0086 0.605 0.1804 1.632 0.1247 0.63 
Month 29 0.0065 0.239 0.1869 1.555 0.1314 0.64 
Month 30 0.0175 0.802 0.2043 1.664 0.1980 0.80 
Month 31 -0.0069 -0.279 0.1974 
1.606 0.2941 1.34 
Month 32 -0.0067 -0.275 0.1907 
1.425 0.1960 0.75 
Month 33 0.0171 0.754 0.2078 1.608 0.1856 0.80 
Month 34 0.0437 1.526 0.2515 1.813 0.2021 0.85 
Month 35 0.0271 1.016 0.2786 1.883 0.2360 1.01 
Month 36 -0.0026 -0.110 
0.2760 1.765 0.2829 1.14 
Figure 6.17 shows the three years post acquisition average CARs of overlapping 
bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds. In 
contrast with Figure 6.16, Figure 6.17 shows a strong pattern of returns, 
the CARs 
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consistently rise after the completion of the acquisition and finally reached 28% in the 
end of the three years period. However, all these monthly CARs are statistically 
insignificant different from zero. 
Figure 6.17. Overlapping bidding firms (94-98, held <3% by 
institutional funds) three years post acquisition average 
CARs 
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Table 6.25.1 presents the one, two, and three years post acquisition CARs and BHARs 
of overlapping firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional funds. 
All the CARs are positive and insignificant, however, the t-value and the P-value of the 
three-year CAR are inconsistent. According to the P-value, the three-year CAR is 
significant at 5% significance level. All the BHARs are positive, the three-year BHAR 
are statistically significant according to the t-statistics, however, according to the P- 
values, the two- and three-year BHARs are statistically significant at 5% significance 
level. Table 6.25.2 reports three intercept terms that are statistically insignificant at 5% 
significance level, and their t- and P-values are consistent with each other. Thus, 
by 
comparing the results shown in Table 6.23, we find some evidence that 
institutional 
holding overlapping bidding firms underperform their non-institutional holding 
counterparts, and this is against the hypothesized monitoring role of 
institutional funds. 
265 
Table 6.25. Overlapping Bidding firms (1994-1998, held<3% by institutional funds) three years 
post acquisition average CARs and BHARs 
There are 24 UK overlapping bidding firms that are not largely or/and consistently held by institutional 
funds involved in the acquisition during 1994-1998 periods. Table 6.25.1 reports the result calculated by 
using the control firms approach. Table 6.25.2 presents the result calculated by using the Fama-French 
three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the 
average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firins. (x is the mean intercept term of Fama- 
French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean (x multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the 
CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values calculated by using the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table 6.25.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 0.0303 0.512 0.710 
1 to 24 0.1548 1.585 0.059 
1 to 36 0.2760 1.765 0.042 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 0.0369 0.576 0.668 
1 to 24 0.2058 1.829 0.049 
1 to 36 0.4726* 2.295 0.022 
Table 6.25.2 
EM T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0011 -0.226 0.658 -0.0132 
1 to 24 0.0025 0.599 0.617 0.0600 
1 to 36 0.0037 1.313 0.310 0.1332 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Consistent with Figure 6.12 and 6.15, Figure 6.18 shows overlapping bidding firms that 
are not largely or/and consistent held by institutional funds outperform their institutional 
holding counterparts in all the 36 month after the completion of the takeover. However, 
none of the CARs in Figure 6.18 are statistically significant different from zero at 5% 
significance level two-sided t-test. 
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Figure 6.18. Three years post acquisition average CARs of all, 
institutional holding and non-institutional holding overlapping 
bidding firms 1994-1998 
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A: all the overlapping bidding firms. 
H: overlapping bidding firms largely and consistently held by institutional funds. 
N: overlapping bidding firms not largely or/and consistently held by institutional 
funds. 
In sum, after examining and comparing the three years post acquisition stock returns of 
three pairs of sub-samples (institutional holding bidding firms vs. non-institutional 
holding bidding firins; institutional holding non-overlapping bidding finns vs. non- 
institutional holding non-overlapping bidding firms; institutional holding overlapping 
bidding finns vs. non-institutional holding overlapping bidding firms), we do not find 
any evidence in supporting the monitoring role of institutional funds, and we even 
obtain some evidence against it. Thus, we conclude that no obvious or significant 
monitoring role of institutional funds have been observed in the three years after the 
acquisition. 
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5. Conclusion 
This chapter examines two controversial hypothesises regarding the monitoring role of 
institutional funds through a new framework of the long-run stock returns of UK 
corporate takeovers. Since it is long argued that institutional funds are finance 
professionals with special expertise in corporate governance and investment 
management, if they are indeed monitoring firms, we would expect that stock returns of 
bidding firms with high level of institutional funds ownership outperfon-n their 
counterparts with low or without institutional ownership in the long-run before and after 
the corporate takeover event. 
We separate our investigation into two stages. Firstly, we examine monitoring role of 
institutional funds through investigating bidding finns three years pre-acquisition stock 
returns. We construct three pairs of sub-samples (institutional holding bidding firms vs. 
non-institutional holding bidding finns; institutional holding non-overlapping bidding 
firms vs. non-institutional holding non-overlapping bidding firms; institutional holding 
overlapping bidding finns vs. non-institutional holding overlapping bidding firms), and 
then calculate and compare their three years pre-acquisition stock returns of each paired 
sub-samples. We do not find any evidence that bidding firms with high level of 
institutional funds ownership outperform their counterparts with low or without this 
institutional ownership in three years prior to the takeover, thus no monitoring role has 
been detected in the three-year pre-acquisition stage. 
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Secondly, we turn to examine bidding firms three years post acquisition stock returns. 
In line with the pre-acquisition stage, we once again construct three pairs of sub- 
samples and compare their performance. Consistent with the findings of the pre- 
acquisition stage, we still do not find any evidence that institutional -holding bidding 
firms outperform their peers with low or non- institutional holdings in three years after 
the takeover. On the contrary, some evidence has been detected that low or non- 
institutional holding bidding firms significantly outperform their institutional holding 
counterparts in the three years post acquisition period, and this is against the active 
monitoring role hypothesis. 
Put together, we do not find any evidence of active monitoring role of institutional 
funds in both three years pre- and post acquisition period, this observed evidence may 
be due to the incapability of institutional funds to monitor firms, such as their passivity, 
myopic goals, legal constraints, and conflict of interests. In a word, we cast our doubt 
on the monitoring role of institutional funds to the firms in which they hold large stakes. 
269 
Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
Mergers and acquisitions is one of the most researched areas in finance. Most research 
on the financial performance of mergers and acquisitions has focused on stock returns 
of target and bidding firms surrounding the takeover announcement and completion 
dates. Virtually all researchers have reported that target firm shareholders either 
successful or unsuccessful earn large significant positive abnormal returns from the 
takeover. Bidding firm shareholders break even or earn a small significant abnormal 
return around the time of acquisition. 
In comparing with the research on announcement or completion period returns, only a 
small body of work has devoted to the investigation of long-run pre- or post acquisition 
stock returns to both target and bidding firms. Although the results are not all one-sided, 
a majority of studies (both in the UK and the US) have reported a long-run significant 
abnormal return to target and bidding firms in a few years prior to the takeover 
announcement, and a long-run significant abnormal return to the bidding finns in 
several years after the completion of the acquisition. Because these findings are 
inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), they remain as anomalies to 
us, and these anomalies make the research on the long-run stock returns of corporate 
takeovers particularly interesting to us. 
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1. Conclusions 
In Chapter 1, the motivation and the objectives of the present thesis are briefly 
introduced and an overview of the main points addressed in the following chapters is 
presented. Chapter 2 aims to provide a contemporary and comprehensive review of the 
key points in the mergers and acquisitions literature, especially on the shareholders' 
wealth effects of corporate takeovers. We discuss the motives for takeovers and analyse 
the size effect and the impact of methods of payment to shareholders' returns. We 
review a few key papers of the past three decades that have a great contribution to the 
development of the M&A literature. We then critically analyse the stock returns to 
both target and bidding firms in the entire acquisition process (i. e., from several years 
prior to the takeover announcement to a few years after the completion of the takeover) 
and surnmarise the previous findings on each stage of the takeover process. Finally, we 
provide a detailed review of the methodologies that have been applied in all these 
previous studies. Thus, Chapter 2 presents a general background of researches on the 
financial performance of mergers and acquisitions, and the empirical issues addressed in 
the following empirical chapters are derived on the limitations of the existing findings 
on mergers and acquisitions. 
Chapter 3 is the methodological chapter of this thesis; it presents all the methodologies 
that we apply in this thesis. In Chapter 3, we firstly discuss and analyze the 
misspecification problems associated with previous methodologies in detecting the 
long-run abnonnal. stock returns. We then introduce the Control Firms Approach 
advanced by Barber and Lyon (1997). Since the control firms approach minimizes the 
271 
chances that the test statistics are misspecified, we set this approach as our main method 
to calculate the CARs and the BHARs throughout the whole thesis. In addition to the 
control firms approach, we also present the Fama-French three-factor model as an 
alternative to calculate the CARs. Finally, Chapter 3 describes both the conventional 
parametric t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test; both of them are 
used as the test statistics throughout the empirical chapters. 
In Chapter 4, we test the validity of the control firms approach advanced by Barber and 
Lyon (1997) in the countries such as UK where the listed firms have various accounting 
year endings. We apply both CAR and BHAR to calculate the long-run abnormal stock 
returns for our sample firms under Barber and Lyon's approach and other approaches 
according to firms' accounting year endings, and test the differences of these abnonnal 
returns calculated under these different approaches. Our findings are remarkably 
consistent. We do not find any statistically significant difference from either the CARs 
or the BHARs calculated under the Barber and Lyon's approach and other 
corresponding approaches. We conclude that at least in our case there is no statistically 
significant difference of the long-run abnormal stock returns calculated under the 
Barber and Lyon's approach and the approaches according to firms' accounting year 
endings. In a word, we find that the differences of the accounting year endings of the 
UK firms will not significantly affect the validity of Barber and Lyon's control firms 
approach. 
In Chapter 5, we apply the control firms approach and Fama-French three-factor model 
as an alternative to examine the impact of overlapping returns, takeover premiums, and 
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methods of payment to the long-run post acquisition stock returns. Firstly, in contrast to 
most previous studies, we do not find any statistically significant three-year post 
acquisition abnormal stock returns for the UK bidding firms in the 1990s; our results are 
consistent with the EMH. Secondly, we find that overlapping returns do inflate the test 
statistics as argued by Lyon et al (1999) through inflating the long-run post acquisition 
average stock returns. Thirdly, after a full scale of investigation of takeover premiums, 
we find an optimal premium region for the bidding firms to takeover the targets. We 
also reject the explanation that the previous evidence of long-run post acquisition 
negative abnormal returns is due to a delayed market reaction to overpriced takeovers. 
Fourthly, we find that stock offer underperforms the other three offers in two years after 
the completion of the takeover. Finally, we find that Fama-French three-factor model is 
severely mis-specified by indicating abnormal performance too frequently. We conclude 
that previous findings of statistically significant long-run post acquisition abnormal 
returns are more likely caused by the five biases argued by Lyon et al (1999), and that 
leads to the mi s- specification of the test statistics. 
In Chapter 6, we apply the control firms approach and the Fama-French three-factor 
model as an alternative to examine the monitoring role of institutional funds through a 
new framework of long-run stock returns of corporate takeovers. We firstly test the 
monitoring role by examining bidding firms (with large level of institutional ownership 
or with low or without this ownership) three years pre-acquisition stock returns; we do 
not find any evidence in supporting the monitoring role of institutional funds in this pre- 
acquisition stage. Secondly, we turn to investigate the monitoring role by examine 
bidding firins (with large level of institutional ownership or with low or without this 
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ownership) three years post acquisition stock returns, we once again fail to find any 
evidence in favour of the monitoring role of institutional funds, on the contrary, even 
some evidence against the monitoring role has been detected in the three years post 
acquisition period. Put together, we cast our doubt on the monitoring role of 
institutional funds to the companies in which they hold large stakes. 
4 
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7.2. Suggestionsfor Future Research 
In the present thesis, we have re-examined the long-run pre- and post acquisition stock 
returns of UK bidding firms. In Chapter 6, we report that we do not find any 
statistically significant pre-acquisition abnormal returns for the UK bidding firms. In 
Chapter 5, the same results are presented to the UK bidding finus in the post acquisition 
period. These findings are inconsistent with most previous studies that report a 
significant positive pre-acquisition abnormal returns and a significant negative post 
acquisition abnormal returns to the bidding firms. However, our results are consistent 
with the efficient market hypothesis and in line with several most recent studies9 that 
resolve the statistically significant long-run anomalies in quite a few corporate events. 
Since a majority of previous studieslo have also reported a long-run pre-acquisition 
significant negative abnormal return' 1 to the target firms, and we think the detected 
underperformance of target firms in the pre-takeover period may also be resolved by 
applying the new methodologies that eliminate the chances of mis specification to the 
parametric t-test. Thus, we suggest that the issue of underperformance of target firms in 
the pre-acquisition period would better be revisited. 
9A few researchers have recently reexamined the anomalies that were previously reported in the event 
studies. See, for example, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) does not find any statistically significant long-run 
anomalies in corporate takeovers; share repurchases, and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Brav et al 
(2000) have resolved the long-run anomalies associated with SEOs and IPO. Eckbo et al (2000) and 
Eckbo and Norli (2000) have resolved the long-run anomalies associated with SEOs and IPO 
respectively. Gompers and Lerner (2001) have resolved the long-run anomalies associated with IPO. 
Boehme and Sorescu (2002) have resolved the anomalies following dividend initiations and resumptions. 
'0 Most previous studies regarding the long-run pre-acquisition stock returns of target firms are written in 
a long time ago, and mainly conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s, with the sample period prior to the 
1980. 
11 See, for example, Mandelker (1974), Ellert (1976), Langetieg (1978), Firth (1979), Asquith (1983), 
Malatesta (1983). This list is by no means exhaustive. 
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Furthermore, in Chapter 5, we have examined the bidding firms long-run post 
acquisition stock returns based on various takeover premiums and methods of payment. 
Since bidding firms experience different stock returns with offering different premiums 
or methods of payment, there must be some distinctive characteristics of these fin-ns to 
offer different premiums or payments. These characteristics could be similar size or 
book-to-market ratio of a group of bidding firms that offer one kind of premiums or 
payments. In addition, what kinds of long-run pre-acquisition stock return of each group 
of bidding firms (according to the premium or payment) are? Do these different pre- 
acquisition stock returns affect the bidding firms' decision-making on offering takeover 
premiums or methods of payment. Finally, what kind of relationship between takeover 
premiums and methods of payment? Are the premiums and payments mutually 
affected? We believe it would be interesting to explore the above questions. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, we compare the pre- and post acquisition stock returns of bidding 
firms with large level of institutional funds ownership or with low or without this 
ownership. What are the characteristics of some bidding firms that are particularly 
interested to the institutional funds and attract them to hold a large stake? Are there 
significant differences, for example, size, book-to-market ratio, and eamings/share etc., 
between the bidding firms largely held by institutional funds and the bidding firms with 
low or without institutional ownership? It demands further investigation. 
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Appendix 1. Long-Run Post Acquisition Stock Returns and the Impact of 
Overlapping Returns: A Sub-Sample (1995-1998) 
Table Al. 1 reports bidding firms (1995-1998) three years post acquisition average ARs 
and CARs. Three monthly average ARs are significant at 5% two-sided t-test. They are 
month 15, month 18, and month 28, that is consistent with the results reported in Table 
5.2 for the UK bidding firms of 1991-1998 periods. Comparing to the CARs presented 
in Table 5.2,2 out of 14 CARs are statistically significant different from zero in the first 
14 months, while the t-values of other 12 CARs are quite big and close to the significant 
point. There is no CAR significant from month 15 to month 36, which is consistent with 
previous evidence. 
Table ALL Bidding firms (1995-1998) three-year post acquisition average ARs and CARs 
There are 112 UK bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1995-1998 periods. AR is the 
monthly average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return 
of all the bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0122 -1.215 -0.0122 -1.215 
Month 2 -0.0173 -1.859 -0.0294* -2.122 
Month 3 -0.0203 -1.809 -0.0497* -2.686 
Month 4 0.0056 0.416 -0.0441 -1.908 
Month 5 -0.0047 -0.421 -0.0489 -1.805 
Month 6 -0.0053 -0.517 -0.0542 -1.755 
Month 7 -0.0147 -1.283 -0.0689 -1.946 
Month 8 -0.0024 -0.176 -0.0713 -1.776 
Month 9 -0.0153 -1.132 -0.0866 -1.952 
Month 10 -0.0036 -0.334 -0.0902 -1.896 
Month 11 -0.0048 -0.302 -0.0950 -1.883 
Month 12 0.0011 0.113 -0.0939 -1.804 
Month 13 0.0064 0.437 -0.0875 -1.650 
Month 14 -0.0029 -0.212 -0.0903 -1.568 
Month 15 0.0266* 2.092 -0.0637 -1.092 
Month 16 0.0226 1.691 -0.0411 -0.686 
Month 17 -0.0142 -0.860 -0.0553 -0.880 
Month 18 0.0384* 2.736 -0.0170 -0.253 
Month 19 -0.0030 -0.259 -0.0200 -0.301 
Month 20 -0.0189 -1.387 -0.0388 -0.558 
Month 21 0.0019 0.126 -0.0369 -0.517 
Month 22 -0.0007 -0.049 -0.0377 -0.515 
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Month 23 -0.0121 -0.696 -0.0498 -0.667 Month 24 0.0112 0.829 -0.0386 -0.530 Month 25 -0.0141 -0-995 -0.0527 -0.704 Month 26 0.0214 1.463 -0.0313 -0.412 Month 27 0.0102 0.565 -0.0211 -0.280 Month 28 0.0317* 2.036 0.0105 0.140 
Month 29 0.0131 0.814 0.0237 0.306 
Month 30 0.0140 0.862 0.0377 0.474 
Month 31 0.0070 0.443 0.0447 0.554 
Month 32 0.0129 0.775 0.0576 0.718 
Month 33 -0.0028 -0.195 0.0549 0.692 Month 34 0.0139 0.872 0.0687 0.859 
Month 35 0.0188 1.118 0.0876 1.085 
Month 36 -0.0268 -1.441 0.0607 0.721 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Figure Al. 1 shows the bidding firms (1995-1998) three-year post acquisition monthly 
average CARs. We find that the return pattern is closely consistent with our findings of 
bidding firms in 1991-1998 periods shown in Figure 5.1. However, it is only two points 
significant in the first 14 months (though the t-values are quite big for other months), 
while 11 out of 14 points are significant in Figure 5.1. 
0.1 
0.05 
0 
0 
0.05 
E 0.1 
-0.15 
Figure Al. l. Bidding firms (95-98) three-year post acquisition 
average CARs 
74 0 
Event Month 1 to 36 
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Table A1.2.1 presents bidding firms (1995-1998) three years post acquisition average 
CARs and average BHARs, their t-statistics and the nonparametric p-values. None of 
the CARs in the three periods are statistically significant different from zero at the 5% 
significance level according to both t-statistics and p-values. On the other hand, the first 
year BHAR is statistically significant at 5% significance level based on the t-statistics, 
while none of them is significant according to the nonparametric p-values. Because the 
first year t-values are inconsistent with the corresponding p-values, the higher t-values 
might be inflated by the overlapping returns. In the long-run, both the three-year CAR 
and the three-year BHAR are positive and economically significant, but they are again 
statistically insignificant different from zero. Consistent with Table 5.3.2, Table Al. 2.2 
reports three significant negative intercept terms and hence three significant implied 
negative CARs, these are consistent with the majority of previous studies that find a 
significant negative long-run post acquisition stock returns. Comparing Table A1.2.1 
with Table 5.3.1, we find that not only the three-year CARs and the three-year BHARs, 
but also their t-values and p-values are remarkably similar, It indicates that removing a 
four-year sub-sample (1991-1994) do not significantly affect the general results of the 
bidding firms three-year post acquisition abnormal returns in the 1990s. 
Table A1.2. Bidding firms (1995-1998) three-year post acquisition average CAR and BRAR 
There are 112 UK bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1995-1998 periods. Table Al-2.1 
reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. Table A1.2.2 presents the result 
calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return 
of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnonnal return of all the bidding firms. (Y. 
is the mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean (x multiplying 
by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values 
calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table A1.2.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.0939 -1.804 0.326 
1 to 24 -0.0386 -0.530 0.552 
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1 to 36 0.0607 0.721 0.359 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0-1035* -2.037 0.267 1 to 24 -0.080 -1.158 0.495 1 to 36 0.0795 0.856 0.215 
Table A1.2.2 
EM (X T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0107* -3.121 0.010 -0.1284 1 to 24 -0-0108* -5.164 0.000 -0.2592 1 to 36 -0.0087* -5.023 0.000 -0.3132 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
To show why the average three-year CAR and the average three-year BHAR are 
statistically insignificant different from zero, we once again use the scatter charts to 
show the CAR and BHAR observations. Figure A1.2 and Figure A1.3 plot all the three- 
year CAR and BHAR observations for the UK biding firms of 1995-1998 periods. Both 
Figures show the observations are randomly fall up and down the zero line, and no 
obvious pattern (either a positive trend or a negative trend) can be found from the 
figures. It indicates why both the three-year average CAR and average BHAR are 
statistically insignificant different from zero. 
Figure A1.2.112 average CAR observations 1995-1998 
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Figure A1.3.112 BHAR observations 1995-1998 
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To check and to confirm the previous findings of overlapping returns effect, we remove 
the overlapping firms from our 1995-1998 sub-samples, and re-examine the overlapping 
returns effect. Table A 1.3 reports the non-overlapping bidding firms (1995-1998) three- 
year post acquisition monthly average ARs and CARs. 4 out of 36 monthly average 
ARs are significant at 5% two-sided test. 12 out of 14 monthly average CARs are 
statistically significant in the first 14 months, and no CARs are significant in the rest of 
22 months. It is remarkably consistent with our findings reported in Table 5.4. 
Table A1.3. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1995-1998) three-year post acquisition average ARs 
and CARs 
There are 89 UK non-overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1995-1998 periods. 
AR is the monthly average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average 
abnormal return of all the bidding fin-ns. T-statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the 
table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0108 -0.946 -0.0108 -0.946 
Month 2 -0.0228* -2.161 -0.0336* -2.066 
Month 3 -0.0293* -2.223 -0.0628* -2.847 
Month 4 0.0002 0.013 -0.0626* -2.306 
Month 5 -0.0174 -1.327 -0.0800* -2.566 
Month 6 -0-0007 -0.056 -0.0807* -2.241 
Month 7 -0.0128 -0.957 -0.0935* -2.223 
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Month 8 0.0064 0.445 -0.0871 -1.885 Month 9 -0.0239 -1.488 -0.1110* -2.153 Month 10 -0-0112 -0.932 -0.1222* -2.151 Month 11 -0.0127 -0.675 -0.1349* -2.262 Month 12 -0-0039 -0.334 -0.1388* -2.272 Month 13 0.0120 0.686 -0.1268* -2.044 Month 14 -0.0089 -0.537 -0.1357* -1.992 Month 15 0.0364* 2.406 -0.0993 -1.430 Month 16 0.0183 1.139 -0.0810 -1.139 Month 17 -0.0184 -0.934 -0.0994 -1.344 Month 18 0.0481 * 2.910 -0.0513 -0.645 Month 19 0.0006 0.046 -0.0507 -0.652 Month 20 -0.0272 -1.678 -0.0779 -0.955 Month 21 0.0115 0.719 -0.0664 -0.785 Month 22 0.0092 0.541 -0.0572 -0.652 Month 23 -0.0132 -0.708 -0.0704 -0.788 Month 24 -0.0033 -0.221 -0.0736 -0.844 Month 25 -0.0079 -0.473 -0.0815 -0.909 Month 26 0.0310 1.846 -0.0506 -0.553 Month 27 0.0134 0.654 -0.0372 -0.409 Month 28 0.0341 1.893 -0.0031 -0.034 
Month 29 0.0111 0.594 0.0080 0.086 
Month 30 0.0062 0.323 0.0142 0.149 
Month 31 0.0235 1.317 0.0377 0.391 
Month 32 0.0129 0.692 0.0506 0.537 
Month 33 -0.0126 -0.823 0.0380 0.404 
Month 34 0.0131 0.700 0.0511 0.543 
Month 35 0.0186 0.926 0.0696 0.739 
Month 36 -0.0208 -0.940 0.0488 0.494 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Figure AIA shows the three-year post acquisition monthly average CARs of non- 
overlapping bidding firms. It follows a similar return pattern with the results of the 
whole sample shown in Figure Al. 1. The CARs are consistently negative until month 
29, and then it becomes positive in the rest of months. Comparing these two Figures, we 
find that non-overlapping firms experience a lower abnormal return than the whole 
sample. It also confirms our previous findings that the higher long-run stock returns of 
the whole sample (comparing to the non-overlapping sample) are inflated by the 
overlapping returns. 
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Figure A1.4. Non-overlapping bidding firms (95-98) three-year 
post acquisition average CARs 
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Table A1.4.1 reports the non-overlapping bidding firms three years post acquisition 
average CARs and average BHARs, their t-statistics, and p-values. Consistent with the 
results reported in Table 5.5.1 for the non-overlapping UK bidding fin-ns in 1991-1998 
sample period, the first year CAR of 1995-1998 sample period is statistically significant 
different from zero at the 5% significance level. Furthermore, the first year BHAR is 
also statistically significant, while the second year BHAR is not significant as reported 
in the Table 5.5.1. To take a look for the longer period, both the three-year average 
CAR and the three-year average BHAR are positive and economically small, but once 
again they are statistically insignificant. By comparing Table Al-2-1 and Table Al-4-1, 
we find that all the CARs and BHARS in Table A 1.2.1 are bigger than their counterparts 
in Table A 1.4.1. Based on our previous findings, the higher average abnormal returns in 
Table A1.2.1 must be inflated by the overlapping returns. If we take a close look at their 
t-values and p-values, we find that the results are inconsistent in Table A 1.2.1. The first 
year CAR and the first and BHAR are statistically significant at 5% or 10% significance 
level based on their t-statistics, howeverý their p-values tell us they are not significant at 
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the 5% or 10% significance level. On the contrary, after removing the overlapping 
returns, Table A 1.4.1 presents a consistent story. 
Consistent with Table 5.3.2, Table 5.5.2, and Table Al. 2.2, Table Al. 4.2, by using the 
Fama-French three-factor model, once again reports three significant negative intercept 
terms with large implied negative CARs. It is inconsistent with our results calculated by 
using the control firms approach, and particularly the three-year CARs. In Table 5.3.1, 
Table 5.5.1, Table A1.2.1, and Table A1.4.1, we all report a positive but insignificant 
three-year CARs. However, the three-factor model provides us large negative and 
significant three-year CARs. This may well confirm the evidence given by Barber and 
Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997), the Fama-French three-factor model are 
severely mis-specified, and has significantly over-rejected the null hypothesis of no 
abnormal performance. 
Table AIA Non-overlapping Bidding firms (1995-1998) three-year post acquisition average CARs 
and BHARs 
There are 89 UK non-overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1995-1998 periods. 
Table A1.4.1 reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. Table A1.4.2 presents the 
result calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnormal 
return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding 
firms. (x is the mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean (X 
multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P- 
values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table A1.4.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.1388* -2.272 0.047 
1 to 24 -0.0736 -0.844 0.268 
I to 36 0.0488 0.494 0.616 
EM BRAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.1585* -2.663 0.041 
1 to 24 -0.1312 -1.598 0.166 
1 to 36 0.0677 0.639 0.642 
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Table A1.4.2 
EM cc T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0-0115* -2.809 0.037 -0.1380 
1 to 24 -0.0119* -4.677 0.000 -0.2856 
1 to 36 -0.0105* -5.036 0.000 -0.3780 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Because the three-year average CAR (about 5%) and the three-year average BHAR 
(about 7%) are economically significant, it is once again necessary to use the scatter 
charts to show why the mean of the CAR and BHAR observations are statistically 
insignificant different from zero. Figure Al. 5 and Figure Al. 6 plot all the three-year 
CAR and BHAR observations for the non-overlapping biding firms of 1995-1998 
sample periods. Both Figures show the observations are randomly fall up and down the 
zero line, and no obvious pattern (either a positive trend or a negative trend) can be 
found from the figures. It indicates why both the three-year average CAR and average 
BHAR are statistically insignificant different from zero. 
Figure A1.5.89 three-year non-overlapping CAR 
observations 1995-1998 
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To double-check the impact of overlapping returns, we examine the three-year post 
acquisition abnormal returns of a sample (1995-1998) that contains all the overlapping 
bidding firms. The long-run abnormal returns of overlapping firms are essential for us 
to find out the overlapping returns effect and to reaffirm our previous findings. 
Table Al. 5 reports the three-year post acquisition average ARs and CARs of the 
overlapping firms. Two monthly average ARs are significant at 5% significance level, 
two-sided Mest, and none of the CARs are statistically significant different from zero at 
the 5% significance level. It is closely consistent with the finding reported in Table 5.6 
for the overlapping bidding firms of 1991-1998 sample period. Although they are 
statistically insignificant, the average monthly CARs show a strong pattern of returns of 
overlapping firms, 33 out of 36 monthly average CARs are positive. 
Table A1.5. Overlapping bidding firms (1995-1998) three-year post acquisition average ARs and 
CARs 
There are 23 UK overlapping bidding finiis involved in the acquisitions during 1995-1998 periods. AR is 
the monthly average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal 
return of all the bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the table. 
Figure A1.6.89 three-year non-overlapping BHAR 
observations 1995-1998 
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EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0174 -0.829 -0.0174 -0.829 
Month 2 0.0040 0.204 -0.0134 -0.536 
Month 3 0.0145 0.792 0.0011 0.041 
Month 4 0.0263 1.095 0.0274 0.720 
Month 5 0.0442* 2.458 0.0716 1.544 
Month 6 -0.0232 -1.390 0.0484 0.923 
Month 7 -0.0223 -1.016 0.0261 0.481 
Month 8 -0.0363 -1.057 -0.0102 -0.128 
Month 9 0.0182 0.896 0.0080 0.098 
Month 10 0.0256 1.009 0.0336 0.485 
Month 11 0.0260 1.115 0.0596 0.767 
Month 12 0.0205 1.088 0.0801 0.957 
Month 13 -0.0154 -0.699 0.0647 0.716 
Month 14 0.0203 1.179 0.0850 0.953 
Month 15 -0.0111 -0.587 0.0739 0.831 
Month 16 0.0394 1.981 0.1133 1.223 
Month 17 0.0019 0.073 0.1152 1.105 
Month 18 0.0006 0.028 0.1158 1.061 
Month 19 -0-0169 -0.736 0.0989 0.853 
Month 20 0.0136 0.679 0.1125 0.937 
Month 21 -0.0354 -0.955 0.0771 0.657 
Month 22 -0.0393 -1.323 0.0378 0.343 
Month 23 -0.0079 -0.174 0.0299 0.261 
Month 24 0.0670* 2.183 0.0968 0.902 
Month 25 -0.0381 -1.598 0.0587 0.521 
Month 26 -0.0157 -0.546 0.0430 0.388 
Month 27 -0.0021 -0.054 0.0409 0.367 
Month 28 0.0222 0.736 0.0631 0.529 
Month 29 0.0212 0.658 0.0843 0.708 
Month 30 0.0442 1.662 0.1285 1.063 
Month 31 -0.0569 -1.836 0.0716 0.575 
Month 32 0.0131 0.342 0.0848 0.591 
Month 33 0.0354 1.025 0.1202 0.903 
Month 34 0.0169 0.592 0.1371 0.966 
Month 35 0.0198 0.731 0.1569 1.053 
Month 36 -0.0501 -1.668 0.1068 0.708 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
Figure Al. 7 shows the overlapping bidding finns (1995-1998) three-year post 
acquisition CARs. It presents a strong pattern of performance. The CARs rise 
consistently after the event month, and the vast majority (33 out 36) of monthly average 
CARs are positive. Thus, we can see that the higher returns shown in Figure Al. 1 
comparing to Figure A 1.4 are solely driven by the overlapping returns. 
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Figure A1.7. Overlapping firms (95-98) three-year post 
acquisition average CARs 
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Table Al. 6.1 presents the overlapping bidding finns three years post acquisition 
average CARs and BHARs, their t-statistics, and p-values. Consistent with the results 
reported in Table 5.7.1, neither the CARs nor the BHARs are statistically significant 
different from zero at 5% significance level for all the three periods. The evidence from 
Table 5.7.1 and Table A1.6.1 also show that the longer the period after the completion 
of the takeovers, the higher the average abnormal returns to the UK bidding firms. Once 
again, we are able to confirm that the higher average three-years CARs and BHARs of 
the whole sample shown in Table 5.3.1 and Table Al. 2.1 comparing to that of the non- 
overlapping sample shown in Table 5.5.1 and Table Al. 4.1 are inflated by the high 
positive average abnormal returns of the overlapping returns. In contrast with Table 
5.7.2, Table Al. 6.2 reports three negative intercept terms, however, two of them are 
insignificant, and the other significant one may be due to the misspecification of the 
three-factor model. Thus, we can conclude that the long-run (one to three years) post 
acquisition abnormal stock returns of overlapping bidding firms, calculated 
by either the 
control firms approach or the Fama-French three-factor model, are statistically 
insignificant different from zero. 
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Table A1.6. Overlapping bidding firms (1995-1998) three-year post acquisition average CAR and 
BHAR 
There are 23 UK overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1995-1998 periods. Table 
A1.6.1 reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. Table A1.6.2 presents the result 
calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnon-nal return 
of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. cc 
is the mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean (X multiplying 
by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values 
calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table A1.6.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 0.0801 0.957 0.101 
1 to 24 0.0968 0.902 0.260 
1 to 36 0.1068 0.708 0.171 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 0.1092 1.408 0.078 
1 to 24 0.1184 1.154 0.162 
1 to 36 0.1253 0.643 0.068 
Table A1.6.2 
EM T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0077 -1.408 0.110 -0.0924 
1 to 24 -0.0068* -2.501 0.050 -0.1632 
1 to 36 -0.0019 -0.912 0.616 -0.0684 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
Figure Al. 8 puts Figure ALI, AIA, and Al. 7 together and compares their long-run 
post acquisition stock returns. Consistent with Figure 5.6, overlapping bidding finns 
outperform the other two, and non-overlapping bidding firms underperform the whole 
sample. It once again shows that overlapping returns have inflated the average returns of 
the whole sample, and that may well inflate the test-statistics of the whole sample and 
leads to an over-rejection of the null hypothesis. 
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Figure A1.8. Three years post acquisition average CARs of 
All, Overlapping and Non-overlapping bidding firms 1995- 
1998 
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A: all samples, non-overlapping and overlapping bidding firms. 
N: non-overlapping bidding firms. 
0: overlapping bidding firms. 
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Appendix 2. Bidding firms (1997-2001) long-run pre-acquisition stock returns 
Table A2.1 reports the three-year pre-acquisition average ARs (abnonnal returns), 
average CARs, and the t-statistics of 78 UK bidding firms from 1997 to 2001. As we 
can see that only 2 out of 36 average ARs are statistically significant at 5% two-sided t- 
test, the ARs of remaining 34 months are statistically insignificant different from zero. 
There is no CAR statistically significant different from zero. This result demonstrates 
that there are no statistically significant CARs for bidding firms in the three-year period 
prior to the takeover announcement. 
Table A2.1. Bidding firms (1997-2001) three years pre-acquisition average ARs and CARs 
There are 78 UK bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1997-2001 periods. AR is the monthly 
average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of all 
the bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month -36 0.0037 0.347 0.0037 0.347 
Month -35 0.0061 0.651 0.0098 0.702 
Month -34 -0.0157 -1.252 -0.0058 -0.315 
Month -33 0.0169 1.487 0.0111 0.458 
Month -32 -0.0089 -0.864 0.0022 0.076 
Month -31 -0.0099 -0.874 -0.0077 -0.238 
Month -30 -0.0197 -1.545 -0.0274 -0.773 
Month -29 -0.0079 -0.696 -0.0354 -0.944 
Month -28 -0.0055 -0.459 -0.0408 -0.954 
Month -27 -0.0016 -0.111 -0.0424 -0.884 
Month -26 -0.0213 -1.681 -0.0637 -1.216 
Month -25 -0.0255 -1.720 -0.0892 -1.715 
Month -24 0.0101 0.978 -0.0791 -1.560 
Month -23 0.0287 1.726 -0.0504 -1.032 
Month -22 -0.0077 -0.630 -0.0580 -1.100 
Month -21 0.0060 0.473 -0.0520 -0.975 
Month -20 0.0154 1.036 -0.0366 -0.662 
Month -19 -0.0118 -0.851 -0.0484 -0.885 
Month -18 0.0182 1.379 -0.0302 -0.537 
Month -17 0.0092 0.628 -0.0210 -0.361 
Month -16 0.0113 0.818 -0.0097 -0.165 
Month -15 -0.0107 -0.631 -0.0204 -0.320 
Month -14 0.0052 0.379 -0.0152 -0.229 
Month -13 0.0109 0.702 -0.0043 -0.062 
Month -12 0.0194 1.330 0.0151_ 
0.203 
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Month -11 0.0143 0.700 0.0293 0.379 
Month -10 -0.0048 -0.295 0.0245 0.321 
Month -9 0.0146 0.950 0.0391 0.492 
Month -8 -0.0329* -2.202 0.0061 0.075 
Month -7 -0.0056 -0.446 0.0006 0.007 
Month -6 0.0123 1.126 0.0129 0.157 
Month -5 0.0138 1.024 0.0267 0.315 
Month -4 0.0130 0.777 0.0397 0.455 
Month -3 -0.0235 -1.580 0.0162 0.179 
Month -2 0.0443* 2.336 0.0605 0.662 
Month -1 0.0224 0.846 0.0829 0.870 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Figure A2.1 shows the trend of 36 months CARs. As we can see that CARs continually 
fall from the event month -36 to -25, and start to rise consistently from month -24 to 
the month -1. It presents that bidding firms start to experience positive abnormal returns 
two years prior to the announcements of takeover bids. However, these CARs are 
statistically insignificant different from zero. 
0. 
Figure A2.1. Bidding firms (97-01) three-year pre- 
acquisition average CARs 
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Table A2.2.1 presents bidding finns one, two, and three years pre-acquisition CARs and 
BHARs, their t-statistics and P-values. It is clearly shown that there are no statistically 
significant CARs or BHARs in one-, two-, and three-year prior to the takeover 
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announcement 12 , all the t-statistics and P-values but one are consistent with each other. 
Table A2.2.2 also reports three insignificant intercept terms. Thus, based on these 
results, we conclude that bidding firms do not experience a statistically significant 
positive abnormal returns in three years prior to the announcements of takeover bids. 
Table A2.2. Bidding firms (1997-2001) three years pre-acquisition average CARs and BHARs 
There are 78 UK bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1997-2001 periods. Table A2.2.1 
reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. Table A2.2.2 presents the result 
calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnon-nal return 
of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firins. (x 
is the mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean (x multiplying 
by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values 
calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table A2.2.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.0872 1.397 0.268 
-24 to -1 0.1721 1.955 0.024 
-36 to -1 0.0829 0.870 0.393 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.1619 1.797 0.144 
-24 to -1 0.1089 0.462 0.190 
-36 to -1 -0.0282 -0.102 0.350 
Table A2.2.2 
EM OL T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
-12 to -1 0.0073 1.578 0.501 0.0876 
-24 to -1 0.0036 1.421 0.352 0.0864 
-36 to -1 -0.0011 -0.631 0.310 -0.0396 
We have so far examined the bidding firms (1997-2001) three years pre-acquisition 
stock returns. In line with most previous studies, we report a positive three-year CAR of 
12 Because the shareholding details are not available for dead companies at the time of investigation, our 
results shown above are calculated from the sample that has excluded the dead 
firms (less than 20 dead 
bidding finns have been omitted). However, we have also examined the sample that includes all the alive 
and dead bidding firms for the 1997-2001 sample period, the results remain the same, there are no 
statistically significant CARs and BHARs in one-, two- and three-year prior to the takeover 
announcement. For the purpose of this article and the space limit, we have omitted these results. 
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8.29%, and in contrast, we find a negative three-year BHAR of -2-82% 13 and a negative 
implied CAR of -3.96%, the results are inconsistent. However, all of them are 
statistically insignificant different from zero. Furthermore, we must acknowledge that 
the sample (1997-200 1) contains a proportion of overlapping firms, and the positive and 
negative three-year abnormal returns found above might be due to these overlapping 
returns. In Chapter 5, we find that overlapping returns inflate the test statistics 14 of a 
whole sample of takeover bidding firms that includes overlapping and non-overlapping 
bidding firms, and hence lead to a misleading inference. Thus, we remove the potential 
bias of overlapping returns by excluding the overlapping bidding firms from the whole 
sample, and reexamine the non-overlapping bidding firms three years pre-acquisition 
abnormal returns. 
Table A2.3 presents the non-overlapping bidding finns three years pre-acquisition ARs 
and CARs. All but one average abnormal returns are statistically insignificant, and all 
the CARs are statistically insignificant different from zero. It is consistent with the 
results reported in Table A2.1 that no CAR is statistically significant even after 
removing the overlapping returns. 
Table A2.3. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1997-2001) three years pre-acquisition average ARs 
and CARs 
There are 56 UK non-overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1997-2001 periods. 
AR is the monthly average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average 
abnormal return of all the bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the 
table. 
13 Most of previous studies in corporate takeovers have applied CAR to calculate the long-run abnormal 
returns, and only recently, the BHAR is applied to measure investors long-run experience. 
14 Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) argue that overlapping returns are the most severe form of cross- 
sectional dependence in the event study of long-run abnormal returns. They find that the lack of 
independence generated by overlapping returns yields misspecified test statistics, and suggest the only 
solution to this problem is to remove the sample of observations of overlapping returns. 
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EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month -36 0.0070 0.516 0.0070 0.516 
Month -35 0.0098 0.904 0.0168 0.977 
Month -34 0.0043 0.288 0.0211 0.951 
Month -33 0.0196 1.403 0.0407 1.389 
Month -32 -0.0034 -0.310 0.0373 1.146 Month -31 -0.0257 -1.884 0.0115 0.295 Month -30 -0.0113 -0.740 0.0002 0.006 Month -29 -0.0036 -0.253 -0.0033 -0.076 Month -28 -0.0055 -0.375 -0.0088 -0.173 Month -27 0.0131 0.987 0.0043 0.082 
Month -26 -0.0073 -0.465 -0.0030 -0.052 Month -25 -0.0205 -1.103 -0-0235 -0.432 Month -24 0.0134 1.043 -0.0101 -0.194 Month -23 0.0310 1.516 0.0209 0.400 
Month -22 -0.0148 -0-952 0.0061 0.105 Month -21 0.0074 0.455 0.0135 0.231 
Month -20 0.0201 1.137 0.0336 0.532 
Month -19 -0.0186 -1.219 0.0150 0.231 Month -18 0.0233 1.628 0.0383 0.578 
Month -17 0 -0.002 0.0383 0.538 Month -16 -0.0012 -0.094 0.0371 0.519 Month -15 -0.0230 -1.063 0.0140 0.175 Month -14 0.0075 0.440 0.0215 0.255 
Month -13 0.0044 0.239 0.0259 0.286 
Month -12 0.0206 1.163 0.0465 0.484 
Month -11 0.0226 0.834 0.0690 0.690 
Month -10 -0.0313 -1.565 0.0378 0.378 Month -9 0.0120 0.615 0.0498 0.482 
Month -8 -0.0287 -1.600 0.0211 0.198 Month -7 -0.0157 -1.113 0.0055 0.050 Month -6 0.0186 1.344 0.0241 0.224 
Month -5 0.0219 1.412 0.0460 0.418 
Month -4 0.0153 0.717 0.0612 0.541 
Month -3 -0.0343 -1.791 0.0269 0.229 
Month -2 0.0589* 2.640 0.0859 0.736 
Month -1 0.0317 0.880 0.1175 0.956 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
Figure A2.2 shows the three years pre-acquisition average CARs of the non-overlapping 
bidding firms. Almost all the monthly average CARs in Figure A2.2 are higher than the 
corresponding CARs in Figure A2.1. It means that non-overlapping bidding fin-ns 
outperform the whole sample in three years prior to the announcement of takeover bids, 
and it suggests that the overlapping returns have deflated the monthly average CARs of 
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the whole sample. However, consistent with Table A2.1, there no CARs are statistically 
significant different from zero. 
Figure A2.2. Non-overlapping bidding firms (97-01) three 
years pre-acquisition average CARs 
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Table A2.4.1 presents bidding firms one-, two-, and three-year pre-acquisition CARs 
and BHARs. their t-statistics and P-values. After removing the overlapping returns, 
Table A2.4.1 clearly shows that either the one-, two-, and three-year CARs or the 
corresponding BHARs are statistically insignificant different from zero at 5% 
significance level, and all the t-statistics and the P-values are consistent with each other. 
Table A2.4.2 also reports three insignificant intercept terms and the t-statistics are 
consistent with their P-values. This once again confirms our findings that there are no 
statistically significant abnormal returns for bidding fin-ns in three years prior to the 
takeover announcement. 
Table A2.4. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1997-2001) three years pre-acquisition average 
CARs 
and BHARs 
There are 56 UK non-overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions 
during 1997-2001 periods. 
Table A2.4.1 reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. 
Table A2.4.2 presents the 
result calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. 
CAR is the average cumulative abnormal 
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return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. Ot is the mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean (x 
multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P- 
values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table A2.4.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.0916 1.169 0.250 
-24 to -1 0.1410 1.260 0.093 
-36 to -1 0.1175 0.956 0.206 
ENT BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.1807 1.538 0.163 
-24 to -1 0.0140 0.043 0.123 
-36 to -1 -0.0444 -0.117 0.300 
Table A2.4.2 
EM T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
-12 to -1 0.0086 1.460 0.804 0.1032 
-24 to -1 0.0033 1.074 0.627 0.0792 
-36 to -1 -0.0002 -0.088 0.517 -0.0072 
By comparing Figure A2.1 and Figure A2.2, we argue overlapping returns might have 
deflated the bidding finus' returns as a whole. To explore this impact, we have to 
examine the three years pre-acquisition stock returns of a sample that contains all the 
overlapping bidding firms. Table A2.5 shows the three years pre-acquisition average 
abnormal returns and the average CARs of 22 overlapping bidding firms. Three average 
ARs are statistically significant at 5% significance level, and in contrast to Table A2.1 
and Table A2.3, Table A2.5 reports five significant CARs. However, most of the CARs 
of the overlapping bidding firms are still statistically insignificant at 5% significance 
level in a two-sided Mest. 
Table A2.5. Overlapping bidding firms (1997-2001) three years pre-acquisition average ARs and 
CARs 
There are 22 UK overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1997-2001 periods. 
AR is 
the monthly average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal 
return of all the bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given 
in the table. 
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EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month -36 -0.0046 -0.286 -0.0046 -0.286 Month -35 -0.0032 -0.164 -0.0078 -0.324 Month -34 -0.0666* -3.567 -0.0743* -2.590 Month -33 0.0100 0.517 -0.0643 -1.679 Month -32 -0.0229 -0.966 -0.0872 -1.618 Month -31 0.0304 1.715 -0.0568 -0.981 Month -30 -0.0411 -1.786 -0.0979 -1.549 Month -29 -0.0191 -1.010 -0.1169 -1.652 Month -28 -0.0055 -0.262 -0.1224 -1.558 Month -27 -0.0390 -1.042 -0.1614 -1.549 Month -26 -0-0569* -3.037 -0.2182 -2.012 Month -25 -0.0382 -1.642 -0.2565* -2.206 Month -24 0.0017 0.100 -0.2548* -2.204 Month -23 0.0230 0.805 -0.2318* -2.269 Month -22 0.0104 0.599 -0.2214 -2.043 
Month -21 0.0026 0.137 -0.2189 -1.973 Month -20 0.0036 0.127 -0.2153 -2.058 
Month -19 0.0056 0.186 -0.2097* -2.225 
Month -18 0.0052 0.174 -0.2045 -2.073 
Month - 17 0.0326 1.307 -0.1719 -1.835 
Month -16 0.0433 1.211 -0.1286 -1.311 
Month -15 0.0206 0.857 -0.1080 -1.121 
Month -14 -0.0008 -0.035 -0.1088 -1.112 
Month -13 0.0275 0.931 -0.0813 -0.866 
Month -12 0.0164 0.631 -0.0649 -0.671 
Month -11 -0.0068 -0.304 -0.0717 -0.705 
Month -10 0.0624* 2.718 -0.0093 -0.096 
Month -9 0.0210 0.938 0.0117 0.113 
Month -8 -0.0437 -1.588 -0.0320 -0.319 
Month -7 0.0202 0.791 -0.0119 -0.117 
Month -6 -0.0037 -0.226 -0.0155 -0.151 
Month -5 -0.0068 -0.254 -0.0223 -0.198 
Month -4 0.0073 0.292 -0.0151 -0.130 
Month -3 0.0039 0.202 -0.0111 -0.093 
Month -2 0.0071 0.199 -0.0041 -0.031 
Month -1 -0.0012 -0.056 -0.0052 -0.041 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
Figure A2.3 plots the overlapping bidding firms three years pre-acquisition CARs. It 
shows a consistent and large loss in the third year prior to the takeover announcement, 
and then the CARs rise consistently but still below or just close to zero. Overlapping 
bidding firms suffer the biggest loss between month -26 to month -18, the CARs are 
less than -20%, and they are significant or very close to significant 
in a 5% significance 
level. 
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Figure A2.3. Overlapping bidding firms (97-01) three years pre- 
acquisition average CARs 
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Table A2.6.1 shows that both the three-year CAR and the three-year BHAR are neither 
economically nor statistically significant. However, the two-year BHAR about 35% is 
statistically significant different from zero, and the two-year CAR about 25.1 % is also 
close to significance. Thus, although the overlapping bidding finns suffer a large loss at 
the third year prior to the takeover announcement, they experience large gains in two 
years before the announcement. However, the two-year BHAR of non-overlapping 
bidding firms and the bidding firms of the whole sample are statistically insignificant 
different from zero at 5% significance level. Consistent, Table A2.6.2 reports three 
insignificant monthly intercept terms and hence three insignificant implied CARs. 
Table A2.6. Overlapping bidding firms (1997-2001) three years pre-acquisition average CARs and 
BHARs 
There are 22 UK overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1997-2001 periods. Table 
A2.6.1 reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. Table A2.6.2 presents the result 
calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnon-nal return 
of all the bidding firins. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. (x 
is the mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean (x multiplying 
by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values 
calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table A2.6.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.0760 0.770 
0.758 
-24 to -1 0.2512 1.942 0.131 
-36 to -1 -0.0052 -0.041 0.615 
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EM BRAR T-Stat P-Value 
-12 to -1 0.1141 0.990 0.527 
-24 to -1 0.3504* 2.266 0.042 
-36 to -1 0.0130 0.073 0.910 
Table A2.6.2 
EM T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
-12 to -1 0.0040 0.588 0.455 0.0480 
-24 to -1 0.0044 0.961 0.363 0.1056 
-36 to -1 -0.0034 -1.224 0.299 -0.1224 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
Figure A2.4 plots the bidding firms three-year pre-acquisition average CARs of the 
whole sample, the non-overlapping sample, and the overlapping sample. All samples 
experience a similar return pattern, that is they all suffer some kind of loss in the third 
year prior to the takeover announcement, and start to gain in two years before the 
announcement. Non-overlapping bidding firms outperform the other two in the three 
years period, and the overlapping returns deflate the average CARs of the whole 
sample. However, most of the CARs shown in Figure 6.4 are statistically insignificant 
different from zero. 
Figure A2.4. Bidding firms (97-01) three-year pre-acquisition 
average CARs of the whole sample, the non-overlapping 
sample, and the overlapping sample. 
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A: all samples, non-overlapping plus overlapping bidding firms. 
N: non-overlapping bidding firms 
0: overlapping bidding firins 
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Appendix 3. Bidding firms (1994-1998) long-run post acquisition stock returns 
Table A3.1 reports all the bidding finns three years post acquisition average ARs and 
CARs. One monthly average ARs and three monthly average CARs are statistically 
significant different from zero in 5% significance level. CARs are negative in the first 
two and half years, and then rise to positive, however, 33 out of 36 CARs are 
statistically insignificant different from zero. 
Table A3.1. Bidding firms (1994-1998) three years post acquisition average ARs and CARs 
There are 99 UK bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1994-1998 periods. AR is the monthly 
average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of all 
the bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0117 -1.187 -0.0117 -1.187 
Month 2 -0.0180 -1.973 -0.0297* -2.452 
Month 3 -0.0168 -1.509 -0.0466* -2.746 
Month 4 0.0096 0.678 -0.0369 -1.706 
Month 5 0.0016 0.146 -0.0354 -1.379 
Month 6 -0.0067 -0.661 -0.0420 -1.414 
Month 7 -0.0233 -1.870 -0.0654 -1.875 
Month 8 -0.0087 -0.726 -0.0741 -1.990 
Month 9 -0.0177 -1.261 -0.0918* -2.159 
Month 10 0.0032 0.314 -0.0886 -1.916 
Month 11 0.0043 0.292 -0.0843 -1.813 
Month 12 0.0138 1.352 -0.0705 -1.476 
Month 13 0.0191 1.463 -0.0515 -1.094 
Month 14 -0.0159 -1.330 -0.0674 -1.306 
Month 15 0.0198 1.821 -0.0476 -0.911 
Month 16 0.0114 0.835 -0.0362 -0.669 
Month 17 -0.0099 -0.661 -0.0461 -0.808 
Month 18 0.0258 1.982 -0.0203 -0.338 
Month 19 -0.0017 -0.137 -0.0219 -0.369 
Month 20 -0.0287* -2.246 -0.0507 -0.824 
Month 21 0.0038 0.239 -0.0468 -0.724 
Month 22 -0.0130 -1.018 -0.0599 -0.953 
Month 23 -0.0122 -0.742 -0.0720 -1.122 
Month 24 0.0143 1.101 -0.0577 -0.914 
Month 25 0.0002 0.020 -0.0575 -0.879 
Month 26 0.0148 1.062 -0.0428 -0.662 
Month 27 0.0154 1.349 -0.0273 -0.411 
Month 28 0.0197 1.546 -0.0077 -0.112 
Month 29 -0.0014 -0.095 -0.0091 -0.130 
Month 30 0.0147 0.928 0.0056 0.078 
Month 31 0.0138 0.867 0.0195 0.271 
Month 32 0.0236 1.548 0.043 0.591 
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Month 33 -0.0198 -1.303 0.0233 0.317 Month 34 0.0119 0.737 0.0351 0.472 
Month 35 0.0268 1.596 0.0619 0.812 
Month 36 -0.0200 -1.048 0.0419 0.525 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
igure A3.1 presents the bidding firms three years post acquisition average CARs. It 
shows that bidding firms experience a negative abnormal returns immediately after the 
completion of the acquisition, and stay negative in two and half years. Bidding firms 
only gain some positive abnormal returns in the second half of the third year after the 
acquisition. However, most of the negative CARs and all the positive CARs are 
statistically insignificant different from zero. 
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Figure A3.1. Bidding firms (94-98) three-year post 
acquisition average CARs 
Event Month I to 36 
Table A3.2.1 reports the bidding firms one-, two- and three-year post acquisition CARs 
and BHARs. Both the one- and two-year CARs and BHARs are negative, while the 
three-year CAR and BHAR are positive. However, All of them are statistica y 
insignificant different from zero at 5% significance level. Table A3.2.2 shows that all 
the one to three years intercept terms are negative and statistically significant. 
This is 
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consistent with previous studies that report significant long-run post acquisition 
ni-I abnormal retums. 
Table A3.2. Bidding flrms (1994-1998) three years post acquisition average CARs and BHARs 
There are 99 UK bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1994-1998 periods. Table A3.2.1 
reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. Table A3.2.2 presents the result 
calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnormal return 
of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. a 
is the mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean Oc multiplying 
by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values 
calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table A3.2.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.0705 -1.476 0.574 
1 to 24 -0.0577 -0.914 0.516 
1 to 36 0.0419 0.525 0.424 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.0702 -1.447 0.503 
1 to 24 -0.0645 -0.931 0.551 
1 to 36 0.1297 1.207 0.164 
Table A3.2.2 
EM a T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0062* -2.049 0.126 -0.0744 
1 to 24 -0.0068* -3.193 0.003 -0.1632 
1 to 36 -0.0058* -3.307 0.003 -0.2088 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided t-test. 
To acknowledge the effect of overlapping returns to the inference of test statistics, we 
once again divide our main sample as non-overlapping and overlapping bidding firms. 
We examine the non-overlapping bidding firrns first. 
Table A3.3 reports the non-overlapping bidding firms three years post acquisition 
average ARs and CARs. 6 out of 36 ARs are significant. All the CARs are negative, 
however, only 4 out of 36 CARs are statistically significant different from zero. 
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Table A3.3. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1994-1998) three years post acquisition average ARs and CARs 
There are 65 UK non-overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1994-1998 periods. AR is the monthly average abnormal return of all the bidding firins. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0127 -1.011 -0.0127 -1.011 Month 2 -0.0240* -2.014 -0.0367* -2.303 Month 3 -0.0331* -2.278 -0-0698* -3.065 Month 4 0.0076 0.384 -0.0622* -2.145 Month 5 -0.0122 -0.867 -0.0744* -2.193 Month 6 0.0010 0.077 -0.0734 -1.876 Month 7 -0.0126 -0.923 -0.0861 -1.957 Month 8 -0.0018 -0.113 -0.0879 -1.870 Month 9 -0.0189 -1.020 -0.1068 -1.999 Month 10 -0.0070 -0.560 -0.1138 -1.934 Month 11 -0.0023 -0.122 -0.1160 -1.924 Month 12 0.0119 0.872 -0.1042 -1.675 Month 13 0.0193 1.117 -0.0849 -1.382 Month 14 -0.0298 -1.988 -0.1147 -1.682 Month 15 0.0380* 2.597 -0.0766 -1.109 Month 16 0.0037 0.224 -0.0729 -1.003 Month 17 -0.0166 -0.802 -0.0895 -1.171 Month 18 0.0256 1.455 -0.0640 -0.785 Month 19 -0.0085 -0.546 -0.0724 -0.899 Month 20 -0.0424* -2.672 -0.1148 -1.421 Month 21 0.0043 0.240 -0.1105 -1.302 Month 22 -0.0139 -0.969 -0.1244 -1.467 Month 23 -0.0143 -0.707 -0.1387 -1.625 Month 24 0.0010 0.063 -0.1377 -1.631 Month 25 -0.0004 -0.026 -0.1381 -1.603 
Month 26 0.0227 1.256 -0.1154 -1.349 
Month 27 0.0133 0.933 -0.1021 -1.155 
Month 28 0.0152 0.881 -0.0869 -0.942 
Month 29 -0.0045 -0.237 -0.0914 -0.989 
Month 30 0.0235 1.249 -0.0679 -0.722 
Month 31 0.0395* 2.176 -0.0284 -0.298 
Month 32 0.0243 1.296 -0.0041 -0.044 
Month 33 -0.0406* -2.047 -0.0447 -0.464 
Month 34 -0.0022 -0.104 -0.0469 -0.490 
Month 35 0.0318 1.371 -0.0151 -0.155 
Month 36 -0.0219 -0.832 -0.0371 -0.364 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
Figure A3.2 presents the non-overlapping bidding firms three years post acquisition 
average CARs. It shows that no monthly average CARs are positive, it means that non- 
overlapping bidding firms suffer a negative abnonnal returns throughout the three years 
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after the completion of the takeover. However, 32 out of 36 CARs are statistically 
insignificant different from zero. 
Figure A3.2. Non-Overlapping Bidding firms (94-98) three 
years post acquisition average CARs 
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Table A3.4.1 reports the non-overlapping bidding firms one-, two- and three-year post 
acquisition average CARs and BHARs. All the three CARs are negative and statistically 
insignificant. However, the t-statistic shows the two years BHAR is significant different 
from zero at 5% significance level. Although the t-statistic is inconsistent with the 
nonparametric P-value, the P-value is also very close to the 5% significance level. Thus, 
the two years BHAR is absolutely significant at 10% significance level, and might also 
be significant at 5%. Table A3.4.2 reports that the two and three years intercept terms 
are negative and statistically significant different from zero. 
Table A3.4. Non-overlapping bidding firms (1994-1998) three years post acquisition average CARs 
and BHARs 
There are 65 UK non-overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1994-1998 periods. 
Table A3.4.1 reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. Table A3.4.2 presents the 
result calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnon-nal 
return of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the 
bidding 
firms. ot is the mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean (x 
multiplying by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding 
P- 
values calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given 
in the table. 
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Table A3.4.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.1042 -1.675 0.271 
1 to 24 -0.1377 -1.631 0.113 
1 to 36 -0-0371 -0.364 0.688 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.1263 -1.910 0.163 
1 to 24 -0.1849* -2.033 0.053 - 1 to 36 0.0297 0.224 0.893 
Table A3.4.2 
EM T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0080 -1.994 0.130 -0.0960 1 to 24 -0.0 104* -3.993 0.000 -0.2496 1 to 36 -0.0091* -4.162 0.000 -0.3276 
* Indicate significant at 5%, two-sided Mest. 
Table A3.5 reports the overlapping bidding firms three years post acquisition average 
ARs and CARs. It clearly shows that all the monthly average ARs and CARs are 
statistically insignificant different from zero at 5% significance level. 
Table A3.5. Overlapping bidding firms (1994-1998) three years post acquisition average ARs and 
CARs 
There are 34 UK overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1994-1998 periods. AR is 
the monthly average abnormal return of all the bidding firms. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal 
return of all the bidding firms. T-statistics of the monthly ARs and CARs are also given in the table. 
EM AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
Month 1 -0.0098 -0.612 -0.0098 -0.612 
Month 2 -0.0067 -0.483 -0.0165 -0.915 
Month 3 0.0143 0.906 -0.0022 -0.100 
Month 4 0.0136 0.775 0.0114 0.397 
Month 5 0.0279 1.879 0.0393 1.152 
Month 6 -0.0213 -1.375 0.0180 0.423 
Month 7 -0.0438 -1.739 -0.0258 -0.451 
Month 8 -0.0219 -1.305 -0.0477 -0.778 
Month 9 -0.0155 -0.742 -0.0632 -0.892 
Month 10 0.0228 1.282 -0.0404 -0.543 
Month 11 0.0168 0.697 -0.0236 -0.332 
Month 12 0.0174 1.203 -0.0062 -0.086 
Month 13 0.0187 0.976 0.0125 0.177 
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Month 14 0.0106 0.547 0.0230 0.314 
Month 15 -0.0151 -1.157 0.0080 0.105 
Month 16 0.0262 1.077 0.0341 0.464 
Month 17 0.0028 0.148 0.0369 0.470 
Month 18 0.0263 1.467 0.0632 0.809 
Month 19 0.0114 0.612 0.0746 0.954 
Month 20 -0.0027 -0.126 0.0719 0.812 
Month 21 0.0029 0.090 0.0748 0.796 
Month 22 -0.0113 -0.443 0.0635 0.772 
Month 23 -0.0080 -0.283 0.0555 0.626 
Month 24 0.0396 1.874 0.0951 1.137 
Month 25 0.0015 0.074 0.0966 1.056 
Month 26 -0.0004 -0.021 0.0962 1.072 
Month 27 0.0195 1.004 0.1156 1.271 
Month 28 0.0281 1.666 0.1437 1.577 
Month 29 0.0045 0.192 0.1482 1.526 
Month 30 -0.0022 -0.074 0.1461 1.369 
Month 31 -0.0352 -1.190 0.1109 1.075 
Month 32 0.0222 0.837 0.1331 1.166 
Month 33 0.0201 0.942 0.1532 1.432 
Month 34 0.0389 1.720 0.1921 1.702 
Month 35 0.0171 0.825 0.2092 1.783 
Month 36 -0.0164 -0.680 0.1928 1.546 
Figure A3.3 presents the return Pattern of overlapping bidding finns in three years after 
the acquisition. The CARs consistently rise after the completion of the acquisition, and 
finally reach 20%. However, all of them are statistically insignificant different from 
zero. 
Figure A3.3. Overlapping bidding firms (94-98) three years 
post acquisition average CARs 
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Table A3.6.1 reports overlapping bidding firms one-, two- and three-year post 
acquisition average CARs and BHARs. According to the t-statistics, all these CARs and 
BHARs are statistically insignificant at 5% significance level; however, the t-statistics 
of three-year CAR and BHAR are inconsistent with the nonparametric P-value. 
According to the P-value, the three-year CAR and BHAR would otherwise significant at 
5% significance level. Table A3.6.2 reports three very small and insignificant intercept 
terms and the implied CARs. Put together, we conclude that the overlapping bidding 
firms earn a normal rate of returns in three years after the acquisition. 
Table A3.6. Overlapping bidding firms (1994-1998) three years post acquisition average CARs and 
BHARs 
There are 34 UK overlapping bidding firms involved in the acquisitions during 1994-1998 periods. Table 
A3.6.1 reports the result calculated by using the control firms approach. Table A3.6.2 presents the result 
calculated by using the Fama-French three-factor model. CAR is the average cumulative abnon-nal return 
of all the bidding firms. BHAR is the average buy-and-hold abnormal return of all the bidding firms. a 
is the mean intercept term of Fama-French three-factor model. Implied CAR is the mean a multiplying 
by 12,24, and 36. T-statistics of the CARs and the BHARs as well as the corresponding P-values 
calculated by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test are given in the table. 
Table A3.6.1 
EM CAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 -0.0062 -0.086 0.427 
1 to 24 0.0951 1.137 0.149 
1 to 36 0.1928 1.546 0.045 
EM BHAR T-Stat P-Value 
1 to 12 0.0371 0.618 0.334 
1 to 24 0.1657 1.812 0.069 
1 to 36 0.3207 1.771 0.017 
Table A3.6.2 
EM T-Stat P-Value Implied 
CAR 
1 to 12 -0.0028 -0.642 0.632 -0.0336 
1 to 24 0.0001 0.035 1.000 0.0024 
1 to 36 0.0005 0.185 0.798 0.0180 
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Figure A3.4 puts Figure A3.1, A3.2 and A3.3 together and compares their long-run 
stock returns. Overlapping bidding firms outperform the whole sample and the non- 
overlapping bidding firms in three years after the acquisition. The overlapping returns 
have inflated the CARs of the whole sample of bidding firms. However, most of the 
CARs shown in Table A3.4 are statistically insignificant different from zero. 
Figure A3.4. Three years post acquisition average CARs of 
All, Non-overlapping and Overlapping bidding firms 1994- 
1998 
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A: all samples, non-overlapping plus overlapping bidding firms. 
N: non-overlapping bidding firms 
0: overlapping bidding firms 
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